PREM NARAIN KHURANA Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE four Income-tax Applications have been filed by the same assessee and relate to different assessment years. They are under Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and have been made consequent upon the reference applications under Section 256(1) of the Act being dismissed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The four applications which were made before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 256(1) of the Act were barred by time. The delay in one of them, namely, Reference Application No. 155 of 1984, which related to the assessment year 1978-79, was condoned. The delay in filing the remaining three applications, however, was not condoned and they were dismissed on the ground that they were barred by time. As regards the three applications which were dismissed as barred by time, suffice it to say that the applications under Section 256(2) of the Act are not maintainable on a plain reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 256. This Sub-section contemplates an application only in those cases where in an application made under Sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal has refused to state the case "on the ground that no question of law arises". THESE three applications having been dismissed on the ground that they were barred by time, it is difficult to take a view that the Tribunal refused to state the case in these three applications on the ground that no question of law arises. At this place, it would be relevant to point out the distinction between the provisions of Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and those of the corresponding Section 256 of the 1961 Act. An application for the statement of case by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court under the old Act was to be filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 66. Sub-section (2) contemplated an application to the High Court in those cases where the Appellate Tribunal had refused to state the case on the ground that no question of law arises. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 66 of the 1922 Act are in parimateria with Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 256 of the 1961 Act. The material distinction between the two provisions is that whereas there was a Sub-section (3) in Section 66 of the 1922 Act which contemplated an application to the High Court even in those cases where the Appellate Tribunal had rejected an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 66 on the ground that it was barred by time, no such corresponding provision has been incorporated or included in Section 256 of the 1961 Act. This deliberate departure is indicative of the fact that an application under Section 256 of the 1961 Act to the High Court was contemplated only in those cases where the Tribunal had refused to state the case on the ground that no question of law arises and not in those cases where the Tribunal had rejected the application on the ground that it was barred by time.

(2.) COMING to the fourth application, namely, the application in regard to the assessment year 1978-79, it may be pointed out that it is true that Reference Application No. 155 of 1984 which was the application in regard to this assessment year had been decided on merits after condoning the delay, but it is equally true that the said application was dismissed by the Tribunal on findings which are essentially findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence. In view of those findings, it is not possible to take the view that any question of law arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. All these four applications are accordingly dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.