LAWS(ALL)-1967-3-18

DEBI DIN Vs. DIVISIONAL OPERATING SUPERINTENDENT NORTHERN RLY

Decided On March 29, 1967
DEBI DIN Appellant
V/S
DIVISIONAL OPERATING SUPERINTENDENT, NORTHERN RLY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the date certain charges were served on the petitioner he held the post of a cabinman. The charges were served by opposite party No. 2 the Assistant Operating Superintendent, Northern Railway Moradabad. A copy of the charges is Annexure 2. The petitioner submitted his explanation a copy of which is Annexure 3. Thereafter opposite party No. 2 passed the order of punishment which is Annexure 4. In this order he mentions the counts for which the punishment is imposed but gives no reasons for not accepting the explanation of the petitioner and finding the two charges mentioned in the order proved. The petitioner then preferred an appeal. A copy of the memorandum of appeal is Annexure 5. It came to be rejected by opposite party No. 1 the Divisional Operating Superintendent, Northern Railway, Moradabad by an order which is Annexure 6. It reads as below:

(2.) THE petition is opposed by the opposite parties.

(3.) IT is admitted on all hands that the punishment which has been imposed on the petitioner in the instant case is a minor punishment being one of those provided in Clauses (i) to (iii) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1707 of the said Code. It is also not in dispute that the procedure prescribed in Rule 1716 of the Code is to be followed in the matter of imposition of a minor punishment specified in Clauses (1) to (iii) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1707. Clause (e) of Sub-rule 1716 provides that the record of proceedings in a case in which a minor punishment is proposed to be imposed is to include the orders on the case together with the reasons therefor. The order of punishment imposed by opposite party No. 2, as already mentioned, though mentions the counts on the basis of which punishment has been imposed omits to mention the reasons for the conclusions which is reached, namely, that the charges referred to in the order stand proved as against the explanation of the petitioner contending for the contrary. Thus it was one of the grounds in the memorandum of appeal that the order of punishment passed by opposite party No. 2 stood vitiated because of his failure to mention the reasons as required by Rule 1716. Admittedly Rule 1731 of the Code provides for the procedure to be followed in the disposal of appeals. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1731 provides for the procedure to be followed in case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 1707. It says that in case of such an appeal "the appellate authority" shall consider: (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (b) Whether the findings are justified; and (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after consultation with the Commission, if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass orders, (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case; Provided that............ (It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to reproduce the proviso)." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that opposite party No. 1 the appellate authority in the instant case failed to comply with the requirements of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1731 in so far as it disposed of the appeal by an order consisting of four words, "The appeal is rejected". The argument is that the very requirement in Sub-rule (2) reproduced above on the part of the appellate authority to consider the various matters enumerated in Clauses (a) (b) and (c) thereof indicates that the appellate authority has to pass an order indicating that it has really considered these points and a laconic order like the one passed in the case in hand can by no means be said to be in compliance with the requirements of Rule 1731 (2).