(1.) THIS is a typical case where the investigating officer, for reasons best known to him, has gone out of his way to implicate the present Appellant in a dacoity although he was not named and although he happened to be a resident of about half a mile distant from the scene of dacoity. It is also a case where the Sessions Judge has betrayed lack of judicial approach and inspite of the fact that evidence was given before him about this distance, he shut his eyes both to this evidence as well as to the admission made in cross -examination by an eye -witess -Chandra Bali P.W. 3 regarding the distance, and convicted this accused. With these observations, I would b riefly discuss the facts of this case.
(2.) IT is alleged that a dacoity was committed at the house of Bansraj in between the night of 20th and 21st June, 1972. There were a lot of dacoits. Torches were flashed by the dacoits as well as the witnesses. The dacoits had looted the property and had inflicted injuries upon Bansraj and Smt. Sughra. After the departure of the dacoits, who had taken with them a lot of property, Bansraj lodged F.I.R. at police station Chhapia on the next date at about 10 -15 a.m. Investigation was taken up by Kedar Nath, Station Officer Chhapia. He is said to have found the complicity of this accused on 23rd of June, 1972, and is said to have arrested this accused on 3rd of December, 1972. The accused, as is normally done in dacoity cases, being not named in the F.I.R. was made bapurdah and was admitted in the District Jail, Gonda. He was put up for test identification on 2nd January, 1973, and having been identified by Bansraj, Ram Baran and Chandra Bali, he was charge -sheeted and was asked to stand his trial under Section 395 IPC.
(3.) AS noted above, it is shocking that the investigating officer, who must be knowing the distance between the village of the accused and the scene of dacoity, went out of his way for reasons best known to him to implicate this accused in this dacoity although he was not named in the F.I.R., nor was he named by the witnesses during course of investigation. In this socialistic State if liberty of a citizen of this country is jeopardised by such unscrupulous vindictive investigating officers, the less said the better. It is equally surprising that the learned Sessions Judge ignored the distance on flimsy grounds and did not take into consideration the replies given by P.W. 3 in cross -examination which clearly went to show that the distance between the scene of occurrence and the village of the accused was very much less than a mile. It was the duty of the Sessions Judge to have himself measured the distance on the standard map. He failed in that duty and when the accused examined a Librarian of the same court to prove the measurement on a map kept in the library of the same Sessions Judge, the learned Sessions Judge betrayed lack of judicial equilibrium by stating as if the statement of the Librarian having no personal knowledge about the measurement done by him, could not be accepted. He forgot that the map prepared by the department becomes admissible in evidence. Measurement of such a map under the circumstances had to be admissible. It appears to me sheer bad luck of the Appellant that he had to contend with a vindictive investigating officer and an ignorant Sessions Judge who brushed aside positive evidence and accepted identification of those witnesses who must be knowing the accused in as much as they resided at a distance of less than a mile from the place where the accused resided. It is high time that the State thought of awarding compensation in such cases to a poor innocent villager who becomes victim of the whims and vindictiveness of such an investigating officer. The law of malicious prosecution prevailing in this country cannot come to the help of the Appellant for the simple reason that the investigating officer would t ake shelter behind the fact that as a public servant he was investigating a case. None of the witnesses could be prosecuted because they had not named the Appellant in the dacoity. The fact remains that the Appellant was deprived of his liberty for a considerable length of time. It is equally a fact that the members of his family, if there are any, were deprived of his company and we do not know what lot would have be -fallen to those members who had been denied the assistance of the present Appellant.