SOMDUTT Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE writ petitions raise common questions of validity of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, hence are being disposed of by a common judgment. Since the decision of the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not require separate narration of facts of these cases, we propose to mention the facts of writ petition No. 2215 of 1975, Som Datt v. State of U. P. and others. A notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for free allotment of house sites to landless agricultural labourers of scheduled castes | tribes, village artisans etc. in village Gudam, Pargana Rampur, District Saharanpur, was published in the official Gazette of the State Government on December 18, 1974. It was followed by a notification under Section 6 of the said Act, published on December 28, 1974. In this notification the purposes for which the land was acquired was also mentioned as 'Free allotment of house sites to landless agricultural labourers of Scheduled Castes | Tribes and village artisans, etc. in the aforesaid villages of district Saharanpur'. By the notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1), it was notified that as the case was one of urgency, as such, the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 17 of the said Act were applicable to the land, and hence, under sub-section (4) of Section 17, the Governor directed that the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act were not applied. Consequently, the petitioners could not file any objection to the proposed acquisition under Section 5-A. As the land was thereafter, not filed under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioners, being aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings, filed the present writ petition. Similar notifications were issued in all the connected cases, which are being disposed of by this judgment, acquiring the land for the same purpose for which the impugned notifications of writ petition No. 2215 of 1975 were issued. The facts, as stated earlier, are not at all material for deciding the points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. As we do not wish to encumber our judgment with the recitation of the facts of other cases, we refrain from doing so and content ourselves by referring to the facts of this case wherever necessary. Challenging the validity of the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that the purpose for which the acquisition was made by Government was not 'public purpose' within the meaning of Section 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act, hence the acquisition is bad and ultra vires the Act. The purpose for which acquisition is being made in the instant case has already been narrated by us above. The same is free allotment of house sites to landless agricultural labourers of Schedule Castes-Tribes and village artisans etc. in the villages of district Saharanpur. Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by U.P. Act No. XXII of 1954, reads as under: "The expression 'public purpose' includes provision for or in connection with- (1) sanitary improvements of any kind, including reclamation; (ii) the laying of village sites, townships or the extension, planed development or improvement of existing village sites or townships. (iii) the settlement of land for agriculture with the weaker section of the people." What is noteworthy in the definition extracted above is that the expression "public purpose" has not been exhaustively denned inasmuch as the definition clearly mentions the word "includes". The use of the word 'includes' is indicative of the intention of the Legislature that it did not wish to keep the purposes for which acquisition could be made the strait jacket. In Nagpur Corporation v. Its Employees A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 675, the Supreme Court observed: "The inclusive definition is a well recognised device to enlarge the meaning of the word defined." The above interpretation of the word 'includes' was reiterated by the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. M\s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 168. In this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: "The word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the 'Statute'. When it is so used, these words and phrases of the construed as apprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word 'include' is also susceptible of other constructions which is unnecessary to go into." Recently, interpreting this word, Beg, J., speaking for the Court, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mjs Pyare Lal Malhotra, etc. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 800, observed as below: "A definition is expected to be exhaustive. Its very terms may, however, show that it is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be defined 'includes' what it specifies, but in that case, the definition itself is not complete." THESE authorities of the Supreme Court lay down in clear terms that in a case where the definition uses the word 'includes' the same cannot be said exhaustive and that its meaning has to be understood in the light of the context and the purposes of the provisions in connection with which the same has been used. This being the position, we are not prepared to accept the submission of the counsel for the petitioners that as the acquisition of land in the instant case does not squarely fall within the four corners of the definition of the expression 'public purpose' given by U.P. Act No. XXII of 1954, the same should not be considered as 'public purpose'. We would presently show that the purpose for which the acquisition was made is otherwise covered by the definition. But, that apart, even if the purpose be taken as not strictly covered by the illustrations given in his definition, it cannot be held that the purpose of rehabilitation of landless labourers belonging to scheduled castes-tribes or village artisans, is not a public purpose. As observed by the Bombay High Court in Jamnadas Devaibhai Bhate and others v. The Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur and another A.I.R. 1976 Bom 129, the scope of the expression is obviously not static and must change with varying concept, time, state, of society and its needs. