HAJI ABDUL SAMAD Vs. JALAL UDDIN AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Quarter No. 49 of House No. 101/288, Colonelganj, Kanpur, was previously in the tenancy of one Mohd. Yakub. According to the allegation set out in the writ petition the petitioner was living with Yakub in the said house. An application was filed by Jalal Uddin respondent No. 1 for its allotment sometime in 1971 on the ground that Yakub had left the premises and as there was a vacancy in respect of the aforesaid quarter, the same may be allotted to him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises to Jalal Uddin, respondent No. 1 on February 22, 1972.

(2.) Haji Abdul Samad, petitioner, thereafter filed an objection for the cancellation of the allotment order on the ground that there was no vacancy as he was living in the premises along with Yakub. He asserted in the said objection that he had been paying rent to the landlord in his own right, therefore, the allotment order made in favour of Jalal Uddin on February 22, 1972, on the ground that there was a vacancy, was invalid. It, however, appears that in pursuance of the allotment order Jalal Uddin, respondent No. 1, also filed an application under Section 7-A of the Old Act for getting the possession against the petitioner. These two matters were heard by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and were decided by means of a common judgment. By the said order the Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the allegation of Haji Abdul Samad that there was no vacancy in the premises was incorrect and that the allotment order had been lawfully passed in favour of respondent No. 1, so he was entitled to get the possession. Aggrieved the petitioner went in appeal before the District Judge, Kanpur under Section 18 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The appeal has been dismissed. Against the dismissal of the appeal the present writ petition has been filed.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the above premises was in his possession since long and that the learned District Judge committed an error in not giving the benefit of Section 14 to him. It appears to me that the aforesaid Section 14 could not be pressed into service in the instant case as an application under Section 7-A was pending on the date of the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. One of the requirements to be fulfilled in order to get the benefit of the aforesaid section is that any proceeding under Section 7-A of the Old Act must not be pending as against the person claiming its benefit. As in the instant case such a proceeding was pending the petitioner cannot get its advantage.