BHUNESHWAR PRASAD Vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge by which he allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur passed in appeal under S. 16-G (c) of the Intermediate Education Act (U. P. Act II of 1921) hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'..

(2.) THE petition was filed by the Managing Committee, Narendra Deva Higher Secondary School, Jalalpur district Faizabad. According to the petitioner the respondent No. 3 had been serving as the Principal of the Institution but as his conduct was not satisfactory, after taking disciplinary proceedings a resolution was passed for removing him from service. Papers were sent for approval of the District Inspector of Schools, but he did not accord his approval. THE Managing Committee then preferred the appeal. THE appeal was dismissed. A point was raised on behalf of the employee before the learned single Judge that the Managing Committee not being a legal entity had no right to maintain the appeal. It was also contended that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education was a speaking order and could not be challenged as invalid. THE learned single Judge did not accept either of the two contentions. THE learned single Judge further held that Regulation 95 framed under the Act was applicable and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education was not in accordance with that Regulation. Regulation 95 provides: "THE decision of the Regional Appellate Committee shall be in writing. It shall concisely state the points for decision, the decision thereon and the final order."

(3.) IT is urged that Regulation 95 is not attracted because it gives direction for the judgment by the Regional Appellate Committee and the Deputy Director of Education is not the Regional Appellate Committee. By U. P. Act 35 of 1958 S. 16-C was introduced in the Act. Clause (c) of sub-s. (3) of S. 16-G provided for an appeal against the order of the Inspector to the Regional Appellate Committee. The Regional Appellate Committee was to consist of the Regional Deputy Director of Education as President of the Committee and a member of the State Managers' Association and a member of the U. P. Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh. Sub-section (3) of S. 16-G was subsequently amended and substituted by the present section. IT provides now for an appeal not to the committee but to Regional Deputy Director of Education. The learned single Judge held that because of the Regulation being preserved and continued by S. 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, it will be applicable. IT is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even it the Regulations continued, the direction under Regulation 95 is about the decision of the Regional Appellate Committee and not by the Regional Deputy Director of Education even though he be an appellate authority. We need not in the present case go to decide this controversy, because in our opinion the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Education is by no standard a speaking order. Regulation 95 contains nothing else than the ingredients of a speaking order. Every speaking order has to state the points for decision, and the decision thereon. The purpose of a speaking order is to let a party know why his appeal is being dismissed. In the present case, even though a large number of grounds pertaining to facts, law and the procedure adopted by the Inspector of Schools were raised in appeal, the Deputy Director of Education has, after stating that the appeal had been filed against the order of the District Inspector of Schools disapproving the proposal of the Committee of Management to dismiss B. P. Pandey, Principal, has disposed of the appeal with the following statement:- "I have come to the conclusion that the points raised in the appeal do not have any weight and as such the order of the Distt. Inspector of Schools, Faizabad dated 27-10-1966 is confirmed. The appeal is therefore rejected." He has not mentioned any of the points which had been raised in appeal, nor has he given his decision on any of those points. He has not even mentioned in his order the facts which may have been found by the Inspector of Schools and with which the Director may be in agreement. Even a judgment of affirmance needs to say the points raised, or which arise in the case and that the appellate authority is in agreement with the findings of the authority against whose order the appeal is preferred. The present judgment of the Deputy Director of Education cannot pass the test of being a speaking order even though it is a judgment of affirmance. We, therefore, find no error in the operative judgment of the learned single Judge.