LAWS(ALL)-1997-3-201

RAM SINGH RAWAT Vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE

Decided On March 03, 1997
Ram Singh Rawat Appellant
V/S
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution a tenant challenges the appellate order recorded against him under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short, the Act). The appellate order was recorded on 16.6.88 by the Addl. District Judge, Dehradun, in R.C. Appeal No. 112 of 1986. The appeal was preferred against an order of the prescribed authority passed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on 4.9.1986 in P.A. Case No. 116 of 1984.

(2.) ADMITTEDLY , the present petitioner had been a tenant in the premises in question in Dehradun. Initially, he was a tenant under Sri C.L. Gupta. The present respondent No. 2, Savita Saran, is a daughter of Sri C.L. Gupta. The father made a gift of the suit property to the daughter, Savita Saran, by the gift deed dated 7.5.1984. The daughter thereafter filed the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the ground of bona fide personal necessity of herself and her family and desired that the tenant (present petitioner) be evicted from the premises. The Prescribed Authority rejected the prayer on the ground of absence of bona fide requirement, as also on a finding that the comparative hardship of the tenant was more than that of the landlord. On appeal, however, the Addl. District Judge set aside the aforesaid findings and allowed the application and directed eviction. On presentation of the writ petition, the order of eviction was stayed.

(3.) AS regards an interpretation of the word purchase the learned Counsel for the respondent relied on the text on Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell. He argued that if by the use of a clear and unequivocal word capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, however harsh or absurd or contrary to the common sense the result may be. This observation of the learned author finds place at page 20 of Maxwell's book, 1976 edition, in Chapter 1. The learned Counsel for the respondent further relied on a text on Interpretation of Statutes by Sri Jagdish Swarup. He referred to page 153 of the book, 1989 edition. Wherein the learned author had opined that the cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is that words should be read in their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider that in construing the word in the constitution conferring a legislative power, the most liberal construction should be put upon the word so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. The learned author further opined that if, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible to another meaning the Court may attach the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must attach the ordinary rule of interpretation. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and not to limit the plain words by consideration of policy behind the framing of the law.