MEERA RANI Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are based on almost identical facts and circumstances. The grounds on which identical reliefs are sought are also the same. They may, therefore, conveniently, be decided by a common judgment. For the planned development of the Ghaziabad area in accordance with the Master Plan the State Government decided to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and to entrust the work of developing areas falling within the municipal limits of Ghaziabad to the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. Ghaziabad was declared to be a regulated area under the U, P. (Regulation of Buildings Operations) Act, 1958, and the improvement Trust, Ghaziabad, was constituted with effect from July 23, 1960. It became generally known in that area that land was to be acquired under the Act and the development of the acquired land falling within the municipal limits of Ghaziabad was to be entrusted inter alia to the Improvement Trust Ghaziabad. A number of representations were received by the State Government from various individuals. Co-operative Societies, Colonizers and others to the effect that the Government or the Improvement Trust should not enter upon an extensive acquisition" of land and may not deprive the private owners of their legimate gains which would accrue to them from the sale of their properties in the area. After considering the matter in detail and taking the diverse view points and factors into account, the State Government came to the conclusion that land falling within the limits of Ghaziabad Municipality may, in the first instance, be acquired under the provisions of the Act and the external development of the entire area and internal development of certain categories, may be entrusted to the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. It was further decided that about forty per cent of the gross land which was likely to be available for plotting after development, may be leased out to the persons from whom land was acquired, by charging from them premium equal to the compensation payable to them for acquisition plus the cost of development. Simultaneously with the first notification under section 4 of the Act issued on August 13, 1962 a broad outline of the policy decided upon by the State Government was forwarded to the Administrator, Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. Under the aforesaid Land Policy certain benefits were conferred on persons whose land was sought to be acquired and who opted for the implementation of the Land Policy. One of the main benefits intended to be conferred under the Land Policy was leasing out of forty per cent of the land out of the total area acquired. Notifications under section 4 of the Act were issued from time to time during the period 1962 to 1968. The case set up by the petitioners is that attracted by the Land Policy formulated by the State Government they purchased land in the area. THESE purchases were made after the notifications under section 4 of the Act. They exercised their option to have the benefits of the Land Policy extended to them within the prescribed period. On being informed of the amount of total compensation payable to them under the Act, they collected the amount of compensation and deposited it with the Improvement Trust. The Improvement Trust thereafter allotted land to the petitioners to the extent of forty per cent of the total land acquired. It was mentioned in the letter of allotment that 20 per cent of the development charges would be payable within one month of the date of the letter and the balance in eight equal half yearly instalments thereafter. The petitioners deposited 20 per cent of the development charges as demanded. It is asserted that the petitioners were delivered possession of the land allotted to them. Some of the petitioners leased out some of the plots allotted to them. They requested the Improvement Trust to execute lease deeds in their favour in respect of the land allotted to them. Thereupon the Improvement Trust took the stand that persons who purchased land after the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act were not entitled to the benefits of the Land Policy and that the Trust would not execute any lease in respect of the forty per cent of the land allotted to them. The petitioners contend that under the Land Policy formulated by the State Government they were entitled to the benefits conferred under it and the refusal to execute the leases in their favour was arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory. It is further contended that as the petitioners altered their position on the representation made by the State Government as contained in the Land Policy, the State Government was bound to execute leases in favour of the petitioners on the principle of equitable estoppel. It is further contended that in implementing the Land Policy discrimination has been practised inasmuch as certain persons who purchased land after the notification under section 4 of the Act have been in fact granted leases in accordance with the Land Policy. This act of the State Government has resulted in hostile discrimination against the petitioners. The petitioners claims a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders of the Improvement Trust refusing to execute lease in favour of the petitioners. A writ, order or direction has also been claimed commanding the respondent to allot plots to the extent of forty per cent of the acquired land of the petitioners and to comply with the assurance given to the petitioners under the Land Policy and execute lease deeds in their favour. The stand taken by the respondents is that the Land Policy formulated by the State Government was only a communication to the Improvement Trust to serve as a guide line and it was not intended as a representations to the public at large or to the owners of the land