LAWS(ALL)-1958-1-4

DWARKA PRASAD Vs. MUNICIPAL BOARD MEERUT

Decided On January 29, 1958
DWARKA PRASAD Appellant
V/S
MUNICIPAL BOARD, MEERUT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a civil revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act brought by a judgment-debtor. The opposite party to this revision had obtained a money decree against the judgment-debtor in 1945. In or about the year 1951 he sought to execute this decree by attachment and sale of a tractor belonging to the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor sought protection from, attachment of the tractor in question under Clause (b) of the Proviso to Section 60 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Small Cause Court refused to give him the protection and held that the tractor was not exempt from attachment. The Small Cause Court also held that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist. It rejected the objection of the judgment-debtor with costs.

(2.) Hence the judgment-debtor has come up by way of civil revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Before we quote Sub-clause (b) of the proviso to Section 60 (1) of the Code we might state that it is admitted that the judgment-debtor was carrying on mechanised farming in a farm of roughly 1,200 bighas. It is also admitted that the principal source of livelihood of the judgment-debtor is now agriculture, though in the past the judgment-debtor had income from other sources. There is no reason therefore why he should not be considered an agriculturist. nOW we will quote the relevant part of Section 60 (1) of the Code.

(3.) In support of the contention that mechanised implements of husbandry are not protected by Clause (b) of the Proviso, the case of Shaligram Shriram v. Sheopratap Wallabhdas, AIR 1939 Nag 3 (A), was cited. That was a case where a motor tractor was sought to be attached. It was held that a motor tractor was not an implement of husbandry. In that case, however, it appears that at the time of attachment the motor tractor was not being used for agriculture at all but was being used for driving a flour-mill. In those circumstances, the tractor was clearly not exemptable and, therefore, it was not necessary to consider whether it could be an implement of husbandry. In that view of the matter we think that the expression of opinion that the motor tractor could not be an implement of husbandry was mere obiter.