KARAM CHAND Vs. BALMUKUND AND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BAL Mukund is the landlord of a certain building which is in occupation of Karam Chand Chug as a tenant. In August, 1970 BAL Mukund (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) filed an application under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947) 'for permission to eject the tenant from the building on the main ground that the house is in a dilapidated condition and needed immediate reconstruction. In July, 1971 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted to the landlord permission to file a suit for ejectment against Karam Chand holding that the accommodation required reconstruction. Against this order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the tenant Karam Chand filed a revision before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, under Section 3(3) of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. Meanwhile, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) was repealed by the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). The New Act came into force on July 15, 1972. This repeal was effected by Section 43 of the new Act. 'Despite this repeal the tenant's revision was decided and dismissed by the Commissioner in August, 1972. That order was challenged by the landlord in a writ petition before this Court. The same was allowed, the order of the Commissioner was quashed and the revision was transferred to the District Judge, Lucknow, for rehearing. The revision was eventually dismissed by the District Judge. In the present writ petition the tenant challenges the decision of the District Judge on the ground that it should have been decided by him in accordance, with the provisions of the new Act and not in accordance with the provisions of the Old Act as had been done. The tenant's case is that under Section 21 read with rule 17 of the Rules made under the new Act a building can be released in favour of a landlord and eviction of a tenant ordered only if the building requires reconstruction and permission to reconstruct has been obtained from the Nagar Maliapalika after submitting a plan and the landlord has funds to reconstruct the building. The contention is that these conditions for grant of release of an accommodation and for an order of eviction of the tenant enacted by Section 21 of the new Act ought to have been kept in view by the District Judge in deciding the revision. The Bench has referred the following question for decision to this Full Bench: - "Whether a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act, pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act, before the Commissioner and transferred to the District Judge after the commencement of the new Act, would be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the old Act or it shall be deemed to be an application or a proceeding under Section 21 of the 1972 Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the new Act." Section 3 (1) of the old Act provided: Under Section 3 (3) of the old Act a revision against an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3(1) lay to the Commissioner and finality was conferred on his decision. Under Section 3 (4) of the old Act a revision from the order of the Commissioner passed under Section 3(3) lay to the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act. Clause (m) of Section 43 of the new Act says: "(m) any revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before Commissioner shall stand transferred to the District Judge and his decision shall be final." The implication of clause (m) of Section 43 is that a revision relating to the grant of permission under S. 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act before the Commissioner was saved and not permitted to lapse but the forum for its decision was altered and jurisdiction was conferred on the District Judge to decide such a pending revision. Admittedly the revision of Karam Chand tenant was pending before the Commissioner immediately before the commencement of the new Act. It was, therefore, a pending proceeding. The argument on behalf of the landlord opposite party is that Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 would be applicable to this case and legal proceedings commenced before the repealing Act came into force shall be continued and concluded in accordance with the old Act. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner tenant Mr. M.K. Seth submits that Section 6 does not apply to temporary Acts, provisions of which expire by efflux of time and, therefore, the benefit of Section 6 is not available to the opposite party. Before the enactment of the Interpretation Act of 1889 the common law rule in England was that 'where an Act expired or was repealed, it was formerly regarded, in the absence of provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except as to matters and transactions past and closed (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edition, page 403). When the Interpretation Act of 1889 (English) was passed the law of repeal was codified and the effect of repeal was laid down in Section 38 (2) of the Interpretation Act. The provision contained in Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 was adopted in the General Clauses Act (Act No. 10 of 1887) and Section 6 of General Clauses Act is word for word the same as Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of 1889. The terms of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act are identical with the terms of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and read as follows: "6. Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made thereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not: - (a) Revive any thing not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under; or (c) Affect any right, privilege, obligation or lability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) Affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed, or (c) Effect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." The reasons and the object intended to be served by the interpretation Act, 1889 are thus stated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pralap Singh A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84 at 87: "under the law of England, as it stood prior to the Interpretation Act of 1889, the effect of repealing a statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, except for the purpose of these actions, which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law: Vide Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 323........Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as is well known, is on the same lines as Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of England." The normal effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it completely as if it had never been passed and that it must be considered as a law that never existed. This is a general rule and on this an exception has been engrafted by the provision in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (Act No. 10 of 1897) and Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act see Municipal Board, Kanpur v. Behari Lal 1962 A.W.R. 229. In other words, by Section 6 a saving clause on repeal of an Act has been enacted by the statute and the provisions contained in Section 6 should be treated as expressly enacted into the body of a repealing Act see National Planners Ltd. v. Contributories A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 230. The result is that if the provisions of section 6 apply to a repealing Act then to the extent of the provisions of Section 6 the statute will not be regarded as having been obliterated from the statute book and a remedy may be enforced and an investigation or legal proceeding respecting a right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred during the pendency of the repealed enactment may be continued and concluded as if the repealing Act had not been passed. In the present case reliance is placed by the opposite party on clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. Clause (c) provides that where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed and clause (e) of Section 6 provides that repeal shall not effect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act. Clause (c) of Section 6 clearly does not apply as it saves only a vested right acquired under the repealed enactment. The landlord clinged on the basis of Section 6 that the legal proceeding, namely, the revision which was pending before coming into force of the new Act should have been decided in accordance with the procedure contained in the old Act and not the new procedure contained in the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. On the basis of Section 6 what is sought to be saved is only the procedure for continuance and conclusion of a 'legal proceeding' and not any right which may have been acquired under the old Act. If Section 3 of the old Act gave to the landlord any right to file any application for permission to sue the tenant for eviction he had already exercised that right long before repeal of the old Act and the revision pending before the Commissioner was not in respect of any such right. On the other hand, in respect of the 'right' to move an application for permission the remedy had accrued in favour of the tenant to challenge in revision an order passed against him under Section 3 of the old Act and all that can be said is that such a remedy within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 6 in respect of a right envisaged by clause (c) could be enforced under Section 6 as if the repealing Act had not been passed. But this remedy also had already been enforced by the tenant before the commencement of the repealing Act (new Act). From this analysis it will appear that on behalf of the landlord an argument can be advanced only on the basis of clause (e) of Section 6 and this is exactly the substance of their argument, namely, that in view of clause (e) of Section 6 the repeal of the old Act shall not effect the revision which had commenced before the repealing Act came into force and this 'legal proceeding' may be continued and concluded as if the new Act had not been passed. It is clear from this argument that it is only the procedure for decision of the revision pending at the time of commencement of the new Act which is intended to be preserved and saved by recourse to the provision of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. As already stated, the normal effect of repeal of a statute is to obliterate it completely from the Statute book as if it had never been passed. This result, however, will not ensue in case it is shown that a saving provision statutorily engrafted on every repealing Act by Section 6 was applicable to a given case. The approach to the present case, therefore, must be whether the provisions of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act to the present case or whether they do not. If the result of an inquiry along this line is that the provisions of Section 6 are applicable to U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 then it may be possible to hold that the pending revision ought to have been decided in accordance with the provisions of the old Act, quite apart from the question as to what is the effect of change in procedural law which is normally retrospective in effect. If, however, the inquiry shows that the provisions of S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act are not applicable to U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 then the normal effect of repeals of statute must be inferred- and the repealed enactment, namely, U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, regarded as having been completely obliterated from the Statute Book and it must be considered as a law that never existed, in which case there will be no question of the provisions of the Act being at all available for decision of the revision pending before the Commissioner under clause (m) of Section 43. I, therefore, address myself to the question as to whether the provisions of Section 6 of the U.R General Clauses Act are applicable in this case. An argument was raised by learned counsel for the landlord Mr. K.B. Sinha that the benefit