BHULLAN SINGH Vs. DY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Present Special Appeal arises out of dismissal of Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1986 vide judgment and order dated January 24, 1992 passed by a learned single Judge, which is excerpted below :

(2.) Sri N.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that although the appointment of the appellants purported to have been made in temporary capacity, but that by itself did not give the Appointing Authority a carte blanche to terminate the services of the petitioners-appellants in an arbitrary manner while retaining the juniors in service. It was also urged that the ostensible ground "services are not required" as incorporated in the order dated April 26, 1986 impugned in the writ petition, was a mere cloak to lend justification to the termination of appellant's services which was otherwise arbitrary. The learned counsel invited our attention to the counter affidavit filed by Prem Nath Upadhyaya, Senior Clerk in the office of the Regional Dy. Director of Education, wherein it has been mentioned that the appellants were placed in the waiting-list and after the list of duly selected candidates had exhausted itself, the Regional Dy. Director appointed the appellants by sidelining the claims of those who were placed higher in the waiting list and if this was the ground of termination, it would tantamount to cancellation of appointments which ought not to have been done except after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellants.

(3.) The law on the point is fairly well settled. In Champak Lal Chaman Lal Shah v. Union of India (1964-I-LL J-752), the Supreme Court was considering the validity of an order of termination of a temporary Government servant In terms of rule which invested the Government with the power to terminate the services of a temporary Government servant by giving him one month's notice or on payment of one month's pay in lieu of notice. The rule was inveighed against on the ground that it attracted frown of Article 16 of the Constitution and in the alternative it was also urged that even if the Rule was posited to be good, the order dispensing with the services of the concerned Government servant, was bad being discriminatory. WANCHOO, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court repelled the alternative argument in these words :