LAWS(ALL)-1976-3-13

BALESHWAR PRASAD SRIVASTAVA Vs. SITA DEVI

Decided On March 10, 1976
BALESHWAR PRASAD SRIVASTAVA Appellant
V/S
SITA DEVI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated 3-9-1974 allowing the appeal of respondent No. 1 filed under Section 22 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (briefly stated as 'the new Act'). Respondent No. 1 is, admittedly, the owner of house No.68, Khuldabad Allahabad. The upper portion of this house was in the tenancy of the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 21 of the new Act for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioner on the ground that the same was required by her for her use and occupation. The application was contested by the petitioner and the claim of respondent No. 1 that her need was bona fide was denied. The petitioner alleged that he was living in the accommodation in the dispute since 1951 and as he did not have any alternative accommodation available to him he would suffer greater hardship in case the application of respondent No. 1 for his ejectment was granted. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application, against which an appeal was filed by respondent No.1. The appeal has been allowed. The tenant has come to this Court by means of the present Writ Petition.

(2.) THE first ground urged by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of the petition was that the finding of the appellate court holding that the need of respondent No. 1 was bona fide was incorrect. He stated that the said respondent had two other houses and, therefore, she did not require the present accommodation. After examining the evidence on record, the appellate court found that respondent No. 1 had another house No. 85, Anarsuiya, Allahabad but the same was in occupation of tenants, and therefore, it was not available to her. THE appellate court, however held that respondent No. 1 was living in the ground flour of the disputed house, and that the said respondent required the portion in occupation of the petitioner for her purposes. It is the settled law that the finding on the question of bona fide requirement of premises is one of fact, which cannot be set aside in writ proceedings. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mattu Lal v. Radhe Lal, (AIR 1974 SC 1596). THE first ground, therefore, fails.

(3.) IN order to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom, the U.P. Legislature enacted U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (briefly stated as 'the old Act'). Section 3 of the Act provided for the restrictions on eviction. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 lays down that a tenant would be liable to be evicted in a suit brought by a landlord only when the landlord has obtained permission of the District Magistrate for filing such a suit. Section 3 was interpreted by this Court in a number of cases. Previously, the view of this Court was that the power exercised by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was administrative. This question, however, came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965 All LJ 353 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767). The Supreme Court held as under: "When the District Magistrate exercises his authority under Section 3 (2) and the Commissioner exercises his revisional power under Section 3 (3) they must act according to the principles of natural justice in as much as they are dealing with the question of rights of the landlord and the tenant and therefore, they are required to adopt a judicial approach."