of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act is not available to the tenant in this case because the old Act was a temporary Act and Section 6 applies to permanent enactment and not to temporary enactments. Ordinarily Section 6 does not apply to temporary Acts but this is not an inflexible rule and is subject to two exceptions: (a) Section 6 will apply to a temporary Act when the temporary Act is repealed before it has expired and the repealing Act contains a provision that the provisions of Section 6 will apply to the repealed Act; and (b) When the temporary Act itself contains a provision similar to Section 6 and provides that the Acts already done, rights already accrued and pending proceeding etc. shall be saved even after the Act expires. Craies on Statute Law at page 377 states; "unless a temporary Act contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect." In the State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Base A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 945 at 953, Gajendra-gadkar, J. observed that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act is not inflexible and admits of exceptions and that, therefore, in considering the effect of expiration of a temporary statute it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. If the right accrued by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person that right cannot be taken away because the statute, by which it was created, has expired. In the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (1) it was held that the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a temporary Act unless a different intention appears if the same is actually repealed but it has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature, automatically expires by efflux of time. In that case his Lordship was considering the effect of repeal of Ordinance No. 7 of 1948, which was a temporary statute. But before the Ordinance expired it was repealed by Repealing Act No. 12 of 1948. It was held that the repeal was an effective one which would normally attract the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This being the state of law it cannot be validly contended that the provisions of Section 6 will not apply to the old Act merely because it was a temporary Act without examining the matter in depth. U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 was due to lapse on September 30, 1973 but it was repealed before it expired, i.e., on July 15, 1972 and, therefore having regard to the decision in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (1) the provisions of Section 6 will be attracted on repeal of this temporary Act unless a contrary intention appears from the provisions of the new Act. The crucial question therefore, appears to be whether the new Act manifests a contrary intention; for Section 6 is subject to the clause 'unless a different intention appears'. It is relevant to mention here that this temporary Act (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947) contained a saving clause in sub-section (4) of Section 1 in the following words: "1 (4) It shall cease to have effect on the expiry of September 30, 1973 except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof, and S. 6 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904, shall apply upon the expiry of the Act as if it had then been repealed by an Uttar Pradesh Act." This saving provision, however, does not come to the aid of the petitioner as what were saved under Section 1 (4) of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 on expiration were things done or omitted to be done earlier. It did not save any proceeding. For a proper appreciation of the approach which I have adopted the authorities on the point may be considered. In the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (supra) it was ovserv-ed: "Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them." In the case of State of Orissa v. M/s. M. A. Tulloch and Co. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1284 it was observed: "The effect in law of a repeal, if it is not subject to a saving as is found in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, is also not a matter of controversy. The repealed Act is to be considered, except as to past and closed transactions, as if it had never existed. The principle on which the saving clause in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is based is that every later enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there were sufficient indications-express or implied-in the later enactment designed to completely obliterate the earlier state of the law." To revert to the main question whether Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act is attracted on the repeal of the Old Act it may be stated here that in determining this question the provisions of the new Act should be examined with a view to discover manifestation of an intention to save and preserve old rights and proceedings but the enquiry should aim at judging whether the new Act manifests an intention to destroy old rights and procedures and to obliterate the provisions of the old Act. Section 43 of the new Act contains a number of saving provisions. Section 43(2) (a) is in these terms: " (a). Any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the old Act shall stand transferred to the prescribed authority having jurisdiction and shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 of this Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act" Clause (b) of Section 43 (2) provides that any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under Section 7 of the old Act or under rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 made under Section 17 of the old Act shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of this Act (new Act). Clause (c) of the same section provides that any proceeding under Section 3-A or Section 5-A of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate shall be disposed of by the District Magistrate, and any proceedings under Section 7-D thereof so pending shall stand transferred for disposal to the prescribed authority, and the decision of