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the Bombay High Court in this case, and find that a rigid or fixed meaning if given to the words 'public purpose' might defeat the very object with which the Legislature made it only an illustrative definition. It is indisputable that the purpose for which the land can now be acquired in 1976 for public benefit could not be so treated in early twentieth century. Hence, the political philosophy in this regard can also play a prominent role in deciding as to whether the purpose for which the land is being acquired can be construed as 'public purpose'. The question as to what is a public purpose arose before the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. R. Nanji A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 294. In this case, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the correct import of the expression 'public purpose'. The Supreme Court observed as follows: "The expression 'public purpose' has been considered in many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them except the three cases cited by the Attorney General. In A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 20 the observation of Batchelor, J. to the effect 'General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned." It would be noticed that by laying down the law, mentioned above, the Supreme Court approved the observations of the Privy Council made in Hamabai v. Secretary of State A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 20. In that case, the Privy Council had found that there could be a 'public purpose' in taking land, if that land was made available to the public at large. In State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 41, where the requisition was made by the Government for housing a person, Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed: "In our opinion, this is not a proper approach to the problem. The Constitution authorises requisitions for a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If, therefore, vacancy is allotted to a particular person who is, in fact, homeless, the purpose is fulfilled. It might be possible to attack a given allotment on other grounds, such as fraud, an invidious discrimination, nepotism, bribery or corruption, but not that is alleged here. All that is said is that there was no 'public purpose'." In Somawanti v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1963. S.C. 151, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the expression 'public purpose'. It observed as under: "This is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one and, therefore, does not assist us very much in ascertaining the ambit of the expression 'public purpose'. Broadly speaking the expression 'public purpose' would, however, include a purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned." The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in Arnold Pod-ricks v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1718. In this case, the Supreme Court observed as under: "The main idea in issuing the impugned notifications was not to think of the private comfort or advantage of-the members of the public but the general public good. At any rate where a very large section of the community is concerned its welfare is a matter of public concern, and when the notifications served to enhance the welfare of this section of the community this is public purpose and the notifications are valid and cannot be impugned on the ground that they were not issued for any public purpose." Dealing with the same controversy in Ratilal v. State of Gujrat A.I.R. 1970, S.C. 984, the Supreme Court held a housing scheme for a section of a public may also be a public purpose. The relevant portion throwing light on the above controversy runs as under: "We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose. It was said that there were hardly about 20 members in the co-operative society in question and therefore the housing scheme for their benefit cannot be considered as public purpose." The trend of the authority, thus would be found, seems to be away from any general definition of the term. What is accepted on all hands is that a private property cannot be taken for other than a public use. It may further be noted in this connection that Section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act lays down that a declaration under Section 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for a public purpose. The fact whether a purpose for which a property is compulsorily acquired is a public purpose is justiciable, but that only means that the Court can see whether the purpose is one for which the property can be taken. The question whether it is necessary to accomplish the public purpose by compulsory acquisition, is not a matter for the Court. It is the matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the executive acting under the powers vested in law to decide such a question. It is also settled that the fact that to the Court or any other person it does not appear necessary or expedient in public interest to acquire a land, is wholly immaterial. Ordinarily, as observed by the Supreme Court, in Rati-lal's case (supra), the Government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purpose or not and further the declaration made by it under Section 6 is a conclusive evidence of the fact that the land in question is needed for "a public purpose. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the present case, we do not find any reason to hold that the declaration recorded by the State Government in the notification under Section 6 should not be considered as conclusive between the parties. In fact, the petitioners did not put forward any material before us which could justify that the purpose for which the land was being acquired was only collateral or not a real one. Counsel for the petitioners, however, urged that the settlement of land in favour of labourers belonging to schedule castes or scheduled tribes cannot be considered as a purpose falling within the ambit of Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act. The counsel asserted that merely because a landless labourer belongs to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, does not justify the acquisition of land for distribution of house sites to the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The submission made is untenable. The expression 'scheduled castes or scheduled tribes' conveys generally an idea of extreme poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and physical cum-economic dependence. As a matter of fact, in our country, a person belonging to a scheduled caste carries the stigma from the time of his birth and the same is not capable of being eliminated at any time in his or her life time. THESE persons are generally poor and are to depend on the mercy of their landlords. Taking advantage of helplessness of landless labourers belonging to this class, the landlords are in a position to evict them from their houses given for their residence, and also to exploit them. THESE