CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S P SHUKLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent No. 1 workman on the basis of a charge-sheet served on the workman on 3.2.1976. THE workman was put under suspension by order dated 6.11.1975 which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. Pursuant to an order dated 27th October, 1976 the workman was discharged from bank service by an order dated 12.11.1976 in terms of Paragraph 19.6 of the Bipartite Settlement between Indian Bank Association and All India Bank Employees Association dated 19.10.1966. THE said order of discharge was reduced on an appeal pursuant to an order dated 24.10.1977 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). By an order dated 13.11.1978, on the representation of the workman for payment of benefits during the period of suspension was disposed of by treating the period between 27.10.1976 to 16.11.1977 as on leave. THEreupon, the workman initiated a proceeding being LCA No. 409 of 1985 before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. THE said proceeding was disposed of by allowing the workman's claim by an order dated 5.12.1985. It is this order against which the present writ petition has been moved.

(2.) SRI Yashwant Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in exercise of Section 33C (2), the Labour Court is empowered to compute the money payable under an existing right. According to him, in computing such benefits, the labour court under Section 33C (2) cannot embark upon determination of any right. Neither it can adjudicate any disputed question, though, according to him it can adjudicate disputed ancillary to computation but still then it cannot determine the rights. According to Mr. Verma, in the present case, the labour court has undertaken exercise to determine the rights since the benefits given does not flow from existing right. In support of his contention, he relies on the decision in the case of M/s. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1996 (1) UPLBEC 42.

(3.) A plain reading of the said order indicates that the termination was met in terms of Article 19 (a) of the Bipartite Settlement. The order of termination has not satisfied as to how the period of suspension would be treated as is ordinarily done in such cases; Therefore, the said order can be construed only with reference to the Bipartite Settlement. The punishing authority has left the issue to be governed by the Bipartite Settlement without exercising any discretion with regard to the determination of the benefit or disadvantage that would be available to the workman for the period from the date of suspension till the date of discharge. The order passed by the appellate authority which is Annexure 2 is reproduced below : "In terms of the order of the undersigned dated 28.5.77, the appeal of Shri S. P. Shukla against the order of discharge passed by the Enquiry Officer was disallowed and accordingly the order of discharge became effective. Shri Shukla requested for a personal hearing and though in terms of the provisions of the Bipartite Settlement, no hearing is required to be given, the same was allowed on 15.10.1977 at Bombay on sympathetic grounds. After hearing Shri Shukla and his representative on 15.10.1977, the conclusion that can be arrived at is that the member has suffered great hardship during the period of his suspension, and is deeply repentant for all that he had done. In view of his repentance and further in view of his agreeing to his demotion and to work as a clerk, or alternatively to reduction in his present emoluments, I feel that the ends of justice would be met if his present basic salary is reduced by three stages to Rs. 450 per month from this date and he be paid only such allowances as may be payable on the reduced basic pay. He may, however, be allowed to receive his usual grade increments each year from the date of this order, i.e., from October. It is, therefore, ordered accordingly as set out above."