the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority shall be deemed to be a decision under Section 8, Section 9 or Section 27 of the new Act. Clause (d) of the same section provides that the provisions of Section 39 shall mutatis mutandis apply to every proceeding under Section 7-B of the old Act pending on the date of commencement of this Act and such proceeding shall be continued and concluded as if this act had not been passed. Clause (e) provides that any proceeding pending before the Munsif on the commencement of this Act under Section 7-C of the old Act shall be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. Clause (f) provides that any proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act in the court of Munsif under Section 7-E of the old Act shall be deemed to be a proceeding under Section 28 of this Act and shall stand transferred for disposal to the prescribed authority. Clause (g) says that any suit for fixation of rent pending immediately before the commencement of this Act in the court of Munsif or Civil Judge under Section 5(4) of the old Act shall be decided by that court and the rate of rent in respect of the period prior to the commencement of this Act shall be fixed in accordance with the old Act and in respect of any subsequent period, be fixed in accordance with this Act. By clause (1) finality was conferred on the orders of the District Magistrate passed before commencement of the new Act granting or refusing to grant permission under Section 3 of the old Act against which no revision has been filed and the order was made more than 30 days before commencement of this Act and in other cases the order of the District Magistrate was made subject to appeal to the District Judge to be filed within specified time. In the same way, finality was conferred by clause (j) on the orders of the District Magistrate under rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 and by clause (k) on the orders of the District Magistrate passed under Section 7 or Section 7-A of the old Act under certain contingencies. Clause (1) conferred finality on the order of a District Magistrate passed under Section 3 of the old Act confirmed, modified or reversed by the Commissioner under sub-section (3) of that section and in respect of which no revision had been filed to the State Government before commencement of this Act. Then we have clause (m) in the following words:- "(m) Any revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the Commissioner shall stand transferred to the District Judge, and his decision shall be final." In similar terms is clause (n) relating to a revision pending before the commencement of this Act before the Commissioner under Section 7-A (4) of the Act jurisdiction over which was retained with the Commissioner and finality was conferred on his order. Clause (o) provided that a revision under Section 7-F of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the State Government shall be disposed of by the State Government and its decision shall be final. There is a similar provision in clause (p) in respect of revision under Section 7-F of the old Act pending before the State Government. Against the orders of the District Magistrate passed under Section 7-A of the old Act against which no revision had been filed or an order under Section 7(2) of the old Act for under rule 6 finality was given to dicision of the State Government over such revisions. Clause (r) provided that any suit for the eviction of a tenant instituted with the permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act or any proceeding arising out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. Clause (s) provided that any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted on any grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the old Act or any proceeding out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. To sum up clauses (a), (b), (c) and (f) of Section 43 (2) of the new Act expressly lay down that in respect of application or proceeding pending before the commencement of the Act under Sections 3, 3-A, 5-A and rule 6 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 and under Section 7-D shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. Clauses (d) and (e) provide that proceedings under Sections 7-B, 7-C and 7-E of the old Act pending on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be continued and concluded under the old Act. By clause (g) in respect of a suit for fixation of rent pending immediately before the commencement of this Act under Section 5(4) of the old Act procedure of the old Act was saved in part by providing that the rate of rent in respect of the period prior to the commencement of this Act shall be fixed in accordance with the new Act. Again by clauses (r) and (s) the provisions of the old Act were saved in respect of suits under Section 3 for eviction of a tenant instituted with permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act and proceeding arising there from as well as a suit for eviction of a tenant on any ground mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the old Act and in respect of proceedings arising out of such a suit pending immediately before the commencement of this Act also the provisions of the old Act were expressly preserved. It will thus appear from the various clauses of Section 43 (2) of the new Act that in respect of some matters the provisions of the old Act were preserved and in respect of other matters it was specifically provided that the matters and proceedings shall not be decided in accordance with the provisions of the old Act but they shall be deemed to be proceedings under specific provisions of the new Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the latter Act. In the case of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (supra) at page 88 the Supreme Court ruled that Section 6 will be applicable in those cases where the new legislation does not manifest an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of that section and that such incompatibility will have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause will be itself be not material. In the case of Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 77 after referring to the aforesaid dictum of State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (supra) Jagannadhadas, J. observed as follows: "Therefore, where, as in this case, the repealing section which purports to indicate the effect of the repeal on previous matters, provides for the operation of the previous law in part and in negative terms, as also for the operation of the new law in the other part and in positive terms, the said provision may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative of the intention to exclude the application of Section 6, General Clauses Act." It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orisso. v. M\s. M. A. Tulloch and Co. (supra) at page 1294 that 'contrary intention' may be expressed by the repealing enactment either expressly or impliedly. Observed Ayyangar, J. thus: "It is manifest that the principle underlying it is that every later enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there were sufficient indications, express or implied in the later enactment designed to completely obliterate the earlier state of the law." On the test laid in the case of Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi (supra) and on a consideration of the various provisions of the new Act it is clear that it provides for the operation of the previous law in part and in negative terms, as also for the operation of the new law in other part and in positive terms. It follows, therefore, that the new Act is a self-contained code and is indicative of an intention to exclude the application of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. In other words, the various clauses of Section 43 of the new Act manifest an intention incompatible with and contrary to the provisions of the section, such incompatibility having been ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new Act. I am therefore, of the view that the provisions contained in Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act are not attracted on the repeal of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The aforesaid conclusion would follow also from the scheme and the general policy of the new Act. The old Act conferred wide and unguided power on the District Magistrate in granting permission to a landlord under Section 3 for filing a suit for ejectment against the tenant. This power was taken away under the new Act which contains no provision for the grant of such a permission by the District Magistrate to the landlord. On the other hand, under the new Act there was two remedies open to the landlord in case he wanted to secure eviction against tenant. He could either file a suit for eviction against the tenant on one or more of the grounds mentioned under clauses (a) to (g) of Section 20(2) of the new Act or he could secure release of the accommodation by moving an application under Section 21 of the new Act. Section 21 lays down various conditions for the grant of an order of eviction of the tenant. For instance, a tenant could be evicted if the building was bono finely required by the landlord either for himself or for a member of his family for purposes of any profession, trade or calling or if the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required for purposes of demolition and new construction. The first proviso to Section 21 placed restriction on the right of a landlord who had purchased an accommodation which was in the occupation of a tenant from before the purchase. An application by such a landlord could not be moved under Section 21 unless a period of three years had elapsed since the date of such application. Under the third proviso no application for release could be moved under clause (a) of that section (i) for purposes of certain categories of trusts, (ii) in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes, and (iii) in the case of any residential building against a tenant who is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union and in whose favour the Prescribed Authority has issued a certificate that he is serving under special conditions or where he has died by enemy action while so serving then no application under clause (a) of the aforesaid section would be against his heirs. By clause (a) of Section 43 (2) of the new Act it was made explicit that an application for proceeding under Section 3 of the old Act pending before commencement of the new Act shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 of the new Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Then clause (rr) contained the following provision: - " (rr) where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 and has become final either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section, after the commencement of this Act, and a suit for the eviction or the tenant has not been instituted, the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under Section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under Section 22." By clause (rr) it is made clear that where permission referred to under Section 3 of the old Act having been obtained on grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 has become final either before or after the commencement of this Act the landlord may apply for eviction of the tenant under Section 21 and there would be no further need for the prescribed authority to determine the existence of any ground as contained in Section 21. Clauses (a) and (rr) of Section 43 clearly indicate that under the new Act the scheme is that even a pending application under Section 3 should be deemed to be one under Section 21 and should be decided in accordance with the conditions laid down in that section and that all orders of eviction under Section 21 can be passed on the basis of permission referred to under Section 3 of the old Act finalised either before or after coming of this Act in case such permission was obtained on one of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 and conversely in other cases the landlord will not be entitled to the benefit of the procedure contained in clause (rr) and may have to apply afresh under Section 21 if the permission under Section 3 of the old Act