LAWS(ALL)-1976-2-25

PARUL DEBI Vs. ASHOK RAJ MUDALIAR

Decided On February 04, 1976
PAROL DEBI Appellant
V/S
ASHOK RAJ MUDALIAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two writ petitions raise common questions of law and, therefore, are being decided by a single judgment.

(2.) SMT. Parul Devi, the petitioner in both the writ petitions, is the owner of premises No. 27, Tashkant Road, Allahabad. This consists of residential building in which she herself is living along with her husband and other members of the family. The building has a garage and four outhouses which are appurtenant to the same. The garage was being used by the petitioner for keeping her car whereas the out houses had been let out by the petitioner to Ashok Raj Mudaliar and Prem Narain Misra. She filed an application under Section 21 (1) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for eviction of the aforesaid two tenants on the ground that the accommodations in their occupation were required by the petitioner for her use and occupation. Giving the details of her needs, she mentioned that the accommodations were needed for her driver and Chaukidar. The application was resisted by Ashok Raj Mudliar and Prem Narain Misra. They denied that the need of the petitioner was bona fide. They also asserted that the need mentioned by the petitioner in her application was not her own and, therefore, the application filed by her was not maintainable. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases.

(3.) THE other ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as Ashok Raj Mudliar and Prem Narain Misra were living in a building, the remaining part of which was in occupation of the petitioner, therefore, there was a presumption in favour of the petitioner with regard to the bonafide requirement of the accommodations in occupation of these two tenants. Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) of the Act raises a presumption with regard to the bonafide requirement of the landlord in respect of the building. This explanation has, therefore, to be strictly applied. This explanation provides that if a part of the building is in occupation of a tenant, the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, the same shall be conclusive to establish that the need of the landlord is bona fide. A reading of this provision would show that it will be applicable only to a case where there is only one tenant inasmuch as only then it can be said that the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord. THE word "whereof" used in this explanation is very relevant. It indicates that the whole of the remaining part of the building, a part of which is in occupation of the tenant, must be in occupation of the landlord for availing its benefit. THE contention that even where there are two tenants in a building while the remaining part is in occupation of the landlord this explanation would apply, does not convince me. In such a case, if an application for eviction under Section 21 is made against a tenant, the remaining portion would not be in occupation of the landlord alone but the other tenant as well. THE language of the provision used in this section does not show that the legislature intended to give the benefit of this provision even to a case where there are more than one tenant.