MUNICIPAL BOARD LUCKNOW Vs. BHAGWAN DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One Bhagwan Das was convicted under Section 7, of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act No. XXXVII of 1954) and sentenced under Si 16 thereof to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- or to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months, the case against him being that he had sold adulterated 'Kali Mirch' to Sri B. C. Dass, Food Inspector, appointed under the said Act.

(2.) Bhagwan Dass appealed to the learned Ses-sions judge who by his order dated 10-8-1956 allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of Bhagwan Dass. The Municipal Board through its Medical Officer of Health and the Administrator who was complainant in the case preferred an application under Section 417(3), Cr. P.C. for special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. This application was made on 17-10-1956. Along with the application were filed copies of the judgments of the learned Magistrate and of the learned Sessions Judge. When this application for leave was taken up before us learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the application was filed beyond the period of limitation of 60 days from the date of the order of acquittal of the Sessions Judge as pre scribed by Section 417 (4) of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure and it was urged that the application should be dismissed on the ground of limitation. It, there- fore, becomes necessary to deal with this question of limitation.

(3.) On behalf of the complainant it is contended that if the time requisite for obtaining ther copies of the judgments of the Courts below is taken into account for computation of the period of limitation the application for leave to appeal is within time. This is accepted that if the time taken in obtaining the said copies is excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the making of the application for leave to appeal then the application would be within limitation. It is necessary to quote Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It runs as follows : "(4) No application under Sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal snail be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal." It is contended on behalf of the opposite party that this period of sixty days is an absolute period and that the benefit or Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not available to the applicant. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act runs as follows : "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was-pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded," The contention firstly is that there are no rules making it necessary for the applicant to file copies of the judgments of the trial Court and of the Sessions Judge and, therefore, the time taken in obtaining such copies is not to be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In regard to this contention it is true that there are no rules prescribing that a copy of the judgment of acquittal should be filed but inasmuch as an applicant cannot be expected to draw up his application without a copy of the judgment of acquittal the time necessary for obtaining such a copy must be considered to be time requisite within the meaning of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. This view is supported by the decision reported in Jijibhoy N. Surly v. T. S. Chettyar Firm, AIR 1928 PC 103. There it was pointed out that the word "requisite" is a strong word and it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word required. It means "properly required." The Privy Council case was a case where it was not necessary on appeal to the appellate side that the memorandum of appeal should have annexed to it certified copies of the decree or order against which the appeal was made or the judgment on which such a decree or order was founded, nonetheless the time taken in obtaining the said copies was excluded. Their Lordships observed : "The decree may be complicated, and it may fee open to draw it up in two different ways, and the practitioner may well want to see its form before attacking it by his memorandum of appeal. As to the judgment, no doubt, when the case does not come from up country, the practitioner will have heard it delivered, but he may not carry all the points of a long judgment in his memory, and as Sir John Edge says, the Legislature may not wish him to hurry to make a decision till he lias well con-eidered it." This view has the support of a decision of our own Court reported in Keshar Sugar Works, Bombav v. R. C. Sharma, AIR 1951 All 122 (FB). In that case although it was not necessary under the rules to file a copy of the decree along with the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council Section 12 was applied and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from was excluded. We are, therefore, of the view that the time necessary for obtaining the copy of the judgment of acquittal was time requisite. Now if Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act applies then that time has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. But it is argued that Section 12(2) applies only in cases of limitations prescribed in Schedule I of the Limitation Act. It is pointed that the period of limitation of 60 days prescribed by Section 417(4), Cr. P. C. is not a period of limitation which is contained in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is also contended that the Criminal Procedure Code is not a special or local law and, therefore, the period of limitation prescribed by Section 417(4) can-toot be deemed to have been prescribed by the First Schedule by the application of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act either.