RAM KUMAR GUPTA Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) D. K. Seth, J. The petitioner was charged with the allegation of rape upon one Smt. Khema Devi who was taken to custody in the Police Station by the petitioner and others who were constables posted therein. Criminal case out of the said allegation ended on the submission of final report. In the disciplinary proceed ings proceeded against the petitioner, the charges were not proved, accordingly, the petitioner was exonerated. Subsequently, in exercise of para 511 of the police regula tion, the Inspector General of Police had passed an order directing taking of fresh evidence and reassessment of such evidence and giving of a fresh enquiry report. Pursuant to the said order, fresh enquiry was held and the petitioner was found guilty. On the basis whereof a punishment of reduction of pay was passed. Subsequently, a notice for enhan cement of punishment was issued and pur suant thereto petitioner's services were terminated and he was dismissed from ser vice. Against the said order an appeal was preferred. The appeal having been dis missed, the petitioner preferred a dispute before the U. P. Public Service Tribunal being case No. 357/v/hm/1983 ). The said claim petition was dismissed by an order dated 8-9-89. It is this order which has since been challenged by means of this writ petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri B. P. Srivastava contends that paragraph 511 of the police regula tion provides for a period of limitation of six months. In the present case, the initial order was passed by the Superintendent of Police on 24-3-76 whereas the order passed under para 511 of the police regula tion was on 21-4-77. According to him after expiry of the period of six months from 24-3-76, the Inspector General of Police cease to have any power to call for the records and pass the order dated 21-4-77. Therefore, the entire process of en quiry and the punishment are vitiated be cause of the absence of jurisdiction on the Inspector General of Police to reopen the case. According to him, on expiry of the six months from 24-3-76, right has been ac crued to the petitioner and the same can not be taken away except in accordance with law. When the law does not empower the Inspector General of Police to exercise such power beyond six months. Therefore, the enquiry is void and ab initio. He con tends further that even on merit, the case could not be said to have been proved on the basis of the materials placed. The learned Tribunal had proceeded in biased and arbitrary manner and not considered the material placed before it.

(2.) SHRI Sabajit Yadav, learned Stand ing Counsel, on the other hand contends that the expression used in para 511 that the Inspector General of Police shall not "ordinarily" call for the records after six months. The expression used 'ordinarily' implies that the limitation of six months was not obsolete though it was a guide to use the power within six months out in deserving cases, it can be exercised there after. He further contends that 21-4-77 was the date on which the order dated 21-4-77 was passed since this point was not taken in the claim petition, therefore, it was possible for them to produce any record to show that the order dated 21-4-77 might have been passed after the records were called long before may be within six months. Since this point was not specifically taken, the petitioner cannot urge the same before this Court or in the Tribunal that without affording proper op portunity to the respondent. He contends further that even on merit, it appears that there is no pervisity and by reason of order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority had assumed the character of concurrence finding of fact by reason of the seal of the tribunal. This court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can not interfere with the finding of facts un less it is shown to be perverse.

(3.) THE rules of interpretation avoids rejection of words. As it is not permissible to add words or fill in a gap or lacuna, similarly effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used. "it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have ap propriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute " (Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1957 SC 369 ). In the interpretation of statute the Court's al ways presume the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect" (J. K. Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of UP. , AIR 1961 SC 1170 ). "the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain (Quebec Railway, Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Vandry, AIR 120 PC 181 ). THE words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed ac cording to their grammatical meaning, un less that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the con trary (State of U. P. v. Vtjay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 ). THE true way is to take the words as the legislature has given them and to take the meaning that the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of the words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered (Crossford v. Spooner, 1846 (4) MIA 179 (PC ). If the language has a natural mean ing we cannot depart from the meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so (Attorney General v. Milne, (1914-15) AUER Rep 1061 (HL)), THEre is a presumption that words are used in a statute correctly and exactly and not losely and inexactly (Prithipal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC1413 ).