RAJ KUMAR MANOHAR LAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER, NORTHERN RAILWAY, BARODA HOUSE, NEW DELHI AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) JUDGEMENT Raj Kumar has filed this revision against the judgment and decree of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad, whereby he set aside, in appeal, the judgment and direction of Sri M. C. Gupta, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.

(2.) THE brief facts giving rise to this revision are as follows: The applicant was employed as a clock-winder in the Moradabad Division of the Northern Railway. He was discharged from service on the 27th of November 1953 by the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad. Thereupon the applicant filed a suit seeking a declaration that his discharge was unlawful and that he continued to be in service throughout. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but was decreed, on appeal on the 13th of November, 1957 in the terms prayed for. When the Railway authorities did not reinstate him the applicant made several representations to them for his reinstatement, and, finally by the order dated the 12th September, 1958 the applicant was allowed the work from the next day. Thereafter on the 4th February, 1959 the applicant moved the application giving rise to this application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter called the Act) alleging that as he was paid lesser wages for the period between the 13th September, 1958, and the 31st January, 1959, and was not paid any wages for the period for which he was held to have been unlawfully discharged, he was entitled to a total sum of Rs. 7952.72 under those two heads from the Railway Administration.

(3.) NOW so far as the first contention is concerned, it is enough to say that whatever force it might have possessed at one time it possesses none after the decision of this Court in Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway Allahabad v. Hukum Chand Jain, AIR 1967 All 459. In this case a Division Bench of this Court, after considering the relevant provisions of the Act and the various authorities bearing upon it, held that the propriety of an order admitting an application after the prescribed period of six months can be challenged in appeal against the direction made under Section 15(3) of the Act. As I am in respectful agreement with this view, the first contention advanced on behalf of the applicant fails and is dismissed.