RANA SHEO AMBER SINGH Vs. ALLAHABAD BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a judgment-debtors appeal against an order dismissing his objections filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2.) It appears necessary to give a short history of the case which begins as far back as the year 1914. Rana Sheoraj Bakhsh Singh was the proprietor and taluqdar of what was called Khajurgaoa estate in the district of Rae Bareli. He relinquished his rights in favour of Uma Nath Bakhsh Singh or 9-5-1913, and Uma Nath Bakhsh Singh became the proprietor and taluqdar of the estate. On 13-7-1914, Rana Uma Nath Bakhsh Singh executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of the Allahabad Bank Ltd., decree-holder respondent. The mortgage was for a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/-and the mortgage money carried interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum compoundable six monthly. Rana Uma Nath Bakhsh Singh mortgaged 167 villages under this deed. On 23-5-1924, the respondent Bank filed a suit for recovery of the balance of the unpaid mortgage money by sale of the mortgaged property. On 31-1-1925, a preliminary decree for sale for the recovery of Rs. 4,86,863-15-8 was passed. This decree was made final on 16-7-1926, and it directed the sale of the mortgaged property, namely the proprietary rights of Rana Uma Nath Bakhsh Singh in the 67 villages which had been mortgaged,

(3.) The first application for execution was filed by the respondent on 23-9-1926, but the parties entered into a compromise on 15-3-1928 whereby the decree was made payable in certain instalments and the rate of future interest was enhanced. The instalments were not paid and on 20-4-1931, the respondent filed a second application for execution. On 4-2-1932, execution proceedings were transferred to the revenue Court and on 19-4-1932, a second compromise was arrived at between the parties. Fresh instalments were allowed to the judgment-debtor after slightly enhancing the future rate of interest though the past rate was somewhat reduced. Instalments were again not paid and the third application for execution was made on 14-9-1933. The execution proceedings were again transferred to the Collector on 8-1-1934. The U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1934 came into force soon after and the judgment-debtor applied for amendment of the decree under that Act. On 19-10-1936, an order was passed under the above Act permitting payment of the decretal amount in six monthly instalments of Rs. 20,000/- each and the rate of interest was also reduced. Information of the amendment of the decree was sent to the revenue Court on 22-12-1936, and the revenue Court returned the papers back to the civil Court on 12-1-1937. On 16-1-1937, the civil Court ordered that the papers be consigned to the record room. On another application filed by the judgment-debtor an order was passed on 29-4-1938, granting three years' time to the judgment-debtor for the payment of the decretal amount. The amount as usual was not paid and the fourth application for execution was filed on 25-5-1940. The judgment-debtor filed objections to the execution and one of the objections was that the last application for execution was made more than 12 years after the date of the decree and was consequently barred by time. The executing Court dismissed the objections and an appeal was filed before the Chief Court or Avadh by the judgment-debtor which was dismissed on 13-4-1944. Vide Umanath Bakhsh Singh v. Sheo Prasad Gupta, 1944 Oudh WN 247; (AIR 1944 Oudh (257) The Chief Court held that the execution application was not barred by time, as the limitation would commence to run from the date of the amendment of the decree and it was quite immaterial for the purposes of limitation as to what happened prior to the amendment. An application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Avadh Chief Court was filed but it was also dismissed. Vide Umanath Bakhsh Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd., 1945 Oudh WN 51: (AIR 1945 Oudh 285). The decision of the Avadh Chief Court that the application for execution filed on 25-5-1940, was within limitation thus became final and binding on the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant has conceded that this is the position and has not contended that the application for execution dated 25-5-1940, was barred by time.