(1.) THIS petition is directed against an order dated 9th September, 1986, passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, acting as a revisional authority, upholding the order dated 2nd January, 1986, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer suspending the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha.
(2.) SRI Ghasito Singh, the respondent no. 3, in his capacity as up Pradhan on 15th August, 1985, made a complaint to the Sub-Divisional Officer. In brief, the allegations made were these. The petitioner had abused his office, he had helped his relations in his capacity as a Pradhan, he had allowed people to take possession of the Gaon Sabha land after accepting money from them, he was a party to the felling of the trees belonging to the Gaon Sabha, and he had misused the funds of the Gaon Sabha. The Sub-Divisional Officer directed the Naib Tehsildar to conduct an enquiry who reported that a prima facie case had been made out. Thereupon the Sub-Divisional Officer issued a notice to the petitioner and regular proceedings in the purported exercise of powers under section 95 (1) (g) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 commenced. It appears that the petitioner failed to produce certain record as desired by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Ultimately, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order suspending the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan. The reasons given by the Sub-Divisional Officer was that the petitioner had disregarded his earlier orders and was deliberately dilly-dallying in the production of the record.
(3.) SECONDLY, it is not the requirement of the statute that in the order of suspension passed under clause (gg), there should be a recital that the officer passing an order of suspension is prima facie satisfied of the existence of the grounds for taking an action under clause (g). It follows that the validity of the order of suspension does not depend upon the recital of a prima facie satisfaction in it, what is necessary is that there should be actual prima facie satisfaction of the existence of grounds under clause (g) for the passing of the order in consequence of such satisfaction. It further follows that the defect can be removed by showing other evidence, in proceedings, when a challenge is made to the validity of the order that in fact the officer concerned was prima facie satisfied of the existence of the grounds. We have already emphasised that there is abundant intrinsic material on the record to demonstrate that the Sub Divisional Officer was prima facie satisfied of the existence of grounds for passing the order of suspension.