LAWS(ALL)-1997-9-125

KRISHNA KUMAR KARTA OF H U F HEIRS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF BISHAMBHAR NATH AGARWAL Vs. KISHAN CHAND

Decided On September 09, 1997
KRISHNA KUMAR KARTA OF H U F HEIRS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF BISHAMBHAR NATH AGARWAL Appellant
V/S
KISHAN CHAND Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) B. K. Sharma, J. Heard Counsel for the parties.

(2.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 15-4- 1983 passed by Sri C. P. Singh, IVth Additional District Judge, Agra in Original Suit No. 439 of 1975, Kishan Chand and others v. Bishambhar Nath Agrawal and others, whereby he had decreed the suit for specific performance of contract and directed the defendant No. 1-appellant Bishambhar Nath Agrawal to execute sale-deed within a period of 3 months on get ting the amount of sale consideration and rent upto 31-10-1975. He was also directed to obtain requisite permission from the District Magistrate, if necessary. It was further directed that in case Bishambhar Nath Agrawal would not comply with the decree within the period aforesaid the plaintiffs-respondents would be free to get sale-deed executed through court at the cost of Bishambhar Nath Agrawal. It was declared by the decree that after 31-10-1975, the plaintiffs-respondents 1-4 and defendant No. 2 to 6 (present respondent Nos. 5 to 9) were not liable to pay rent or interest to Bishambhar Nath Agrawal, defendant No. 1-appellant.

(3.) HE (the appellant) further claimed that time was essence of the contract and since the contesting respondents failed to perform the terms of the compromise, they lost their rights to seek specific per formance. It was also claimed in the alter native that mere offer of the payment of the amount was not enough, that the con testing respondents were under the obligation to actually pay the amounts to him within the stipulated time in the man ner provided under the compromise at Gwalior before seeking execution of reconveyance deed. It was further claimed by the appellant, that since the amount had not been paid to him under the terms of the compromise, he was under no obligation to seek any permission for transfer of the property under the Tem porary Ceiling Act. HE claimed that it was the contesting respondents who com mitted the breach of the contract. HE also claimed that the suit was barred by time. HE also claimed that the suit of the con testing respondents was barred by Section 47,c. P. C.