RAM GHULAM Vs. DALLOO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this appeal by the plaintiff the point for consideration is whether the suit was barred by limitation. The two courts below have dismissed the suit holding that it had been filed beyond the period prescribed under Art 99 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

(2.) THE material facts about which there is no controversy now are that there was a joint decree for money against the appellant and respondent No. 1 in execution of which some property belonging to the appellant was sold; that on 28-1-1954 the appellant filed an application under order XXI, Rule 89, C. P. C. and deposited Rs. 1751.00; that the sale was set aside by the executing court by an order dated 6-2- 1954; that the appellant would be entitled to a decree for Rupees 1439.00 by way of contribution from respondent No. 1 if the suit is not barred by limitation and the decision of the courts below dismissing the suit as barred by limitation is wrong. The courts below have held that the starting point of limitation under Article 99 of the Limitation Act would be the date of deposit made by the appellant in court on 28-1-54 and that the suit which was filed on 4-2-57 was, therefore, barred by limitation.

(3.) ARTICLE 99 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: Description of the suit Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. For contribution by a party who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount due under a joint decree, or by a sharer in a joint estate who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount of revenue due from himself and his co-sharers. Three years. The date of the payment in excess of the plaintiff's own share. The cause of action for a suit for contribution accrues to a person "who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount due under a joint decree". This right to contribution arises, because of a joint decree, the liability for the discharge of which lies on all the judgment-debtors, has been satisfied by one Judgment-debtor alone and he has paid no only his proportionate share of the decretal sum, but also the shares which his co-judgment-debtors were liable to pay and ought to have paid. Therefore, to my mind it is upon the full or even partial satisfaction of the joint decree on payment by one of the judgment-debtors that the law gives a right to the judgment-debtor concerned to recover the excess amount paid by him by a suit for contribution if his co-judgment-debtors do not voluntarily reimburse him. In considering the question of the applicability of Article 99 of the Limitation Act, therefore, it will be essential to consider as to when the joint decree itself has been so satisfied on payment by one judgment-debtor who claims contribution,