OM PRAKASH GUPTA Vs. STATE OF U P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a reference by the Taxing Officer in the matter of the amount of court-fee leviable on an appeal filed against the decision of the Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam). The appellants have filed a memorandum of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal and claim that they are liable to pay a court-fee of Rs. 5.00 only and are not liable to pay ad valorem court-fees. The appellants have claimed a sum of Rupees 4,52,341.00 before the Nagarmahapalika Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) but were awarded a sum of Rs. 36,560.70 only. In the present appeal the claim is in respect of a sum of Rupees 1,62,740.30 only. The Stamp Reporter has pointed out a sum of Rs. 13,035.00 is payable as court-fees on the memorandum of appeal. Two objections were filed on behalf of the appellants and it was stated therein that the above appeal is not directed "against an award made by a Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Town Improvement Act or any other similar statute" and consequently it was not covered by Section 8 of the Court-fees Act. It is further stated that with the enforcement of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, (U.P. Act No. 11 of 1973), hereinafter referred to as the Development Act, the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam had been deleted with effect from the 2nd September, 1973 and consequently the Development Act is a similar statute to the U. P. Town Improvement Act as contemplated under Section 8 of the Court-fees Act. It was further stated that there is no other specific provision providing for court-fees on appeals against an award or order relating to compensation for compulsory acquisition of land passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Adhiniyam. In view of the repeal of the provisions of Chapter XIV containing Sections 343 to 384 of the Adhiniyam it could not be said that the Adhiniyam was a statute similar to the U.P. Town Improvement Act. It is further stated that under Section 59 of the Development Act only the right to appeal under Section 381 has been preserved. Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Aijaz Uddin v. Taxing Officer, AIR 1966 All 227 wherein the learned single Judge held that the decision by the Tribunal constituted under the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Act was an award made by a Tribunal as contemplated under Section 8 of the Court-fees Act. The Taxing Officer finding the matter one of general importance has referred it for a decision to this Court.

(2.) IN June 1944, the land of the appellants was notified for acquisition under the provisions of the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1922. During the pendency of the proceedings the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam came into effect from 1st February, 1960. The Collector gave the award in 1961 and thereafter possession of the land was taken on the 16th November, 1961. The matter of compensation was referred to the Tribunal constituted under Section 371 of the Adhiniyam. In the meantime the appellants filed a writ petition against the acquisition and the matter went up to the Supreme Court. The proceedings meanwhile remained stayed. The appeal was partly allowed and the impugned modifications were held to suffer from the vice of discrimination and were quashed but the Court upheld the acquisition and the validity of the award made on the 13th April, 1961. On the 30th November, 1974, the Tribunal gave its decision. In the meanwhile under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 a Development Authority was created for Allahabad on the 19th August, 1974 and the schemes which were pending with the Nagar Mahapalika were taken over by the Development Authority. With the constitution of the Allahabad Development Authority the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam stood suspended as contained in Section 59, of the Development Act but it made clear that "all proceedings relating to acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes under the said enactments pending immediately before such suspension before any court, tribunal or authority may be continued and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the said enactments (which shall mutatis mutandis apply) as if those provisions were not suspended."

(3.) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in brief is this, the provisions of Section 8 are inapplicable in this case because it is a decision of the Tribunal not constituted under any similar statute as that of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act and as such court-fees payable on the memorandum of appeal would be only Rs. 5.00 as is provided in Item 1 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. In other words, his contention is that the matter of compensation was before a Tribunal constituted under the Adhiniyam which was a statute similar to that of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act but by the time the award came to be made and with the deletion of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam it could not be said that the Adhiniyam was a similar statute as that of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act and consequently Section 8 of the Court-fees Act would have no application. He further contended that notwithstanding the preservation of the provisions in relation to proceedings relating to acquisition of land and interest in land for improvement schemes to pending proceedings before any court, tribunal or authority the repeal of the remaining provisions took away from the Adhiniyam the provisions by which it could be judged to be a statute similar to that of the U. P. Town Improvement Act. Learned counsel further contended that the Court-fees Act was a fiscal statute and if there were two interpretations possible the benefit must go in favour of the appellants. I have also heard the Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. He has contended that the provisions of Section 8 of the Court-fees Act will apply wherever it is an acquisition for a public purpose. He further contended that the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam is a similar statute like the Town Improvement Act notwithstanding its repeal under Section 59 (1) (a) of the Development Act. He also contended that in view of the provisions of sub-section (13) of Section 59 of the Development Act wherein clause (a) of Section 59 (1) had not been assigned to be the function of the Development Authority, which indicated that notwithstanding the repeal of Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam by the Development Act for the purposes of appeal the Adhiriiyam would be deemed to be existing law. He also referred to the U. P. General Clauses Act Section 6 (c) and (e) and contended that it saved the provisions of the Adhiniyam notwithstanding their repeal by the Development Act. He placed reliance on the decision of the learned single Judge in the decision of Aijaz Uddin v. Taxing Officer, AIR 1966 All 227. He further contended that the acquisition in the present case was for a public purpose although it was initiated under the U. P. Town Improvement Act and continued under the Adhiniyam. Lastly, he contended that the meaning to be given to words "all proceedings" in Section 59 (1) (a) of the Development Act would have the effect of keeping intact until the disposal of the appeal the provisions for the acquisition of land for public purposes.