persons are generally poverty stricken illiterate and effectively conscious of little beyond their neighbourhoods. Poverty, as is known, is a phenomenon which is complex in origin as well as in its manifestations. This being the position of the classes for whom the land is being acquired, one cannot dare say that the same is not a 'public purpose'. In considering the question as to whether allotment of free house sites to scheduled castes tribes and village artisans could be justified, one has to consider the provisions of the Constitution under which we are governed. The Constitution has solemnly promised to all its citizens, justice-social, economic and political. Part III of the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights to its citizens. Part IV contains Directive Principles of State Policy. There is no doubt, as laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases, that these principles are unjusticiable, hence cannot be judicially enforced, but having regard to the aspirations which have been incorporated in this context, one cannot consider them as mere formality. This may or may not be enforceable in any Court, but are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar said in his speech in the Constituent Assembly: "No Government responsible to the people can afford light-heartedly to ignore the provisions in Part IV of the Constitution." In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, Chief Justice Kania, dealing with the Directive Principles, stated that: "It represents not the temporary will of a majority in the Legislature but the deliberate wisdom of the nation." Considering the importance of the Directive Principles in the light of what has been said above, if we look at Article 38, we find that it is the duty of the State Government to make an effort to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic, and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. Article 47 joins upon the State particularly to regard as among its primary duties to raise the level of standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health. In accordance with Article 46, the State is required to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Hence, if for the fulfillment of all these primary duties the State was required to make adequate provision for shelter to the weaker sections to the extent of the resources available with it, it is hardly possible for anyone to say that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is not a 'public purpose'. It has rightly been emphasised in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that to provide a decent roof over the head in relation to weaker sections could not, therefore, be postponed indefinitely for long if their standard of living has to be raised. Hence, we do not find any merit in the first submission raised on behalf of the petitioners. Furthermore, India is a welfare State. As stated by Mr. Justice K.K. Mathew, a Judge of the Supreme Court, delivering address at the Second Kerala State Lawyers' Conference, 1974, held on December 22, 23, 1974, "....... State is not an end in itself, but only an instrumentality, to be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the welfare of the members of the political community. The concept of the laissez faire state of the nineteenth century arose from a philosophy that general welfare is best promoted when the intervention of the State in economic and social matters is kept to the lowest possible minimum. The rise of the welfare State proceeds from the political philosophy that the greater economic and social good of the greater number requires greater intervention of the government and the adoption of public measures aimed at general economic betterment. Today, people cry for intervention of government when anything goes wrong in any front. They demand interjection of government in every aspect and sphere of life." Amongst the various identifying characteristics of welfare state according to H.W. Jones (The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 Column, L. Rev. 143 (1958) one is the direct furnishing of services by government to individual members of the national community- unemployment and retirement benefits, family allowances, low cost housing, medical case and the like. It is known to all of us that the problem of poverty accentuated by the rise of social inquality prevails in our villages. Harijans Duller from the dual curse of economic inequality and social inequality. They constitute a large class of landless labourers who are treated untouchables by the rest of the community. They have no house to live in, generally no cloches to wear. This is, in tact a blot on India's name. Hence the acquisition of land, being aimed at to meet the challenge of poverty, cannot but be regarded as one for public purpose. The second question urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners was relating to exercise of power by the State Government under Sections 17 (i), (1-A) and 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act. Sri S.K. Verma vehemently contended that the exercise of discretion conferred by Section 17 (4) being arbitrary and there being no material available with the State Government, the nominations issued under Sections 4 and 6 are liable to be quashed. Elaborating his contention, counsel urged that the purpose for which the land is acquired is not relevant for deciding the urgency or the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The question that the exercise of discretionary power under Section 17 (4) could be challenged if the grounds which are relevant for the purpose for which the power can be exercised have not been considered or grounds - which are not relevant and yet are considered, and an order is based on such grounds, was also raised by the learned counsel in this regard. Reference was made by him to a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Narsiah v. Bhadraiah A.I.R. 1973 A.P. 75. The submission in so far as it goes that a Court is competent to quash an order passed by a competent authority in exercise of its subjective satisfaction on the ground that it had no material available with it for coming to such a conclusion, is indisputable. What is, however, material to be noted hi this connection is that the power of judicial review in matters of subjective satisfaction or in exercise of discretionary power, is limited, and that a Court of law must not forget that it is not sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Government in these matters. The question of urgency, as was said by a Division Bench of our Court in Ram Surat and others v. State of U. P. and others A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 