LAWS(ALL)-1996-2-101

VIJAI BAHADUR SINGH Vs. STATE OF U P

Decided On February 19, 1996
VIJAI BAHADUR SINGH Appellant
V/S
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) VIJAY Bahadur Singh has filed this writ petition under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The prayers contained in this writ petition are basically two-fold. First, certiorari is prayed for quashing auction notice dated 12-12-1995. Second, another certiorari for quashing the order dated 28-9-1995 (Annexure II) granting right to the petitioner to realise toll tax only for a period of six months ending with 31-3- 1996 and mandamus commanding the respondents to continue the period atleast and until 31-3-1997.

(2.) WHEN this writ petition was filed, Dr. R. G. Padia, learned counsel for the petitioner was permitted to file supplementary affidavit which he had already filed. He has been heard at sufficient length in support of this writ petition. Sri S. G. Hasnain has also been heard on behalf of opposite parties. It may be stated here that according to the pleadings, the petitioner responded to the advertisement regarding realisation of toll tax in respect of bridge, namely, Dona Nala Bridge, situated at Manahajpur Chiraiyacote Marg, District Azamgarh. Duration shown in an advertisement was 1 1/2 years. It is pleaded that the petitioner's bid though second, being highest, was accepted because first highest bidder did not respond. Therefore, it is said that vide order dated 23-9-1994 the petitioner was given right to realise the toll tax for a period of 1 1/2 years. It may be mentioned that on the action taken by respondents which is supported by Standing Counsel, this fact is denied and the original order in favour of the petitioner indicates that the period for which ultimately the petitioner has been asked to realise the toll tax was six months only, i. e. , October 1995 to March 1996.

(3.) IF the petitioner could come to the Court on two earlier occasions, it is not understandable why he had not made the prayer of such type which he is making today. The date on which the petitioner had obtained interim order concerning the payment of stamp duty is 21-10-1994 in the writ peti tion No. 33811 of 1995. I the petitioner was really granted the permission by the Commissioner prior to 20-10- 1994 referred to above, the communica tion must have been addressed to him and it is absolutely ridiculous to think that if such an order had been passed by the Commissioner, the same would been communicated to him. It appears that for this reason though the petitioner made some ancillary prayer, he did not pray for the type of prayer he has made in the writ petition. As per the latest decision of the State Governments as communicated through the G. O. of 1993, the' Government has required that the auction for realisation of toll tax should necessarily end by 31st March of the subsequent year. This notification narrates that if there was any existing bid before that period for a longer period, it should be brought down lawfully to end with 31st March. Under the circumstances, it is obvious that the petitioner's bid had not been accepted by the Commissioner prior to the impugned order dated 28-9- 1995 (Annexure II to the writ petition) indicating to the petitioner the validity of the bid for a period of six months ending 31st March, 1996. IF the petitioner's allegations were correct the period of one and a half year would have begun on October 1994 and ended on 31-3-1996. In view of the policy decision of the State Government, the aforesaid directions contained in Annexure II appear to fortify the said decision. Absolute silence on the part of the petitioner in respect of the execution of the lease-deed in his favour causes enough doubt about the validity or the genuineness of the grievances now sought to be raised by the petitioner.