I T C LIMITED Vs. RAKESH BEHARI SRIVASTAVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision application under Section 115 is directed against an order dated 24.5.1996 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Gorakhpur, in Suit No. 208 of 1995. The suit was filed by the present three respondents against the present revisionist and the defendant-revisionist filed an objection that the plaint was to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. The suit was valued at more than Rs. 1 lakh but did not extend to Rs. 5 lakhs. The application of the defendant-revisionist was rejected by the impugned order and hence this application.

(2.) A preliminary objection was raised by the plaintiff-respondents on the ground that the revision-application is not maintainable in the High Court as the suit was valued at Rs. 1 lakh and odd and it should have been presented before the District Judge, Gorakhpur. The revisionist objected to this point and stated that under Section 115, C.P.C, as amended in Uttar Pradesh upto date, the revision-application is beyond the jurisdiction of the district court as it is valued at more than Rs. 1 lakh.

(3.) IT is in this context that Sri Naithani argued that when the two powers to extend the pecuniary limit of appeal and revision flow from the same amending Act, this must be read as co-extensive. To reiterate his argument, it may be stated that it was his contention that the amendment in Section 115, C.P.C. was made for the purpose of giving more powers to the district courts. In this connection, a decision of the Supreme Court was placed before me by the other side as in (1980) 2 SCC 378. The amendment of Section 115 as enforced by virtue of the amending Act of 1978 was in question before the Supreme Court and the main question was whether a second revision would lie before the High Court against a revisional order made by the district court. In this connection, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that "it seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated." IT was also observed in this very paragraph of the Judgment after considering the legislative history, that the consistent object behind the successive amendments (in Section 115 C.P.C.) was to divide the work-load of revision petitions between the High Court and the district courts and decentralise that jurisdiction. IT cannot, therefore, be stated that the purpose of creating revisional courts at the districts was to give more powers to the District Judges. IT was solely for the purpose of distributing the work-load and not for any other thing. IT is true that a certain point of time the pecuniary limits of these two Jurisdictions were co-extensive but from that alone, it may not be inferred that the Legislature always wanted that the district courts would be entitled to receive any revision in cases of such valuation where appeals would lie before them. IT was argued by Sri Naithani that an anomaly would be created if the revision lies before this Court and an appeal lies before the district court on a particular valuation of a suit. That was the situation prior to 1970 when the district courts enjoyed no revisional powers and the theory of anomaly would not stand to reason. The purpose of the legislation has already been indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court.