RAJ RANI Vs. YAD RAM AND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RAM Chander was the tenant of the shop in dispute. He died in June 1973 leaving behind as his heirs, three sons, a widow, and three daughters. Subsequently, the landlord filed an application under Section 21 of the Act XIII of 1972 against the three X sons and obtained an order of eviction on June 7, 1975. An appeal filed against this order failed. Thereafter, the widow and the daughters filed a suit alleging that the tenancy rights of RAM Chander had devolved on them also, after his death, and the order under Section 21 of the Rent Act was not binding on them, as they were not parties to it, and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing their possession. An application for a temporary injunction was filed. The learned Munsif dismissed it. An appeal filed against that decision failed. Hence the present revision. Appellate Court has held that inasmuch as the applicant had not filed any receipt or other evidence to show that they had claimed to be tenants after the death of RAM Chander or paid any rent to the landlord or were recognised as such, they cannot be treated as tenants of the shops in dispute. It also held that inasmuch as the sons had paid the rent without any protest on behalf of the applicants, it would give a sufficient basis to the defendants to argue that the applicants had relinquished their tenancy. The default of the brothers to assert in Section 21 proceedings that the plaintiffs were also co-tenants was also taken into account for the conclusion that the applicants were not tenants of the premises in dispute. Considering the balance of convenience, he held that it had not been shown that the plaintiffs had any interest in the business carried on in the shop and had neither shown that they would incur any loss in case they were evicted. The view of the District Judge that the plaintiffs had not become the tenants of the premises appears to be erroneous. Section 3 of the Rent Act defines a tenant thus:- " 'tenant' in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death:- (1) in the case of a residential building such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death. (2) in the case of non-residential building, his heirs;. . . .". This provision makes it abundantly clear that in case of non-residential building as is the present case, all the heirs of the deceased became the tenant of the premises. Thus the mere fact that the applicant did not pay any rent for the premises in dispute or that the rent had been paid by the sons could not deprive the plaintiffs of their status of tenants, as that benefit was conferred by the status itself. As to the consideration that the plaintiffs could not be treated tenants of the premises on account of the fact that the sons had not taken up such a stand in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, that seems to be irrelevant, for default by the sons cannot bind the mother and the sisters when they were not parties. It also does not appear to be correct to hold that the plaintiffs would be bound by the decision in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act on the score that they would be deemed to be represented by the sons of RAM Chander. This view was possibly only in case proceedings under Section 21 of the Act had been instituted during the life time of RAM Chander, and thereafter only some of his heirs had been brought on the record. Once RAM Chander died, all his heirs became the tenants of the disputed premises and the landlord should have impleaded all of them as parties to these proceedings, before he could claim that the order passed under Section 21 was binding on all the tenants. I must hasten to add that the pronouncement on this point may not be taken to be conclusive of the position for the defendants may be able to lead some evidence which is not for the coming at this stage which may be available later, which would give binding efficacy to the order passed under Section 21 proceedings against the plaintiffs. Thus there was a basic error in the approach of the District Judge to the case. As regards the balance of convenience, inasmuch as the business belonged to Rani Chander, who was a Hindu, the plaintiffs who were the widows and daughters of RAM Chander succeeded to the business along with her sons in view of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, as they were all heirs of Class I category, and as they had an equal interest the business devolved on them too. Thus the view of the District Judge that the plaintiffs would not be put to any irreparable loss in case no injunction was granted in their favour for they had failed to establish that they had any interest in the business, is based upon a palpably erroneous view of the law without there, being any evidence to the contrary. The plaintiffs along with the sons succeeded to the business of late RAM Chander. In view of these conclusion. I am constrained to hold that on account of the palpable misconception of the true legal position, both the courts below failed to exercise the jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of law. The revision is accordingly allowed. The injunction prayed for by the application (Paper No. 6-C) is granted. The trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. As none has appeared to oppose this application, parties to bear their own costs.