166, is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government and is not open to the Courts to examine the propriety or correctness of the satisfaction of an objective appraisal of facts. Such an opinion can only be challenged as ultra vires if it can be shown that the Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the Government is mala fide. It must be forgotten that if every act or decision of the State Government were to be reviewed by a Court, the administration itself will come to a standstill. The Supreme Court in Raja Anand v. State of U. P. A.I.R. 1967 S.C 1081, observed as under: "But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under Section 17(4) of the Act, in subjective terms the expression of opinion of the State Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide." This decision of the Supreme Court shows that the power of review-ability conferred by Section 17 (I), (1-A) and 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition net is very limited. T. Narsatain's case (supra), cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, also does not advance his case any further than what has been said above. We, however, wish to make it clear mat it is no doubt true that if non-existence of the state of affairs on which the validity of a power conferred by a statute based is demonstrated to be absent, a Court of law will certainly nave the power to interfere with the same. Keeping the above observations in view, we proceed to examine this contention on merits. Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act runs as under: "17. (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section y, sub-section (1) take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a company. Such land snail thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (1-A) The power to take possession under sub-section (1) may also be exercised in the case of other than waste or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development. (2) ........ (3) (4) In the case of any land to which in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (i), suo-appropriate (1-A) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section o-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time alter the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)." Sri S.K. Verma's contention, as stated above, was that since in taking the decision to dispense with the compliance of Section 5-A of the Act, the state Government had taken irrelevant or wrong matters into consideration, the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 must be held to be ultra vires the Act. According to him, the only irrelevant thing for exercising the power under sub-sections (1), (1-A) and (4) of Section 17 was the prior notice of the true character and nature of the land sought to be acquired. Having heard counsel for the parties, we are definitely of the opinion that the submission made is devoid of substance. Whether or not the decision of a body is ultra vires, undoubtedly depends on the interpretation of the Statute by the reviewing Court. On examination of the Act we find that it is fallacious to think that the determination of the question of urgency is not dependent on the purpose for which the land is being acquired, but on the nature of land sought to be acquired. The power of dispensing the requirement of Section 5-A or taking of possession was conferred by the Legislature to be utilised to those cases, where the 'public purpose' to be achieved demands emergent and prompt action. It is worthy of being mentioned, that before Section 5-A added by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1923 (Act No. 38 of 1923), it was held in Ezra v. Secretary of State 7 C.W.N. 249, that in making acquisition of land, the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant under the Act. It did not contain any provision for any objection on the part of the owner to the Acquisition itself. To remedy this defect, a Bill, being No. 29 of 1923, was introduced on July 11, 1923. The Bill having been passed into law as Act No. XXXVIII of 1923, came into force with effect from January 1, 1923. By this very Amending Act, sub-section (4) was also added in Section 17. Previous to this amendment, power to take possession could alone be exercised in case of urgency. The history of these provisions shows that Legislature thought that as Section 5-A proceedings could cause delay in acquiring lands, hence to meet the requirement of urgent action it conferred power of dispensation of Section 5-A on the State Government. The language used in sub-section (4) of Section 17 also does not support the petitioners' counsel. It clearly lays down in most unambiguous terms that in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-sections (1), (1-A) (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. Reading this sub-section with sub-section (1), (1-A) and (2), one leads to the irresistible conclusion that it is the purpose of the land which is determinative of this controversy. If one goes on the character of land which is sought to be acquired, the very object of sub-section (4) of Section 17 might be defeated. It appears to us that the argument of the learned counsel is based on misconstruction of the relevant provisions of the Act. In support of his argument that determination of character of land being preliminary on which jurisdiction of the State Government depends, counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raja. Anand Brahma Shah's case (supra). In that case, on October 4, 1950, notification was issued by the State Government under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act stating that the area of 409.6 acres in the village of Markundi Churma, Pargana Aghori, was needed for a public purpose. The notification provided that the case being one of urgency, the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 applied to the land and it was, therefore, directed under sub-section (4) of Section 17 that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act would not apply. On December 12, 1950, a further notification was issued under Section 6 declaring that the Government was satisfied that the land mentioned in the notification was needed for public purposes. It was, there Don, that the writ petition was filed in this Court. One of the contentions raised in the writ petition was that the State Government had no jurisdiction apply the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act to the land in dispute as it was neither waste nor arable. The writ petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, Raja Anand Brahma Shah took up the matter to the Supreme Court. One of the grounds urged in the Supreme Court was that as Section 17 (1) applied to waste and arable lands, the State Government wrongly treated the land in dispute as waste and arable, when as a matter of fact the same was neither waste nor arable. Upholding the contention, the Supreme Court found that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 were not attracted to the facts of that case. Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court held as under: "If, therefore, in a case the land under acquisition is not actually waste or arable land but the State Government has formed the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 are applicable, the Court may legitimately draw an inference that the State Government did not honestly form that opinion or that in forming that opinion the State Government did not apply its mind to the relevant facts bearing on the question at issue. It follows, therefore, that the notification of the State Government under Section 17 (4) of the Act directing that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply to the land is ultra vires. The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Estate and Trust Agencies Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust, (1937 A.C. 896)." It may be noted that at the time when this case was decided by the Supreme Court, sub-section (1-A) of Section 17 had not been incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. Accordingly, the power of dispensation of Section 5-A could be exercised only with regard to waste and arable lands. Hence, in these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the application of the provision of Section 17(4) dispensing with the requirement of Section 5-A for acquiring the properties which were not covered by Section 17 (1) demonstrated that the Government had not applied its mind to the preliminary question on which the exercise of jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 17(1) depended. In the instant case, when the notification under Section 4 was issued, Section 17(4) had already been amended by U.P. Act No. VIII of 1974. As a result of this amendment, now the proceedings under Section 5-A can be dispensed with also in respect of land other than waste and arable. Hence, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Anand Brahma Shah (supra) would not be applicable to the present case. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Bhooth Nath Mete v. State of West Bengal 74(1) S.C.C. 645. Dealing with the question of subjective satisfaction under Article 22(5), the Supreme Court laid down the factors that were required to be considered before issuing the detention order. Counsel for the petitioners urged that even in arriving at the subjective satisfaction certain relevant facts have got to be established. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law. This case, therefore, does not advance the case of the petitioners. The power under Section 17 (1), (1-A) and (4) can be exercised when the Government takes the view that there is urgency as regards acquisition of the land. Urgency in regard to acquisition of the land would arise when the 'public purpose' is to be urgently implemented and when that situation arises. This section entitles the Government to dispense with the two stages of possible delays in the acquisition of land, one by holding the enquiry under Section 5-A. and the other by going through the award proceedings. As said above, the elimination of these two stages is the power conferred by this provision as both these matters taken singly or individually and collectively might cause delay in acquisition proceedings. In the instant case, by the notification issued under Section 4 read with Section 17, the State Government being of the opinion that the matter was urgent, waived the compliance of Section 5-A of the Act. Counsel appearing for the petitioners could not bring any material to our notice showing that the State Government was not posted with materials which could justify the dispensation of the proceedings under Section 5-A. As a matter of fact, the burden of proving that the State Government had no material before it lies heavily on the petitioners. To the contrary, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government shows that the implementation of the scheme of rehabilitation of landless labourers belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes has already been delayed and that the same could not wait indefinitely. The counter-affidavit further shows that the proceedings under Section 5-A consume unduly long period. Hence, examining the purpose for which the land was being acquired and also the fact that Section 5-A proceedings take long time in its disposal, we are prepared to accept the submission of Sri B.D. Agrawal, Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the State, that the exercise of power under Section 17(4) in the instant case could not be termed arbitrary. The suggestion made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that proceedings under Section 5-A do not take a long period, and that the State Government acted mala fide in dispensing with the same, does not impress us. Apart from the fact that the petitioners have not placed any material in support of this contention and we are not prepared to accept the bare submission made at the bar on behalf of the petitioners, we can take judicial notice of the manner in which the proceedings under Section 5-A progress. Dealing with a similar matter, Gujrat High Court, with which we are in respectful agreement, observed in Ishwarlal v. State (1067) 8 Gujrat L.R. 729, as under: "In that case a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court observed that since Section 5-A gives only 30 days' time to a person affected or interested to file his objections to the proposed acquisition under the notification under Sec. 4, any urgency that demands dispensation with Section 5-A must necessarily be an urgency which will not brook a delay of 30 days. This observation, in our view. does not represent the correct law and there are two very good reasons why we find ourselves unable to accept the validity of this observation. The first is that the observation seeks to determine the urgency by reference only to the time likely to be taken up by the inquiry under Section 5-A which, as we have pointed out above, is not correct test for determining the question of urgency and secondly the observation seems to proceed on the assumption that the only time which is likely to be taken up in the inquiry under Section 5-A is a period of 30 days. But this assumption is wholly unfounded as the period of 30 days referred to in Sec. 5-A is merely the period given by the section for