HYDRO ELECTRIC EMPLOYEES UNION, LUCKNOW AND ANOTHER Vs. U.P.STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, LUCKNOW AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AGGRIEVED by the order dated 30.4.2008, whereby the Presiding Officer, Rampur has rejected application of the petitioners regarding the authority of Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta to represent respondent No. 1 (employer) in various adjudication cases pending thereat, this writ petition has been filed contending that though the petitioners have not given any consent for representation of the respondent No. 1 through a legal practitioner, yet in utter ' violation of provisions of Section 6-I (2)of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as '1947 Act')read with Rule-40 of U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as '1957 Rules') the respondent No. 2 has illegally rejected their objection. It is contended that unless there is a clear con­sent given by the parties before the Tribunal, other party ca?not be represented through a lega? practitioner and in support of the above submission reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Fertilizer Karkhana Mazdoor Union etc. v. P.O. Industrial Tribunal, II, Lucknow and others, 1987 (54) FLR 577 and another single Judge judgment of High Court of Delhi in Hindustan Motors Limited v. Presiding Officer and others, 2004 (100) FLR 31.

(2.) I have considered the above submissions. However,I am not inclined to accept the same. In my view, the writ petition does not deserve any merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine. From the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour " Court, it is evident that on the date when Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta filed his author­ity to represent respondent No. 1 in various adjudication cases, no objection was raised by the authorized representative of the petitioners on those dates. Thus, Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta continued to represent the respondent No. 1 on some further dates thereat. It is only at a later stage, an objection has been raised by the petitioners regarding the authority of Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta on the ground that no consent has been given by the petitioner and that application has been rejected by the respondent No. 2 by the order impugned in this writ petition.

(3.) IN the present case, it is not the ease of the petitioners that on the date when Sri HarshKumar Gupta filed his authority for representing respondenlNo. 1, the petitioners were not aware that he is a lega? practitioner and, therefore, on that date and subseguent thereto, they could not file any objection, but subse-guently they came to know and then filetfobjection. On the other hand, from the argument? advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioners, it appears that from very beginning, the petitioners were aware that Sri Harsh Kumar Gupta was a lega? practitioner, but they did not raise any objection regarding his authority to represent respondent No. 1 when he filed the same and the matter, thereafter, proceeded on certain other dates. It is only at a later date that the said objection has been raised. So far as the leaveof the Court is concerned, when the authori-zation is filed by the lega? practitioner and has been taken on record by the Labour Court or the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, as the case may be, on a par-ticular date without there being any objection by the other side and, thereafter, the matter has proceeded on certain dates, in my view, it is sufficient compliance of Section 6-I (2) of 1947 Act and the leave of the Court concerned can be treated to have been granted impliedly. Subseguently it is not permissible to such party to raise an objection that the other side is represented by a lega? practitioner, though no consent has been given for the said purpose. In Fertilizer Karkhana Mazdoor Union (supra), the Court has upheld this view that consent and leave can be by implication"and not being in writingas would beevident from the following :