UDAI SINGH TYAGL Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) D. K. Seth, J. By an order dated 15-4-93 the petitioner was retired compulsorily by means of a punishment imposed upon him pursuant to the disciplinary proceeding on a charge that he has refused to vacate the quarter allotted to him on his transfer to some other place despite verbal instruction and written orders issued to him. The ap peal against the said order was dismissed by the appellate authority on 17-11-93 concur ring with the findings of the disciplinary authority. A revision against the said order was also rejected by an order dated 17-2-94 concurring with the findings of the two authorities below. These three orders have been challenged by means of this writ peti tion.

(2.) MR. Vivek Shandilya, learned coun sel for the petitioner assailed the said order on the ground that the order is bad since the same has been passed without complying with the provisions of Rule 153 of Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. Inasmuch as the punishment of the compulsory retire ment is major punishment under Rule 158. 2 (c) of Chapter 12 of the said Rule. Inasmuch as no notice of the enquiry was given to him neither he was allowed to par ticipate in the enquiry nor any opportunity was given to him at all. He further contends that,. unless the conditions contained in Rules 84 and 85 are fulfilled none can be retired compulsorily. So far as the charge on which the petitioner has been retired com pulsorily does not come within the ambit of Rule 120 (3) of the said Rules in case the petitioner has refused to vacate the quarter the same could be recovered under the provision of the said Rule. There cannot be any scope for holding any enquiry on the basis of the said findings when a specific provision is provided for the recovery of the quarter on the ground that petitioner did not vacate the quarter. He contended last that the findings are otherwise perverse and, therefore, the order should be quashed and the writ petition should be allowed.

(3.) ADMITTEDLY the finding by the dis ciplinary authority was concurred both by revisional and appellate authority render ing the character of a concurrent finding of fact which this Court is slow to interfere in writ jurisdiction unless it is shown that the finding was perverse. Nothing has been shown to this Court to indicate that there is any perversity in the orders contained in Annexures-5, 6-B and 7-B respectively being impugned orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority and revisional authority. I have perused all the three orders and have found that each of the authorities had applied their mind to the case and had considered the facts and cir cumstances of the case on the basis of the materials placed before them and have ar rived at a concurrent finding. The counsel for the petitioner has also taken a point that the punishment is disproportionate. It is found from the revisional order that the petitioner was punished twice earlier once in 1972 and again in 1973. After having taken into the consideration all extenuous circumstances the authorities had come to the finding that the misconduct, for which the petitioner was charged, would have serious consequence on the discipline in force. Therefore, it was of the view that the order of dismissal or removal was ap propriate. But taking a lenient view only the punishment of compulsory retirement has been awarded. Thus it does not appear that the punishment is disproportionate.