BHARAT Vs. CH KHAZAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the defendants from a decree for possession of a plot of land passed against them by the courts below. The suit was instituted against the appellants by the respondent on the following allegations:

(2.) All building situated within the limits of an estate belonging to, or held by, an intermediary, tenant or other person are to continue to belong to or to be held by, such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site is to be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed; see Section 9. The building on the land in dispute belongs to the appellants. It was admittedly constructed by them. There is no dispute about the ownership; the respondent himself does not claim that it belongs to him. Since the building is situated within the limits of an estate, under Section 9 its site (together with the area appurtenant thereto) must be deemed to be settled with the appellants by the State Government. The appellants now are in lawful possession of the site of the building on account of the settlement and are not liable to ejectment. They might have been liable to be ejected as trespassers before the vesting but in consequence of the vesting, their possession on the site is to be deemed as the result of the settlement with the State Government in whom the land vests.

(3.) In the view that we take we are supported by Manohar Lal v. Sulah Kumar, (S. A. No. 1981 of 1950) decided by our brother V. Bhargava on 17-10-1952 (All) (A); Tilak Ram v. Ram Singh (S. A. No. 95 of 1948) decided by Sapru J., on 14-7-1952 (All) (B); and Syed Mohammad Raza v. Ram Lal, 3955 All LJ 496 (G). We were referred by Sri S. B. L. Gaur to two decisions in which a contrary view has been taken. They are Pheku Chamar v Harish Chandra, 1953 All LJ 197: (AIR 1953 All 406) (D) and Kumarji v. Bahorey Lal, 1954 All LJ 693 (E). The previous decisions of our brothers V. Bhargava and Sapru are not noticed in the case of Pheku Chamar (D). In that case Agarwal and M. L. Chaturvedi JJ., held that the benefit of Section 9 can be claimed only by that intermediary, tenant- or person who is in rightful possession of the land; with great respect we are unable to agree. There is nothing in the language of Section 9 to suggest that the site of a building is to be deemed to be settled with the intermediary, tenant or other person only if he is its lawful owner or holds it lawfully, and a Court has no authority to import the word "lawful" or its equivalent. The learned Judges found it difficult to understand why the Legislature should have given preference to trespassers over the rights of persons having a title in the land. We may respectfully point out that the Legislature has given no such preference and that the trespassers' possession was recognised because that was the only right that remained and could be recognised as the right, title and interest of the rightful owner had been extinguished and had vested in the State. In the present case the respondent's right over the land in dispute was extinguished with effect from 1-7-1952; he had not constructed any building upon it and, therefore, the land could not be deemed to have been settled with him. If the appellants had not constructed the building, its site would have vested in the State Government and the respondent would have had no right over it. He has lost nothing by the site being deemed to have been settled with the appellants now. After the vesting and the extinction of the rights of the proprietors, it has now become a matter between State and trespassers, and the State could recognise the rights of the trespassers; there is nothing strange or improper in it. The only construction standing on the land in dispute is of the appellants and the Legislature thought it advisable to settle the site with them, instead of forcing them to vacate the site. The Legislature has used wide language in Section 9 and it covers the case of buildings belonging to persons who constructed them lawfully or unlawfully. When wide language was chosen it was not necessary for it to lay down expressly that the benefit of Section 9 can be availed of by trespassers also. In the case of Kumarji (E), Agarwala J., observed that the suit related not to abadi or buildings but to possession over a plot of land, that Section 9 applies to a case in which the intermediary whose estate vests in the State was himself in possession of the abadi or building and that the word "belong to" mean "validly belonging to." The land in dispute before us is abadi (and so was the land in dispute in the case of Kumarji) and the suit does relate to it, but we are not concerned with the questions whether the land in dispute is abadi and whether the suit relates to abadi. Section 9 does not use the word abadi at all and has no reference to any suit relating to abadi; the site of a building is to be deemed to be settled with the owner, regardless of where the building is situated and whether any suit in respect of the building or its site is pending or not. The site of a building is not to be deemed, to be settled with any other person, if a trespasser has constructed a building, the site will be deemed to have been settled with him and not with the owner of the land. It will be deemed to have been settled with the intermediary if the building belongs to him and not other-wise. For these reasons we respectfully differ from the view taken by Agarwala and Chaturvedi JJ., and prefer to follow the view taken by Kidwai and H. S. Chaturvedi JJ., in the case of Syed Mohammad Raza (C),