RAM DAS Vs. STATE OF UP AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS special appeal directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing the Appellant's petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution has its roots in proceedings under the UP Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act.

(2.) THE Appellant did not file any objection Under Section 9 of the said Act. Subsequent to the receipt of notice Under Section 10 of the Act the Appellant preferred an objection on 3 -3 -1962. The village was notified under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act on 16 -3 -1963. The Appellant objected to the notice issued Under Section 10 on the ground that he did not actually own the area shown in the notice as his holding. It appears that the proceedings under the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act dragged on for some time because of the two remands made by the appellate authority one after the other. The decision of the prescribed authority after the second remand was given on 4 -7 -1964. Aggrieved by this decision the Appellant went in appeal as provided under the said Act. Before the appellate authority the Appellant wanted to file the decisions of the consolidation authorities dated 27 -12 -1963, 28 -12 -1963, 2 -1 -1964 and 8 -1 -1964 which had the effect of reducing the area of the holding of the Appellant from what was indicated in the notice issued Under Section 10 or held to be the area of his holding by the prescribed authority by its decision dated 4 -7 -1964. The appellate authority refused to receive these documents at that stage. The reason given by the appellate authority in its own words for that refusal is:

(3.) THE other contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is that the appellate authority acted wrongfully in not accepting the decisions of the consolidation authorities referred to above and produced before it. This contention too did not find favour with the learned single Judge for the reason that by virtue of Section 38 of the Ceiling Act, Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure applied to the acceptance or otherwise of the additional evidence tendered by the Appellant before the appellate authority and there existed no case for accepting that additional evidence which had factually come into existence prior to the decision of the prescribed Authority on 4 -7 -1964. Here again we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. Having regard to the mandatory language of Section 5(b)(ii) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act reproduced above, there was probably no scope for the appellate authority to refuse to look into the decisions of the consolidation authorities when produced before it by one of the parties before the appellate authority. According to Section 5(b)(ii), the authority before whom the proceeding is pending has to accept the decisions given by the consolidation authorities and is to dispose of the proceeding before it in accordance with those decisions on the communication of the same by the parties. The word used in Section 5(b)(ii) is "communication." This word "communication" cannot possibly be equated with the tendering of additional evidence which of course, if tendered, has got to be done in conformity with the requirements of Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure the provisions of which no doubt apply to the proceeding under the Ceiling Act by virtue of Section 38 of the Ceiling Act. Even if for the sake of argument we accept the suggestion raised on behalf of the other side that notwithstanding the language of Section 5(b)(ii) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act the communication referred to therein has to be made in accordance with the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can be said that having regard to the relevant provisions of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act the appellate authority should have accepted those documents Under Clause (c) of Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the said Clause (c) the appellate Court may receive additional evidence at the appellate stage if it requires the same to enable it to pronounce judgment or "for any other substantial cause". Having regard to the language of Section 5(b)(ii) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act there is no escape from the conclusion even if Order 41, Rule 27 be held to be applicable that there was a good case within the meaning of the words "substantial cause" occurring in Clause (c) of Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure for accepting the additional evidence consisting of the decisions of the consolidation authorities and tendered by one of the parties to the dispute before the appellate authority. We are accordingly of the view that the appellate authority committed a manifest error of law in refusing to take the decisions of the consolidation authorities into consideration in order to dispose of the appeal which it was bound to do in view of the provision contained in Section 5(b)(ii) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act.