HARBANS SINGH Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE BALLIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RESPONDENT No. 3 is the landlord of an accommodation of which the petitioner is the tenant. An application was made by the respondent No. 3 for the release of the said accommodation u/Sec. 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972. Subsequently, an application was made by the respondent No. 3 for amendment of the application for release. This application was allowed on payment of Rs. 20/- as costs by the Prescribed Authority. Against that order, an appeal was filed before the District Judge by the petitioner. The appeal was dismissed on 17th April, 1976. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.

(2.) IT was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the District Judge committed a manifest error of law in taking the view that no appeal lay against an order allowing an application for amendment. According to learned counsel, the word 'an' in the phrase "any person aggrieved by an order under section 21" occurring in section 22 of the Act means 'any', and, as such, any order passed under section 21 of the Act was appealable. Reliance in support of this submission was placed on Krishnan Narayanan v. Shertallai Muttathu Pallikkariam, ILR 1970 Kerala 310. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission. In Lalji Tandon v. Union of India, 1976 AWC 105 this very provision came up for consideration and it was held that orders for eviction of a tenant or refusing to do so passed under section 21 alone are appealable under section 22 of the Act. The submission that any order, even though interlocutory in nature, was appealable under section 22, was repelled. Further what has been made appealable under section 22 is an order passed under section 21. The order allowing the application for amendment has been passed by the Prescribed Authority not under section 21 but in the exercise of his powers under rule 22(d) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. In this view of matter and in view of the decision in Lalji Tandon's case (supra), the submission made by counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. A perusal of Krishnan Narayanan's case (supra) indicates that there the provision which fell for consideration was section 18(1) (b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Control) Act which provided, "(b) any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court, may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction............" On a plain reading of section 18(1) (b) aforesaid, it is apparent that under the said provision an appeal could be filed against an order passed by the Rent Control Court. IT is in this context that it was said that the word 'an' had the same meaning as 'any' and consequently any order passed by the Rent Control Court was appealable. In the instant case, however, the language of section 22 is entirely different. IT does not make an order passed by the Prescribed Authority appealable but it makes an order passed under section 21 or 24 appealable. Krishnan Narayanan's case, is, therefore, clearly distinguishable and in any view of the matter the decision in Lalji Tandon's case which is a direct decision on that very provision which is under consideration in the present case is to be preferred than Krishnan Narayanan's case (supra). The District Judge cannot, therefore, be said to have committed any error in taking the view that no appeal lay against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the amendment application. IT was then urged that rule 22(d) which empowered the Prescribed Authority to allow an amendment application was ultra vires. Reliance in support of this submission was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AWC 50. In that case, the question of the validity of rule 16(2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 came up for consideration. That rule provides that while deciding an application for release under section 21(1) (a) it was incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority to consider the need of the tenant also in the manner prescribed in the said rule. IT was held to be ultra vires on the ground that the use of the words 'bona fide required' in section 21(1) (a) of the Act did not justify the consideration of the need or hardship to the tenant and indeed rule 16(2) did not complement but supplemented the power granted in the Act which was beyond the rule making power. IT was further pointed out for holding it to be ultra vires that rule 16(2) runs contrary to the provisions of section 21(1) (a) of the Act and it cannot survive being in direct conflict with the provisions of the Act. In my opinion, the decision in Chandra Kumar Sah's case (supra) has no application in the present case. Section 41 of the Act confers on the State Govt, power to make rules to carry out purposes of the Act. Section 34 refers to powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them. Section 34(1) provides that the District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely.........(g) any other matter which may be prescribed. Section 3(d) contains the definition of the word 'prescribed' and according to this definition "prescribed" except in clause (e) means prescribed by rules made under this Act. IT was, therefore, within the competence of the State Government to frame rule for the purposes mentioned in clause (g) of section 34(1). Rule 22(d) has been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by section 41 to carry out the purposes of the said clause (g) of section 34(1) of the Act. The rule of interpretation in this behalf, as contained in Maxwell "On the Interpretation of Statutes" 10th Edition pages 50 and 51 is as follows :-

(3.) IN the result, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The order of stay dated 25th May, 1976 is vacated. Petition dismissed.