filing objections against the proposed acquisition. This period can, under the rules made by the Government under Section 55, be extended by the Collector, if proper cause is shown. After the objections are filed, a date has to be fixed for hearing the object or in person or by pleader. The hearing then takes place and if the Collector permits, oral as well as documentary evidence can be led and where evidence is led by one party, the opposite party has to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the first party as also to rebut the case by means of other evidence. The Collector then has to consider the objections and to make his report to the Government and the Government has to decide the object one after taking into account the report of the Collector. This elaborate procedure is bound to take a considerable amount of time and it is difficult to see how the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has limited the determination of the existence of urgency by saying that the urgency must be of such a nature as cannot brook a delay of 30 days." Hence, we are not prepared to hold that there was no justification for the Government for dispensing with the proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act. Linked with the above, the argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as stated above, the purpose for which the land was being acquired, was wholly irrelevant for deciding the question of urgency. In the submission of Sri S.K. Verma and Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawal, what was necessary to be seen was the character of the land which was sought to be acquired. Although we are not at all prepared to uphold the submission, but assuming the same to be correct, counsel could not show any evidence from the record which could support their submission that the State Government did not have any material before it for coming to the conclusion about the nature of the land. Paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit of Kazi Akhtar Husain, filed on behalf of the State Government, shows that a proposal for acquisition was furnished by the Collector with a covering letter giving details of the land etc., and that the State Government carefully considered the proposal about the existence of public purpose and the urgency for acquisition. THESE facts narrated in the counter-affidavit demonstrate that the Government had the relevant materials about the character and nature of the land as well. Apart from the above. Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act does not justify the submission made by the petitioners' counsel. Read closely, it would be seen that it is the urgency of the purpose which alone is to be seen in examining the question as' to whether the power conferred by Section 17(1), (1-A) and (4) be exercised. As noted above, elaborately the purpose was of such a nature that it could not be permitted to wait any longer. One must not forget that India although achieved independence in 1947 and adopted the Constitution in January 1950, but nothing tangible was done on this count. So, the Government could legitimately think that it was high time that action for acquiring the land was expeditiously taken. Merely because the State Government has taken so long does not mean that it could not be considered as a matter of urgency. Sri S.K. Verma as well as Sri Deoki Nandan Agrawal referred to the notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act pointing out in support of their argument that the State Government took irrelevant considerations into account while waiving the requirement of Section 5-A. They urged that had the Government known the character of the land, it would have not come out with two different notifications with regard to the same. Clarifying, counsel TH contended that the nominations under Section 4 did not mention about the character of the land whereas that issued under section be snowed that both waste, arable as well as constructed portions of land were covered by the acquisition proceedings. On this assumption, the submission was that the relevant consideration, viz., the character of the land, having not been taken into consideration, the dispensation of section o-A was unjustined. Thereafter, reliance was piece by on S.K. Verma v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah's case (supra) iii support of his argument. you have given our anxious consideration 10 the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, but and ourselves unable to subscribe to the same. As pointed out above, the urgency has to be seen with reference to purpose. We may point out by taking an illustration that if a piece of land is accounted by the state government for constructing an aerodrome to meet an emergent situation, it would be entitled to exercise its power under section IV (i), (I-A) and (4) of the Act without looking into the character of the land, that the very purpose for which the land is being acquired might be defeated. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in jamunadas's case (supra), which has laid down that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is a relevant consideration under section 17 (i) of the Act. 16 the same effect is the view of our Court taken in Ram Swat's - case (supra). We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in this case as well. Some of the counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that the constructions of their clients such as tubewells, Kothris, Kothas and houses, were standing on the date of the notifications under Section 4 issued in their cases, and, therefore, they could not be dispossessed. Reference was made by them to the notifications under Section 6 issued in continuation to that of Section 4, wherein it has been stated that, "The Government being satisfied that the case is one of urgency, is furtner pleased under sub-section (1) and (1-A) of Section 17 the said Act, to direct that the Collector of ..........though no award under Section 11 has been made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 8, take possession of any waste or arable and forming part of the land mentioned in the schedule for the said public purpose." Sri B.D. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the State however, pointed out that since the fact that the constructions standing over the land have been disputed by the State Government in most of the cases, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief on that basis. It is indisputable that now after the amendment of Section 17(4) by the U.P. Act No. VIII of 1974, by which sub-section (1-A) has also been added to this section, the Government is entitled to dispense with the compliance of Section 5-A even in respect of land other than waste and arable. Accordingly, assuming that some constructions were standing in some cases, that would not vitiate the notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. Since the question of constructions has been controverted by the State Government in its counter-affidavit, and otherwise also it is not possible for us to record any finding on this question of fact, we are not in a position to give any direction to the State Government not to take possession of the portions other than waste arable when awards nave been pronounced. Moreover, when the notification, noted above, itself has authorised the Collector to take possession of any waste and arable land forming part of the land mentioned in the Schedule, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners that the authorities would dispossess them even from constructed portions which were standing on the dates of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The authorities can be presumed would act in accordance with law, hence no direction in this regard is required to be given. Before parting with this point, we wish to mention that as two proceedings can be dispensed with under Section 17. One under Section O-A and the other for taking of possession without aware being pronounced, it was possible for the state Government to have dispensed with the requirement of Section 5-A alone and not to have done so with regard to taking of possession without declaration of awards in respect of portions over which constructions were standing. Hence, the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be considered as illegal. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners was whether the power under Section 17(4) with regard to land other than waste and arable could be exercised in the msiant case. It would be found from sub-section (1-A), quoted above, that possession under the aforesaid provision can be taken in the case of at least waste or arable land where the land is acquired for or in connection with the sanitary improvement of any kind or planned development. The question that needs consideration is whether the purpose for which the acquisition was being made in the instant case falls within the four corners of the aforesaid sub-section. Counsel for the State urged that the acquisition of land for allotment of house sites to Marijana and others being in pursuance of '.Rural Housing Scheme', the same must be considered as one for planned development. What is 'Planned Development' has not been denned in the Act. Therefore, we have to understand its meaning as used in common parlance with the aid of dictionary. The word 'Plan' means a scheme of arrangement, a scheme of action, project or design, the way in which it is proposed to carry out some proceeding. The word 'planned' has been denned in the Oxford Dictionary as a scheme for accomplishing a purpose. In Words and Phrases, Volume 32-A, the word 'planning' has been defined as under; " 'Planning' is a science and art connected with land economics and land policies in terms of social and economic betterment and control essential to planning is received through government ownerships or regulation of the use of the locus. 'Planning' is a term of broader significance than zoning and connotes a systematic development continued to promote the common interest in matters that have from the earliest times been considered as embraced within the police powers." Similarly, the word 'Development' has been defined in Websters' 111 New International Dictionary, Vol. 1, at page 618, as below: "To convert (as rawland) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes-alao to alter a land into an area suitable for building site." The Oxford Dictionary has also denned the word 'development' in 1962 Edition, as gradual, unfolding, evolution, realisation of potentialities on sites or territory by building or mining. Taking these dictionary meanings into consideration it appears to us that the present case can also be considered as one of the 'planned development'. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question of 'planned development' in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi A.I.R. 1974, S.C. 2077. Mathew, J., held that as the Government found it necessary to take effective steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent sub-standard constructions, the scheme framed by it could be considered as one for 'Planned Development of Delhi'. This decision of the Supreme Court has been followed in its subsequent decision in Smt. Ratna Devi v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1969. 69. THESE decisions would show that anything which is antithesis of haphazard development may amount to 'planned development'. In the instant case, the notification issued by the State Government mentions that the land is being acquired for 'Rural Housing Scheme'. This conveys an idea of a 'planned development'. The Fifth Five Year Plan, Vol. I page 252, and Annual Plan for 1975-76, pages 130 and 144, read closely would show that the Government is acquiring the land in pursuance of a scheme. One of the Paragraphs which deals with this question is 10.42, and the order is 10.50. THESE read together would show that, the house site for rural landless labourers and artisans is a provision made by the Fifth Five Year Plan which is being fulfilled through these acquisitions. THESE paragraphs are extracted below: "10.42 House site for rural landless-While addressing the Parliament on March 23, 1971, the President of India referred to the need for improving housing conditions of people residing in rural areas and observed as follows: "Simultaneously, efforts to improve rural housing conditions will be given further consideration. The aim is to allot building sites to landless workers on a larger scale to legislature for the conferment of homestead rights and to assist in the construction of decent livable houses for the rural population. This will necessarily have to be a joint programmer of the State and Central Government." Government of India have accordingly introduced the scheme for the provision of house sites to landless workers in the rural areas as a Central Sector Scheme under which 100 per cent grant assistance is made available to the State Governments. The benefits of the scheme are to be admissible to all such families that fulfil the criteria prescribed in the scheme and for this purpose the term 'family' has been deemed to consist of the worker, his wife and dependant Parents]children. The criteria prescribed have been kept in view while formulating the scheme for this State." "10.50 Assistance for the construction of houses-In order to ensure