had not been obtained by him on one of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21. It will be noticed from the above that to the extent the Legislature desired that provisions of the old Act should not stand destroyed by repeal it provided so in express terms and where it did not intend this to be the result it did not expressly so provide. Thus, the Legislature expressly provided in clauses (d), (e), (r) and (s) that matters referred to in those clauses of Section 43(2) 'shall be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. In contrast the Legislature did not provide in clauses (m), (o) and (p) that pending revisions either before the Commissioner or before the State Government and referred to in these clauses shall be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. If in respect of pending revisions also the Legislative intent was that they should be governed by the provisions of the old Act and not by the new procedure laid down in Section 1 then in clauses (m), (o) and (p) also they should have added the words 'they shall be continued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed', meaning thereby that they shall be disposed of in accordance with the old Act as was done expressly in the case of clauses (d), (e), (r) and (s) and partly clauses (f) and (g). This is an internal evidence suggesting the inference that the Legislature intended the provisions of the old Act to be destroyed by repeal in relation to disposal of revision pending before the Commissioner or the State Government under Section 3 (3) and Section 7-F of the old Act at the time of commencement of the new Act and that they should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 21 of the new Act. This intention is manifested also clearly by clauses (a) and (rr) of Section 43. The Legislature having expressly declared in clause (a) of Section 43 the intention that the tenant's application or a proceeding under Section 3 should be decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 it could not be (sic) that a revision under Section 3 (3) before the Commissioner and under Section 7-F before the State Government was intended to be decided in accordance with the old Act. Such an assumption will be inconsistent with the scheme and general policy of the new Act, namely, to make it no longer easy for the landlord to secure release and eviction of a tenant and to regulate it by conditions contained in Section 21. It cannot be imagined with consistency and reason that whereas the Legislature intended that no landlord could secure eviction of a tenant unless the aforesaid conditions laid down in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 were fulfilled the tenant could be permitted to be evicted by the Commissioner and the State Government in revisions falling under clauses (n), (o) and (p) of Section 43 in complete disregard of these onerous restrictions. One can see no valid reason for such departure being permitted in the case of pending revisions. Indeed there is positive indication in clause (rr) of Section 43 supporting this conclusion. Clause (rr) of Section 43 provides that where no permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has become final after commencement of this Act having been obtained on the grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 the landlord may apply for the tenant's eviction under Section 21. This is made clear by the use of the phrase 'has become final ...... after the commencement of this Act'. The benefit of clause (rr) has been expressly confined in so far as pending revisions are concerned. To such revisions only as are finalised after coming into force of the new Act and in which permission to file a suit referable to Section 3 of the old Act has been granted on any grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21. The provisions contained in clause (rr) also clearly demonstrated the legislative intent that all pending revisions shall be decided in accordance with Section 21 and not in accordance with Section 3 of the old Act; for if permission to file a suit for eviction against a tenant is granted by the District Judge while disposing of a revision under clauses (m) and (q) of Section 7-F in revision covered by clause (p) orders passed in such revisions will be not better than waste paper as on the basis of such permission neither the landlord shall be able to file a suit for eviction on account of bar of Section 20 of the new Act nor shall be able to apply for tenant's eviction under Section 21 and he will be forced to resort to a fresh application under Sec. 21 and to satisfy the pres-cribed authority as to the existence of grounds specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21. An intention which may lead to stalemate, frustration and a stage of absurdity or which may render an order passed in a revision pending under Section 3 of the old Act unavailing or in fructuous is not attributable to the Legislature. In the case of Parma Nand v. Kalyan Dass A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 610 it was observed that it is a well known canon of interpretation of statutes that an interpretation which attributes absurdity to the Legislature, must, if possible, be avoided. A consequence of this kind can be avoided taking the view that the provision of amendment contained in clause (h) of Section 43 is applicable to revisions and that if need be this provision can be taken advantage of by a revisionist and the grounds of revision suitably amended so as to bring the same in conformity with the grounds of Section 21, at the same time retaining the prayer for a permission to file a suit for eviction of the tenant so as to qualify for the benefit of clause (rr) of Section 43. In Volume 59 of the Corpus Juris at pp. 1105-1106 it is stated: "Laws enacted in the interest of the public welfare, or convenience, or in regard to the rights of citizenship, or relating to the military power of the government, or relating to schools and school districts, laws for the construction of works of great public utility, laws for the protection of human life, or for the preservation of health and laws for the prevention of fraud or providing