DR. M.D. MISRA Vs. SMT. VEERA RAFI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is the tenant of a portion of house No. 18 St. Johns Compound, Dr. Katju Road, Allahabad, of which respondent No. 1 is the landlord. The remaining portion of the house is occupied by respond No. I herself. She made an application under Sec. 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for the release of the portion of the house aforesaid in the tenancy on the petitioner on the ground that she required it for the use of her recently married son. According to her case the accommodation already at her disposal had become inadequate on account of the fact that one of her sons had been permanently transferred to Allahabad and had recently married. The application was contested by the petitioner and was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority. Appeal was filed respondent No. 1 which has been allowed by the 3rd Additional District Judge Allahabad. It is this order of the 3rd Additional District Judge, Allahabad which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.

(2.) It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the need of respondent No. 1 was not bona fide and the Additional District Judge has erred in taking the contrary view. Reliance was placed on Mattulal Vs. Radhelal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596 where it held that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one. The word 'required' signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should he an element of need and the landlord must show, the burden being upon him-that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. In Mattulal's (supra) the requirement of the landlord was for business purpose. In the instant case the requirement is for residential purpose. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court will, however, equally apply even if the requirement was for residential purpose. On a perusal of the order of the Additional District Judge, I am satisfied that he had decided the case understanding the law as has been laid down in Mattutal's case (supra). He has passed a detailed order giving the extent of the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord as also the tenant. He has also given the number of the family members of both the parties. He has considered their respective needs and has come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide. He has also come to the specific conclusion that on a comparison of the likely hardship the landlord would suffer much whereas the tenant would not suffer at all. I find it unnecessary to repeat the reasons for the finding aforesaid recorded by the Additional District Judge. The finding recorded by the Additional District Judge is based on appreciation on evidence and is essentially a finding of fact. Such a finding cannot be challenged or quashed in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

(3.) It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that this finding was based on no evidence. In my opinion there is no substance in this submission either. From a perusal of the order of the Additional District Judge it will appear that both the parties produced evidence by filing affidavits in support of their respective cases and the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge is based on the evidence produced by the parties. As such it is not right to contend that the finding of the Additional District Judge is based on no evidence.