STATE Vs. MANGALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the State against an appellate order of acquittal passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge of Agra by which Mangala, the respondent, had been acquitted of the charge under Section 14 of the U. P. Opium Smoking Act No. III of 1934. The respondent Mangala was prosecuted with two others, namely Sharafat Husain and Bundu of offences punishable under Section 12 and 14 of the Act. The learned Magistrate upon the plea of guilty made by the accused persons and upon the statement made by them before him convicted Bundu under Section 14 of the Act and sentenced him to six months' R. I. and also under Section 12 of the Act to two months' R. I. He acquitted Mangala and Sharafat under Section 12 of the Act but convicted them under Section 14 and sentenced each of them to a fine of rupees one hundred, in default of which to undergo one month's R. I. Mangala, the respondent, appealed against his conviction and sentence. The learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, by his judgment and order dated the 12th of April, 1954, came to the conclusion that the statement of Mangala cannot be construed as an admission of guilt under Section 14 of the Opium Smoking Act and there was no plea or "guilty" to the charge, and that the Magistrate was wrong in quoting the sections of the Act because according to the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge Section 14 of the Opium Smoking Act does not provide for penalty for contravention of the Act but lays down the rule for search and seizure. Section 9 of the Act will appear to provide for penalty. Upon all that view of the matter the appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence set aside.

(2.) We have gone through the record along with the learned counsel for the parties and we are of the opinion that the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge has not only misquoted the statement of the accused and the sections of the Act but he refused to look into the charge and to the note made by the Magistrate on the charge itself when it was read out to the respondent and to which the respondent had pleaded "guilty. Section 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the other sections of the Code where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class on such a plea, there shall be no appeal except to the extent or legality of the sentence. The jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge when the appeal was laid before him and had been heard by him extended, in view of Section 412 of the Code, to the question of the extent or the legality of the sentence and not to the question of the conviction.

(3.) Apart from that aspect of the matter we have looked into the statement of Mangala and the charge that was framed against him and we find that the criticism by the judge was not justified.