RAM NARAIN SINGH Vs. DARSHAN AND ANR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition is directed against an order passed by a learned Munsif Under Sec. 89 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act setting aside the judgment and decree of a Nyaya Panchayat in the following circumstances: The Petitioner had filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 126.50 with interest against Darshan, opposite party No. 1, in the Nyaya Panchayat Biparpur in the district of Sultanpur. Darshan appeared and denied the correctness of the claim. The Nyaya Panchayat believed the case set up by the Petitioner which was supported by a pronote signed by Darshan and a witness named Deen Mohammad. Darshan also entered the witness box and denied his signature on the pronote. In the course of its judgment, the Nyaya Panchayat not only commented on the conduct of Darshan but held definitely that money was received by Darshan who affixed his signature showing the receipt of money on the pronote. The Nyaya Panchayat observed that Darshan could make signatures of two kinds. In any case, it believed the Plaintiff's version that the signature on the document in question was that of Darshan. It gave good grounds for believing the Petitioner's case.

(2.) The Petitioner's allegation that Darshan filed a revision application Under Sec. 89 of the Act on 8 -12 -1961 beyond time against the judgment and order of the Nyaya Panchayat dated 30 -7 -1961 admitted by the opposite party, but the opposite party relied upon an affidavit, giving grounds for condonation of delay, said to have been filed before the Munsif who made no reference to it. It was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain an application "beyond 60 days from the date of the order complained of or where personal service of summons had not been affected on the Applicant from the date of the knowledge of the order...." In the instant case, there could be no question of want of personal service as Darshan appeared before the Nyaya Adalat. The jurisdiction to interfere Under Sec. 89 of the Act, however, is not confined to cases in which there is an application invoking it. The Munsif could interfere suo moto also. Nevertheless, it would have been more proper for the learned Munsif to have recorded a finding whether the grounds alleged by Darshan for delay in filing his application Under Sec. 89 of the Act entitled Darshan to a condonation of delay.

(3.) The more important question was whether the learned Munsif could, either on his own motion or on an application made by a party, set aside findings of fact on the grounds given by him and hold that it was a case of "material injustice". It is a condition precedent to an interference Under Sec. 89, in such a case, that it should appear to the Munsif "that injustice or material irregularity has occurred." The Explanation to Sec. 89 lays down: "Failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested by law or exercise of jurisdiction in excess of that vested by law shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to be a material irregularity". As regards the interpretation of this section, it may be conceded that the "ejusdem generis" rule does not apply inasmuch as the word "injustice", which is wider, appears before and not after the words "material irregularity" and "material irregularity" is explained so that its connotation may be fixed and circumscribed. Nevertheless, the broader rule of interpretation, "noscittur a sociis", applies. This means that the meaning of a term must be gathered from the associated words or the context. The learned Munsif, therefore, correctly used the term "material injustice" to convey the kind of injustice which was required, but misunderstood its implications as applied to the facts of the case as stated by him.