SHIV SARAN LAL GUPTA Vs. USHA KIRAN GUPTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AMITAVA Lala, J. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order passed by the concerned Civil Court, Shahjahanpur dated 28th May, 2007, by which the application of the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been rejected and accordingly the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedur?, 1908 (hereinafter in short called as 'cpc') has also been rejected holding it to be barred by time.

(2.) THE point for adjudication before us is about maintainability of the appeal. Learned Counsel appearing for both the contesting parties have arrived at a con sensus that the appeal will be heard on informal papers, which was accordingly done at the stage of admission.

(3.) NOW the remaining question before us is whether the appellate Court will ignore such principle as hypertechnical and proceed with the order impugned in the appeal or not. In discussing so, we have to be forgetful about our mindset regarding the matters in constitutional jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is grounded with natural justice unlike the civil cases, which are grounded on lega? justice, meaning thereby when earlier one proceeds on equity, the later one proceeds on law. Therefore, it is right of a party to take the benefit of such situation against a defaulting party. Such right is inherent in nature. It has been already held in Ratan Singh (supra) that there is no justification for placing a rigid construction on the provisions of the Limitation Act. But the other profile is that in construing statutes of limitation, considerations of hardships are out of place. What is needed is a libera? and broad-based construction and not a rigid or narrow interpretation of the provisions of the Limitation Act. According to us, whether the Limitation Act will be liberally construed or not, that is depending upon the consideration of the appropriate Court not of this Court, whose jurisdiction itself is in question. If the Court passes an order ignoring such jurisdiction, it may lead to irregularity even to nullity. Therefore, we should refrain ourselves from making any comment with regard to merit of condoning the delay. We feel that subsequent judgment is mor? attractive than the earlier one not only because it has been delivered at a later point of time but also for the reason that it is arising out of civil Court's jurisdiction.