SRI RAMESH CHANDRA Vs. STATE OF U.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned counsel for the appellant Sri Hari Bans Singh, and learned Standing Counsel.

(2.) The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground that on account of the criminal case relating to loss of public exchequer withholding of gratuity and other benefits to the appellant is justified. The order impugned in the writ petition dated 20th March, 2012 passed by the Joint Director Agriculture, Agra Division, Agra records allegations of misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 57,14,844. An FIR under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13/2 by the Prevention of Corruption Act has been lodged, in which a charge sheet has been submitted against the appellant along with others. The gratuity of the appellant has been withheld, whereas his pension, leave encashment and earned leave benefits have been released. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition and has given valid reasons for dismissing the writ petition. The order passed on 20th March, 2012 by the Joint Director Agriculture does not suffer any legal infirmities, so as to warrant interference as the said order itself indicates that the entire dues cannot be released at this stage. This obviously means that as and when the appellant is either discharged or acquitted in the criminal case or any other order is passed by the criminal Court, then only can release of gratuity be directed by the authorities. We accordingly, do not find any error in the judgement of the learned Single Judge. This issue was dealt with, in the case of State of U.P. and Others v. Jai Prakash 2014 (1) ADJ Page 207 (DB), and in the case of Surendra Pal v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2016 (1) ADJ pg. 370, followed in Mahabir Prasad Misra v. State of U.P. and Others W.P. No: (S/S) 241 of 1998 decided by a learned Single Judge on 04.07.2016, that has been affirmed in the case of Keshav Prasad v. State of U.P. reported in 2017 Vol. 10 ADJ Page 135, answering the issue against the appellant.

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the criminal prosecution certain interim orders have been passed in favour of the appellant. The passing of an interim order in the criminal proceedings will not amount to discharge or acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case. Consequently no prohibition to take such action can be inferred on the strength of such interim orders passed.