KESARI LAL Vs. III ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE MEERUT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.

(2.) THE property in dispute is a portion of the house situated on the first floor numbering 113, Maida Moballa, Lal Kurti Bazar, Meerut Cantt. THE petitioner is a tenant of the said accommodation. Respondent no. 2, Smt. Prakashwati, is the landlady of the premises. It has been stated in the petition that the petitioner is a tenant of the accommodation since 1959. In the year 1975 an application was made under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act by the land-lady on the ground of bonafide need. This application was numbered as Case No. 5 of 1975. THE Prescribed Authority rejected the application. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority an appeal was filed. THE appellate court dismissed it on 25th May, 1977. Against the order dated 25th of May, 1977, writ petition no. 1498-A of 1977 was filed in this Court. This Court by an order dated 4th of October, 1979, affirmed the two orders, passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority. THE applications consequently for release stood dismissed.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has raised three contentions before me. His first contention is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the need of the land-lady for the accommodation in dispute was bonafide and genuine, is a finding erroneous in law. The second contention is that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that greater hardship would be caused to the land-lady in case the release application is rejected is a finding based on irrelevant considerations and the third contention of the learned counsel is that the lower appellate Court has wrongly applied the Explanation to section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any illegality in the finding recorded by the lower court in regard to the bonafide need of the land-lady. He placed before me various affidavits filed by the parties before the Prescribed Authority. On going through the various affidavits I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has rightly recorded the finding that the need of the land-lady was a bonafide one. It has been found that the land-lady is living with her relations at Modi Nagar. It has, further, been found that the husband of the land-lady has got possession over shop no. 114 which is situated on the ground- floor of the disputed premises and that her husband has to come to the shop no. 114 at Meerut every day from Modi Nagar causing inconvenience and expenditure to the land-lady. On these facts it cannot possibly be said that the land-lady does not require the accommodation and that her need is not bonafide or genuine. In the circumstances, the first contention, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion does not have any substance. In regard to the second contention, the lower appellate Court has recorded a finding that the land-lady has no alternative accommodation whatsoever where she can live with her husband and as stated above she is living with some relations at Modi Nagar. It has been further found that the son of the tenant, Mahendra Pal Gupta, has acquired two accommodations, one is a portion of house no. 81 Maida Mohalla, Lalkurti Bazar, Meerut Cantt. It has been further found that Mahendra Pal Gupta, the son of the tenant, has further acquired a residential accommodation from Avas Evam Vikash Parishad. Since there are two alternative accommodations available with the tenant and no alternative accommodation is available with the land-lady, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the learned appellate Court that greater hardship would be caused to the land-lady in case the release application in not allowed, cannot be said to have been based on irrelevant considerations, in view of the above, in my opinion the second contention raised by the learned counsel also does not have substance.