in the area on which any legal right could be founded. The Land Policy was only in the nature of a concession to the owners of the land sought to be acquired and conferred no rights on the petitioners which could be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is further asserted that under the Land Policy benefit of the grant of lease of the plotted area was to be extended only to those persons who were holding the land at the time of notification under section 4 of the Act and not to those who came in picture "subsequently and acquired interest in the land notified for acquisition. It is asserted that the State was under no statutory obligation to grant any benefit to the persons whose land was sought to be acquired and consequently no mandamus could issue commanding the respondents to execute leases. Since no representation was made to the petitioners, the plea of equitable estoppel could not be invoked and even if it be assumed that a representation was in fact made, it was in exercise of executive power of the State Government and plea of estoppel was not available to the petitioners against the respondents. It is further asserted that there exists no similarity between those who got the benefit of the Land Policy and the petitioners as they were differently situated and hence there was no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Even if benefit was wrongly given to some, the petitioners cannot claim the same benefit as of right. It is disputed that any act of hostile discrimination has been practised against the petitioners. On facts it was disputed that possession was delivered to the petitioners. It is not in dispute that the Land Policy was formulated by the State Government at a time when it was decided to acquire land in Ghaziabad area with a view to carry out planned development of the area in accordance with the Master Plan prepared by the State. Under the Laud Policy certain benefits were sought to be conferred on the persons whose land was being acquired. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the respondents that the land policy was only to serve as a guide for the Improvement Trust. Under the Land Policy the land holder was required to exercise his option within one month of the date on which possession of his land was taken over by the Trust. He was further required to deposit the entire compensation payable to him under the Act. He was also required to deposit development charges and ultimately on the allotment of land in accordance with the Land Policy certain documents had to be executed. THESE factors clearly indicate that the Land Policy was in absence a representation to the persons affected inviting them to take the benefit Conferred under it. In support of the plea that the petitioners acquired a legally enforceable right under the Land Policy it was contended that the State was not in a position to carry out the scheme of planned development of the area on its own and with a view to enlist assistance and cooperation it conferred certain rights on the land owners on the condition that they deposited the entire amount of compensation received for the total area of their acquired land and pay development charges etc. The land owners had to forego their right to claim compensation for the land at the market rate and be satisfied with only leasehold rights in respect of only forty per cent of their total land acquired. The stand taken by the respondents, on the other hand, is that on completion of acquisition proceedings the entire land would have vested in the State resulting in total extinguishment of the rights of the land owners. It was merely by way of concession that the State decided to confer certain benefits on them to which they were not entitled under the law. The mere fact that the land owners were to deposit the compensation received under the Act and to pay certain development charges would not change the nature of the transaction or create any enforceable right in favour of the land owners. It is not necessary to resolve the conflicting stand taken by the parties on this aspect of the case as, in our opinion the petitioners do not constitute the class which could claim any legally enforceable right under the Land Policy. As noted earlier, the Land Policy was formulated at the inception of the Scheme for planned development of the area after considering various representations on the subject. It was made public at the time when the first notification under section 4 of the Act was issued in August 1962. The stand taken by the respondents that under the Land Policy it was contemplated that the benefit of the grant of lease of the plotted area was to be extended only, to those persons who were holding the land at the time of the issue of the notification under section 4 is borne out by the language of the Land Policy statement. The recital in the Note that it had been decided to lease out the plotted area to the persons from whom the land was acquired by charging premium equal to the compensation payable for acquisition plus cost of development clearly indicates that the owners of the land at the time of initiation of acquisition proceedings were under contemplation for being conferred the benefits or rights under the Land Policy. The further recital that 'former land owners' will be given preference in the allotment of developed plots if they need such allotment for construction of houess for themselves is also indicative of the class of persons who were sought to be benefited. The guiding consideration under the Land Policy was to enable the owners of the Land to derive benefits under the planned development scheme and to compensate them to some extent the benefits that they may have derived if the land had not been acquired and they were free to seal their land at their option. To allow the subsequent purchasers of the land to claim same rights and benefits would have given