beneficial utilization of the house site, some assistance will in any case need to be given to the allottees to enable them to construct their hutments as they do not have much of ready cash to invest in house construction activity. It is proposed to provide a subsidy of Rs. 250.00 per house site for construction of hutments. This will be a small contribution but will be a great incentive to the poor people. At the rate of Rs. 250 per house site this assistance will work out to be Rs. 3,700.00 lakhs for the existing 14.80 lakh families. An additional amount of Rs. 385 lakhs will be required if provision is also made for increasing the number of landless labourers during the next five years. The President's address referred to in para 10.42 already stipulates for assistance in the construction of decent liveable houses for the rural population." Accordingly, the acquisition being in pursuance of the Fifth Five Year Plan, the same has to be considered as one for 'planned development'. It is possible that in some of the cases, although the same was not brought to our notice, the words 'Rural Housing Scheme' has not been mentioned in the notifications issued under Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act, but that would not mean that acquisition is not for 'planned development'. As a matter of fact, this question has to be considered in the light of all the material facts, including the Five Year Plans and other facts, mentioned above. Examining this light, the irresistible conclusion to which we reach is that the acquisition is for the planned development. Hence, the State Government could lawfully exercise power under Section 17 (4) and dispense with the requirement of Section 5-A as well as of taking over possession without award being made under this provision. Sri Sant Prakash, counsel appearing for one of the petitioners, urged that the acquisition for the purpose of allotment of land to landless agricultural labourers of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes could under the law be made under Section 122-C of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and not under the Land Acquisition Act, and, therefore, the acquisition made in the instant case is bad in law. He also submitted that as Section 122-C of the said Act is ultra vires the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution, having not been reserved for consideration by the President, the acquisition could not be justified even under this provision as well. It is difficult to understand the submission of the learned counsel as both the points urged cannot stand at the same time. It has been laid down by this Court in Ram Surat's case (supra) that when the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for a purpose envisaged by Section 122-C of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act alone would apply. Hence, the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act could not be said to contravene the provisions of Section 122-C of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Bench in this case. Therefore, the acquisition in this case having been made under the Land Acquisition Act, the question of the applicability of Section 122-C does not arise. Moreover, according to the argument of Sri Sant Prakash himself, Section 122-C is ultra vires the Constitution. Assuming to be so, without deciding, the acquisition could not be made under the aforesaid section. Accordingly, the submission made by Sri Sant Prakash is liable to fail. This leads to the question of mala fide, which has been raised in a number of writ petitions. The term 'mala fide' is often very loosely used. The scope of malice is wide enough to include both 'malice in law and malice in fact'. As said by Lord Haldane in Sheerar v. Shields, "Between 'malice in fact' and malice in law there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any system of jurisprudence. The person who inflicts a wrong or an injury upon any person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did not do so with an innocent mind. He is taken to know the law and can only act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state of mind was concerned, he acted ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. 'Malice in fact' is a different thing. It means an actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has done the wrongful act." In the instant case, we have already dealt with the question of mala fide in law and have found that the acquisition made in the present case is in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. So far as the allegations of mala fide in fact are concerned, in some of the cases vague assertion of mala fide either against Lekhpals or against the Members of the Committee of Management or District Authorities have been made. It is not possible to act on. the allegations made in these writ petitions. Furthermore, in the instant case, notifications under Sections 4 and 6 have been issued by the State Government. None of the counsel could point out anything in the writ petition asserting that the State Government acted corruptly or with ulterior motive or under some influence while making these notifications. As no allegation against the State Government has been made, the question of finding that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were mala fide does not arise. Sri D.K. Agrawal, counsel for the petitioners, contended in writ petition No. 1914 of 1975 that the correct area of plot No. 403)4 is 5 biswas, but the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 mentioned it as 1 Bigha 2 Biswas 2 Biswansis and, therefore, these notifications are liable to be quashed. We do not find any substance in this submission. Admittedly, the area given is more than what it should be. Accordingly, no prejudice having been caused to the petitioners in this case, there is no question of granting any relief to them on this basis. Before we close the judgment, we wish to point out our respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench on all the points in Ram Surat's case (supra). In fact, the same points have been urged in different voice before us. In difference to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, we have dealt with the same and added a few words of our own. Some of the counsel had also urged before us that Ram Surat's case does not lay down the law correctly. But, as we are in complete agreement with the view taken in that case, there is no occasion to refer the questions to a larger Bench. This covers the entire field of arguments advanced before us. For these reasons, all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. The stay orders in all the writ petitions are discharged.