PRAMOD KUMAR TIWARI Vs. BADRI NARAIN PANDEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY means of this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders dated 27-10-1975 and 28-10-1975 passed by respondents Nos. 3 and 2 respectively whereby the lock placed by the petitioner over the accommodation alleged to be in his tenancy was opened and he was deprived of possession.

(2.) THE short facts of the case are that the petitioner had been in occupation of shop No. 35, Bahadurganj, Allahabad since the year 1971. After the enactment of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) the petitioner applied under S. 14 thereof for his possession being regularised. His case was that he had been in possession with the consent of the landlord and, therefore, his possession should be deemed to be in the capacity of a tenant of such accommodation. In the same application the petitioner had also made a prayer for allotment of the accommodation in his favour. THE application was resisted by the landlord respondent No. 1 and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 21-7-1975 gave the benefit of S. 14 to the petitioner. It was expressly found in that order that the accommodation had been let out to the petitioner by respondent No. 1 and that the petitioner's possession over the same had commenced in June 1971 and had continued without interruption. It appears that subsequently the landlord, respondent No. 1, approached the Additional District Magistrate (City) Allahabad with a representation that the said accommodation remained locked for eleven months and was no longer occupied by the petitioner, hence, suitable orders may be passed for breaking open the lock and putting respondent No. 1 in possession thereof. Without any notice to the petitioner and behind (his back the Additional District Magistrate passed the impugned order. Pursuant to that order the City Magistrate, Allahabad (respondent No. 2) broke open the lock of the Shop in dispute on 30-1- 1975 and handed over possession to the landlord, respondent No. 1'.

(3.) IT is commonplace that sometimes in order to give adequate relief to an aggrieved petitioner it becomes imperative that some kind of consequential relief be also granted. This is precisely the reason why in the language of the Supreme Court the High Courts are entitled 'to mould the relief to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements" of a case. The question has, for instance, arisen in those matters where orders relating to the assessment of sales-tax have been challenged. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 the facts were that the assessment of tax under the impugned notification had been held invalid by the High Court. A portion of the tax, however, assessed had already been deposited by the petitioners. Apart from quashing the order by a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus was also issued by the High Court commanding the State of Madhya Pradesh to refund the amount illegally collected. The order directing the refund of tax was upheld by the Supreme Court and Das Gupta, J. observed: (at p. 1011 of AIR) "We see no reason to think that the High Courts have not got this power. If a right has been infringed - whether a fundamental right or a statutory right - and the aggrieved party comes to the Court for enforcement of the right it will not be giving complete relief if the Court merely declares the existence of such right or the fact that that existing right has been infringed. Where there has been only a threat to infringe the right, an order commanding the Government or other statutory authority not to take the action contemplated would be sufficient. IT has been held by this Court that where there has been a threat only and the right has not been actually infringed an application under Art. 226 would lie and the courts would give necessary relief by making an order in the nature of injunction. IT will hardly be reasonable to say that while the court will grant relief by such command in the nature of an order of injunction where the invasion of a right has been merely threatened the court must still refuse, where the right has been actually invaded, to give the consequential relief and content itself with merely a declaration that the right exists and has been invaded or with merely quashing the illegal order made." We are fully satisfied that the case in hand is a fit one for issuing directions to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to restore the status quo ante.