GOVIND RAM SHARMA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Chaturvedi dated the 29th March, 1955, dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) THE appellant was appointed Headmaster of the G. H. P. Higher Secondary School, Nagina, in the year 1928. At that time the school was a Middle School. Subsequently it became a High School and in 1948 an intermediate college. THE appellant continued to hold office as Headmaster, and he acted as the first Principal of the College until October, 1948. In that month a new Principal was appointed and the appellant thereafter performed the duties of an assistant teacher. On the 29th August, 1949, the managing committee of the college terminated the appellant's services with effect from the 1st September, 1949. THE appellant did not accept the validity of the resolution terminating his services and the ensuing dispute was ultimately referred to a board of arbitration. That board, by an award dated the 10th March, 1954. upheld the action of the managing committee in terminating the appellant's services. THE appellant thereupon filed a petition in this Court challenging the validity of the proceedings before the board and praying that they be quashed by a writ of certiorari. This petition was dismissed by the order which is the subject of the present appeal.

(3.) THE substance of the appellant's grievance, therefore, is that the Board which was constituted to decide his dispute was constituted in breach of the provisions of the agreement regulating the conditions of his service. It is true that he did not execute an agreement in his capacity as an assistant teacher, but he says that the effect of paragraph 358(2) of the Educational Code is to put all parties in the position that they would have been in, had the appropriate agreement been executed; and this is not disputed. It follows in consequence that the quest on at issue between the appellant and the managing committee is whether there has been a breach of the terms of the appellant's agreement. It is, in other words, a dispute of a contractual nature, end this Court has consistently declined to entertain disputes of this character in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.