TAROK PRASAD GHOSH Vs. SHANTI LATA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the judgment of Sri Narain Das, 10th Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 23-9-1974, allowing the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 under section 22 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (briefly stated as the Act). Respondent No. 1 is, admittedly, the owner of house No. 79-A, Lukerganj, Allahabad. A portion of this house was in her occupation, whereas the remaining part thereof was in occupation of the petitioners as tenants. She filed an application under section 21 of the Act for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioners on the ground that she required the same for her use and occupation. She also stated in the application that as apart of the aforesaid house was in possession of the petitioners, the remaining part of which was in her occupation for her residence, therefore, her requirement for the release of the portion in occupation of the petitioners had to be construed as bona fide under Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of the Act. The application was resisted by the petitioners. The Prescribed Authority rejected it, against which an appeal Was filed by respondent No. 1 before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the impugned judgment with the finding that the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of one room in the house in question for residential purposes and as the remaining portion of that house was in occupation of the petitioners, the need of respondent No. 1 must be deemed to be genuine under Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) of the Act. The learned District Judge also found that in view of the application of the aforesaid Explanation, the question of consideration of the need of the petitioners did not arise. On this view, the appeal was allowed by him. Consequently, the application made by respondent No. 1 stood granted. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court.

(2.) AT the time of hearing, having found that the questions involved were of general importance, two questions, mentioned below were referred for decision by a larger Bench :

(3.) ALL that this Act ensures is that the judges who have no access to the decisions themselves shall be provided with their accurate copies. Mere reporting of a ruling does not give any greater sanctity than it had before. A certified copy of the judgment, when produced before a court, establishes its authenticity and correctness. On such a copy being produced, the lower courts are bound to treat the same in the same way as reported judgments. Section 3 of the Indian Law Reports Act, 1875, as stated above, only provides that a court should not look into unauthorised reports. The obvious intention behind it is that as there is no presumption of correctness of the judgments reported in unauthorised reports, it is not safe to rely on the same. As stated above, what is binding is the decision of the High Court and not a report. Hence, the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in ignoring the certified copy of the judgment on the ground mentioned above. In this regard one has to keep in mind that all the judgments approved for reporting by the High Court or otherwise decided cannot be reported in approved journals. Therefore, if section 3 of the Indian Law Reports Act is construed so strictly as done by the learned Additional District Judge, the same might have a very undesirable result. The third ground given by the learned Additional District Judge for not following the decision that the facts were different, is also not tenable. What was laid down by the learned Judge in Roshan Lal's case was the law applicable to an application by a landlord under section 21 of the Act. The principles laid down in the aforesaid case have nothing to do with the facts of that case.