TARAK PRASAD GHOSH Vs. SHANTI LATA DEVI AND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE questions have been referred by a learned single Judge for an answer by a Division Bench. THE questions are.- "1. Whether explanation (iv) of Section 21 (1) (a) raising the irrebutable and conclusive presumption, rules out enquiry about bona fide requirement remaining part whereof is in his occupation.

(2.) WHETHER the prescibed authority is required to weigh the real need of the tenant even in a case covered by Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act with the inconvenience that the tenant will suffer by grant of the application for release." In so far as the second question referred above is concerned, it stands answered by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shitla Pd. v. Saidullah, District Magistrate, Pratapgarh and others 1976 A.L.R. 95. It has not been demonstrated to us that the Full Bench decision required reconsideration. Accordingly, we answer the question aforesaid in terms of the Full Bench division in the negative. As regards the first question we find that the provision of the law is clear. Explanation (iv) of sub-section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 enacts a rule of irrebutable presumption. Once the set of facts on which the presumption arises are established then second set off fact would stand proved without any further evidence being produced in support thereof. The matter as regards the second fact, that is, need of the landlord is bona fide becomes unjusticiable and the Court will not allow any evidence to prove the contrary. Our attention was invited to Din Dayal v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 520 to support the contention that conclusive evidence proof necessarily does not imply that the court will not look into any evidence which may be destructive of the conclusiveness. We do not think we can draw any assistance from the ratio of that decision. There the peculiar provisions of the law pertaining to the conclusiveness to be attached to the opinion of the Chemical analyst in relation to adulterated food was the subject-matter of consideration and this Court held, on examining the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, that what it enacted was merely a rule of rebuttable presumption. Another case to which our attention was drawn was Satya Narain v. Sub-Divisional Officer 1965 A.L.J. 428. The decision in the said case, to our mind, did not rest upon the controversy as to what is conclusive presumption, conclusive proof or conclusive evidence. There, on the peculiar facts of the case it was held that the document in the shape of a receipt, which the law made conclusive, did not exist at all and what was produced before the Court was a forged document, in order to attract the rule of conclusive proof or presumption. This Court held that the rule enacted regarding the conclusive nature of a receipt did not preclude party from establishing by evidence on record that in fact that was produced was not a document as contemplated by law entitling a party relying upon it to take the benefit of conclusiveness attached to it. We think the rule laid down in Som-wati v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151 by the Supreme Court will be more apt and supports the contention that Explanation (iv) of Section 21 (1) (a) of the 1972 Act precludes a party from adducing evidence to establish the state of affairs which may be destructive of or purporting to be destructive of the bona fide need of the landlord. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the affirmative. Let the papers of the case be sent back to the learned Single Judge with the answers above.