impetus to large financiers and speculators, a situation that the Land Policy intended to avoid. We are impressed by the argument that so long the owners of the land were not vested of the right in the land, which occurs simultaneously with the vesting of the land in the State under the provisions of the Act, the transferees after the notification under section 4 of the Act fulfil the qualification of being the original owners of the land. The object before the policy makers was to formulate a scheme which may be to some extent enable the owners of the land to derive advantages of the scheme of planned development in the area and only those persons could have been in contemplation who were owners of the land when the scheme was finalised. Future owners of the land could not have been in contemplation when the policy was decided upon as the petitioners were not the owners of the land on the date when the acquisition proceedings were initiated, they are not entitled to any rights under the Land Policy. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Land Policy, as originally framed was meant to apply to all land owners irrespective of the fact where a person was the land owner before issuance of the notification under section 4 or became the land owner after the notification but before the date of vesting. Reliance was placed on the letter of the State Government dated 8/12/1971 (Annexure CA1) addressed to the Administrator, Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. In that letter it is stated that after considering the representations made by the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad, and the public certain decisions specified therein had been taken by the State Government one of such decisions being that the benefit under the Land Policy would not be extended to those who purchased land after the notification under section 4 of the Act. We are not inclined to infer from this letter that this decision was taken for the first time at that stage. It appears more probable as contended by the respondents, that certain doubts had arisen in the minds of person entrusted with the implementation of the Land Policy regarding the class of persons to whom benefits under the Land Policy was meant to be extended and this letter was only by way of clarification, although the language employed was that a decision had been taken by the State Government. As observed earlier, the Land Policy as originally formulated was meant to extend certain benefits to the original land owners i.e. those who owned land in the area sought to be acquired before the notification under section 4 of the Act. We are also inclined to agree with the contention of the respondents that the Land Policy could not be attributed to any statutory obligation under the Act which is not concerned with any policy being evolved with the development of the acquired land but its operation is confined to acquisition of land for public purpose. The land policy was decided upon by the State Government in exercise of its executive powers. It was competent for the State Government to alter the Policy or to decide upon the category of persons to whom it was applied as and when it considered expedient. The action of the State Government could not be characterised as illegal or beyond jurisdiction. The Land Policy was initiated in exercise of executive power of the State. Even if it be assumed that there was some representation contained in the Land Policy and the petitioners were also in contemplation for the benefits conferred under it, the question arises whether the plea of estoppel against the State is available to the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that acting on the assurance extended in the Land Policy the petitioners purchased land in the area. On the acquisition of the land they were paid compensation for the land owned by them which they deposited with the Improvement Trust and also deposited the development charges demanded by the Trust. In view of these facts and circumstances the respondents were estopped from going back on their assurance and were bound to execute the lease deeds in their favour. Reliance was placed on The Union of India v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies(A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 718). In that case the Supreme Court ruled that granting that the Export Promotion scheme published by the Textile Commissioner was executive in character the Courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the Scheme upon the departmental authorities. It could not be said that the executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. The same view was reiterated in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and another v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and anothers(A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1021). Following the decision in the Anglo Afghan Agencies case (supra) it was held that public holds are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to promise may be enforced ex contracture by a person who acts upon the promise; when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation it' the contract be not in that form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. The principle of equitable estoppel as applicable to the public bodies and the Government in their conduct towards private citizens was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd.( A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1311). Learned counsel for the Improvement Trust brought to our notice certain later decisions of the Supreme Court in which a departure appears to have been made from the dictum laid down in the above noted cases. In Excise Commissioner U. P. v. Ram Kumar(A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2237), after referring to a number of its earlier decisions the Supreme Court ruled that it is now all settled by a catena of decisions that there can be no question of estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its legislative sovereign or executive powers. The Supreme Court referred to the decision in Rama Nathan Pillai v. