LAWS(ALL)-1996-5-14

ADIL RASHID KHAN Vs. DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER BADAUN

Decided On May 24, 1996
ADIL RASHID KHAN Appellant
V/S
DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER BADAUN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) D. P. Mohapatra, CJ. These four Special Appeals involve common questis of fact and law. Therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for parties they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common Judgment.

(2.) THE core question, which falls for determination in the case, is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the pro visions in the Uttar Pradesh Rural Development (Gram Sewak) Service, Rule, 1980 (for short the Rules) the Commissioner, Agriculture Production and Rural Development, Uttar Pradesh (for short the Commissioner) is com petent/has power to draw up a list of candidates for undergoing training ignoring the list of selected candidates prepared by the District Selection Committees THE answer to this question depends on interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Rules with a view to ascertain the intent r ' purpose of the Rules.

(3.) ON a first look at the matter, the contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel appears to be attractive. No doubt, the primary purpose of any examination is to find out the most meritorious candidates but the answer to the question that falls for consideration in the case, in our view depends on a fair reading and interpretation of the provision of the Rules, particularly Rules 14, 15 and 16. The principle is well settled that if the Rules prescribe a certain procedure for selecting candidates for training and the language of the Rule is clear and unambiguous, then it has to be inter preted according to the plain meaning of the provisions of the Rules and no Court is permitted to add to it or delete from the Rule with the avowed purpose of achieving laudable object of selecting the most merito rious candidate. It is for the framers of the Rule to prescribe such pro cedure for selection of candidates which they consider proper and neces sary for achieving the intent and purpose of the selection. If, however, on a reading of the relevant provisions of the Rule the meaning is not clear and there is some ambiguity regarding the intent and purpose, then it may, in the circumstances be open to the Court to give an interpretation in accord with the intention of the Rule and the purpose sought to be achieved by it.