CH. SHARFUZZAMAN AND OTHERS Vs. INTIZAMUN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution have sought the quashing of the order made by the Special Judge, first grade, Barabanki, directing the Compensation Officer under the U.P. Zaimindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to place at his disposal a sum of Rs. 6,152.00 of taluqa Bhilwal out of the interim compensation payable in respect of the estate which had vested in the State Government under that Act. Previously that estate vested in the petitioners who were the trustees of a trust, the property acquired by the State under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act being the subject of the trust.

(2.) The case came up before the learned Chief Justice and he referred it to a Division Bench for deciding the question whether a revision under Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act did or did not lie after indicating his view that in case a revision did lie it was not proper to entertain this petition.

(3.) The trustees had filed an application under Sec. 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. In those proceedings, the opposite-parties had filed a claim in respect of the arrears of guzara payable to them out of taluqa Bhilwal. It was while those proceedings respecting the claim were pending before the Special Judge that the special Judge made the order in question purporting to act in exercise of the powers accruing to him under Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not applicable in respect of interim compensation, but that is a question which we think we need not go into. The question that we have to decide is whether the order passed by the Special Judge, purporting to be in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 70 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, is an order which could be brought up to this Court and suitable orders in respect of which could be passed by this Court under Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act. The learned Chief Justice, when referring this case to the Division Bench, has taken notice of a number of cases which were cited before him, but it appears that the decision in all those cases turned on the language of Sec. 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act. In most of the cases, the provision that came up for consideration was sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 45 and in other cases it was sub-sec. (2) or (2a) of Sec. 45. None of those cases deal with the scope of Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act which is the provision with which we are at present concerned. Sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 45 is as follows: