(1.) R. A. Sharma, J. Petitioners, who claim to be employees of a sugar factory known as Venus Sugar Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company), have filed this writ petition challenging the orders of the com pany demanding security of Rs. 20,000 (Rs. Twenty thousand) from each petitioner for appointment as Seasonal Weighment Clerk/centre Incharge. Their case is that as they were employed by the company in earlier season also, they are entitled to re-employment in the current session automatically without depositing any security, in view of the Standing Orders of the company certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Their grievance, therefore, is that demand of the security is in violation of the certified Standing Orders of the company. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties.
(2.) THIS writ petition is not maintainable. The company is a private trading organisation and it is neither a "state" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution nor is it a statutory authority. That apart, company is also not discharging any statutory function or public duty.
(3.) CASES relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are of no help to him. In the first case Smt. Rajni Sharma v. Union of India, 1995 (3) UPLBEC 1664 : 1995 (1) LBESR 164 (All) it was held that the Army School run by Army Welfare Education Society is a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, because administrative and financial control of the Society vest in the Government and its official. It was accordingly held that writ petition would lie against an order passed by the Society against any of its employees. In the second case, Aley Ahmad v. District Inspector of Schools, AIR 1977 All 539 (FB) this Court laid down that writ petition would lie even against the order of a private, individual if he passed an order in exercise of statutory powers. In the instant case the company is neither a 'state' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution nor did it pass the impugned order in exercise of statutory power. Therefore, the law laid down in the above two cases cannot be applied to the instaut case. In Executive Committee, Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 (supra) the question was whether the Committee of Management of the Degree College registered under the Co- operative Societies Act, and affiliated to a University, is a statutory body and further whether contract of personal service can be enforced through a Court. Supreme Court negatived both the contentions. It held that the Executive Committee of a Degree College is not statutory body. As regards the enforcement of the contract of service it was held that contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced except in the following three cases : (i) Where a Government servant has been removed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution ; (ii) Where a workman has been dismissed in service under Industrial Law ; and (iii) Where a statutory authority has acted in breach of mandatory provisions of the statutes. Petitioners' case does not fall in any of the three exceptions. The last case of D. K. Yadav v. M/s. J. M. A Industries Ltd. , 1993 (3) JT 517 also does not enhance the case of the petitioners. In this case Supreme Court held that right of life covered under Article 21 of the Constitution include right to livelihood and as the order of termination of service of workman affect his livelihood and career his service should not be terminated without giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard, it was, therefore, held that principle of natural justice are to be read into the Standing Orders governing conditions of service of the workman. Such a controversy is not involved in the instant case.