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2641), wherein quoted with approval the statement of law contained in American jurispruderce 2nd at page 783 paragraph 123 to the effect that as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its Governmental, public or sovereign capacity. Again in The Bihar Eastern Gangestic Fisherman Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others(A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2149), the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could also not be pressed into service as it is well entitled that there cannot be any estoppel against the Government in exercise of its sovereign legislative and executive functions. In this case the decision in Anglo Afghan Agencies case (supra) was distinguished. The declaration of law in these cases to the effect that there can be no estoppel against the Government in exercise of its sovereign legislative or executive power is binding on this Court. The binding effect of these decisions cannot be avoided on the ground that these cases related either to the exercise of sovereign or legislative power of the Government. The principle laid down in these cases covers the exercise of executive powers of the Government also. The plea that the Land Policy is discriminatory and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India is wholly untenable. The Land Policy, as noted eailier, was formulated in exercise of the executive function of the Government. It has no statutory basis. Moreover, it is well settled that Article 14 prohibits class legislation but does not forbid classification. Permissible classification must, however, satisfy two conditions, namely, (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. In permissible classification mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. The classification of land holders in two classes, (1) those who were owners of the land before notification under section 4 of the Act and (2) those who acquired ownership of the land after the notification under section 4 is founded on an intelligible differentia. A person who was the owner of the land prior to the date of initiation of the acquisition proceedings could legitimately be classified as a distinct entity from a person who came in the picture later on. Since the intention was to confer some benefits or right on the persons whose land was likely to be acquired such persons could be treated as a class distinct from those who became owners of the land after the acquisition proceedings had been put in motion. It was open to the Government to chooss the date of notification under section 5 of Act as a relevant date -for classifying the two classes of persons. The classification has also a rational relation to the object sought to achieved. The object behind the Land Policy was, as pointed out above, not be deprive the original land owners of all the benefits that would have accrued to them by the planned development of the area if they were free to sell their land and since as a result of acquisition proceedings they would have been deprived of all those benefits, it was decided to enable them to obtain leases of a part of the land acquired on certain terms. In dealing with this question the object behind the land acquisition proceedings should not be confused with the object under the Land Policy. The object under the Land acquisition proceedings may have been for the land planned development of the area but the object under the Land Policy was to some benefit to the persons whose land was likely to be acquired. Viewed in that light the differentia must be held to have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Land Policy. The contention that in implementing the Land Policy hostile discrimination has been practised against the petitioners also not well founded. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners it has been asserted that certain persons had been given the benefit of Land Policy even though they had purchased that after the notification under section 4 of the Act. In the supplementary counter affidauit of Kaushal Kishore the circumstances in which such persons had been granted leases have been set out in detail. It appears that a very small pieces of land had been jointly purchased by persons mentioned in the supplementary affidavit after it had been notified under section 4 of the Act along with two tracts of land which came to be subsequently notified under section 4. In respect of the entire land so purchased an order of allotment had been made under the Land Policy in favour of these persons and a registered agreement to lease had also been executed by the Trust before the classification regarding the applicability of Land Policy was made by the State Government in its letter dated 8-12-1971. In view of these special circumstances the State Government agreed to the leasing out of the Small tract of land also to those persons. From such an isolated transaction, which was based on special circumstances, it could not be legitimately inferred that a hostile discrimination has been practised against the petitioners. The grant of benefit in an isolated case will not entitle the petitioners to claim a similar benefit. Even if it is assumed that benefit was wrongly given in a case it would not justify similar action in other cases. We are fortified in our view by the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das(A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1547). In our opinion none of the contentions raised by the petitioners has any merit and they are not entitled to the relief claimed. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.