(1.) THE petitioner filed Application Nos. C -46, C -50 and C -55 before the IVth Additional District judge, Varanasi the first respondent before whom the appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (for short 'the Act') is pending. The petitioner is a tenant of certain accommodation of which the second respondent Ranjan Kumar Chakravarti is the owner and the landlord. It appears that the landlord has filed an application for the eviction of the petitioner in respect of the accommodation under his tenancy. The Application was filed under clause (a) of sub -section (1) of Section 21 of the Act which has been granted by the Prescribed Authority. By the applications aforesaid, it is said that the petitioner had prayed for summoning of the record of Suit No. 4/1995 pending in another Court. The case taken up by the petitioner was that during the pendency of the appeal, it came to her knowledge that in respect of the property in question, the landlord had entered into two agreements to sell with certain persons and, therefore, the bonafide need of the landlord with regard to the disputed accommodation was no longer there. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that she has already filed copies of the alleged agreements to sell and also a copy of the affidavit which the landlord had filed in the other suit.
(2.) THE Court below has observed in the impugned order that the applications of the petitioner referred to hereinabove, for summoning the records of another case shall be dealt with together with the appeal itself. It is, therefore, evident that on the applications filed by the petitioner, no orders have yet been passed accepting or rejecting those applications. The documents on which the petitioner seeks reliance by summoning the records of other case, have already been brought on the record of the appeal which has been filed by the petitioner. It is now for the Appellate Court to take its decision whether or not on the basis of the evidence and documents filed on record the appeal can be decided effectively without summoning any further record or documents as desired by the petitioner. The impugned order is in the nature of interlocutory order by which no right or obligation of the parties has been decided. If the petitioner feels aggrieved against that final order that may be passed in appeal in due course and decides to challenge the same, it will always be open to the petitioner to challenge the order that may ultimately be made on the applications referred to hereinabove. Now considering the facts of the case and contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner in my opinion, no case for interference has been made out at this stage.