STATE Vs. RANGU LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal on behalf of the State against an order of adiuittal. The respondent was prosecuted for breach of Sec. 7 (1) (a) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. 111 of 1947) on the ground that he was the landlord of an accommodation which had fallen vacant but had failed to notify the vacancy to the District Magistrate. Before the learned Magistrate who was trying him the respondent pleaded guilty. He was therefore convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500.00. He went up in appeal to the Sessions Judge and contended that his conviction was unjustified because no form of notice having been prescribed under Sec. 7 (1) (c) of the Act it was not possible for him to comply with the provisions of clause (1) (a) of the section. This contention found favour with the learned Sessions Judge. He therefore allowed his appeal and acquitted the respondent. The plea raised by the District Government Counsel that the appellant having pleaded guilty in the trial Court could not question the correctness of his conviction and could appeal only in respect of the sentence was rejected.

(2.) The State has now come up in appeal against the order of acquittal and it is contended on its behalf that the ground on which the learned Judge acquitted the respondent was really untenable in law. Sec. 7, Sub-Sec. (I), of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 provides as follows:-

(3.) The learned Sessions Judge appears to have been of the view that the notice referred to in Sec. 7 (1) (a) of the Act was to be in a prescribed form. The particulars which were to be entered in were to be prescribed under clause (c) of the sub-section and as no rule or order had been issued by the District Magistrate under clause (a) prescribing the particulars that were to be mentioned in the notice it was not possible to comply with the provisions of clause (a). The learned Judge apparently had in mind the legal maxim lex non cogit ad impossible according to which the performance of something which is prescribed is to be dispensed with if the performance is idle or impossible. He thought that when no form had been prescribed in respect of the notice that was to be given the respondent could not be expected to send the notice and if he did not send it he could not be held liable for the omission.