remedies against either public or private wrongs should be liberally construed with a view to promote the object in the mind of the Legislature." To my mind, an interpretation which would tend to effectuate the transparent legislative intent, namely, to regulate with some stringency the eviction of a tenant by the landlord from an accommodation on the ground of personal need should be accepted and that interpretation clearly indicates that a pending revision relating to grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act shall not be decided in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. There is an additional pointer to the conclusion that a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 pending at the time of the commencement of the new Act should not be decided under the old Act but should be decided according to Section 21 of the new Act. Clause (q) of Section 43 of the new Act reads: "The provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all appeals filed before the District Judge, under clause (i), Cl. (j) or Cl. (k) and all revisions transferred to him under Cl. (m) or Cl. (p)." This provision, which makes provision of an appeal contained in Section 18 of the new Act applicable to a revision transferred to the District Judge under clause (m), has the effect of converting such a revision into an appeal and this also is indicative of an intention to destroy the provision of the old Act contained in Section 3, for clause (q) enjoins in effect that the revision will be decided under the provisions of the new Act as an appeal and not as a revision under the new Act. Under the new Act an application by the landlord for release of vacant building lies under Section 16 and an appeal against an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16 is provided under Section 18. For release of a building under occupation of a tenant one has to apply under Section 21. An application under Section 3 of the old Act was in nature and substance an application for release envisaged under the new Act; for permission to file a suit obtained under Section 3 of the old Act was one of the steps taken for filing a suit for eviction by the landlord against the tenant. As an application which was filed under Section 3 of the old Act for permission to file a suit for ejectment related to a building under occupation of a tenant, in respect of such a building an application for release under the new Act would lie under Section 21 and not under Section 18 which provided for appeal from a release order passed in respect of a vacant building. In this background the words 'the provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply' occurring in clause (q) are pregnant with significance. The implication of the phrase 'mutatis mutandis' used in clause (q) above, to my mind, is that the revision transferred under clause (m) shall be heard under Section 18 having due regard to the provisions contained in Section 21. In the conclusion that the provision of Section 43 contains an 'indication to the contrary' and that the provision of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act does not apply on a repeal of Act No. 3 of 1947. I am supported by the decisions in Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 396 and M/s. Allahabad Theatres (Put.) Ltd. v. Smt. Kusum Kumari A.I.R. 1974 Alld. 73. There is yet another aspect deserving comment. Even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act is attracted on repeal of the old Act what is sought to be saved under clause (e) of Section 6 is 'pending proceeding', viz., the revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes 8th Edition, at p. 195 says: "In general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights." Tek Chand, J. in the case of Karim Shali v. Mt. Zinat Bibi A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 175, observed that to this general rule, however, there is an exception that where the enactment merely affects procedure to be followed in pending cases it will be regulated by the amended Act. In the case of Shiv Bhagwan v. Ondarmal (A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 365 the Court observed: "Now I think it may be said as a general principle that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum and it is also well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the Legislature expressly states to the contrary." Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in a concurring judgment expressed the same view as follows: "There is authority for the proposition that if the law is changed at date of the hearing the Court should give effect to the changed law, and that it is the duty of the Court to administer the law of the land at the date when the Court is administering it." In the present case there has been a procedural change as found in Section 21 of the new Act which must be given, the law being as stated here, retrospective effect because in Section 43 the Legislature did not express a contrary intention to the effect that in relation to revisions relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 pending immediately before the commencement of this Act the old procedure as contained in Section 3 of the old Act shall apply. I, therefore, conclude that such revisions should not be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the old Act but in accordance with the conditions and procedure contained in Section 21 of Act No. 13 of 1972. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the following authorities: Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. 1973 A.W. R. 489; Inderjeet Singh v. The State of U. P., 1973 A.W.R. 499: Mohammad Matin v. The Additional District Judge, Lucknow, A.I.R. 1975 Allahabad 390. Maharaj Narain Khanna v. Addl. District Judge, Moradabad, 1976 A.L.R. 48. In the case of Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1973 A.W.R. 489 a Division Bench of this Court held that a revision against rejection of permission to sue for eviction of a tenant transferred under Section 43(2) (m) of Act No. 13 of 1972 has to be decided under Section 43 (2) (m) of Act No. 13 of 1972 has to be decided under the provision of old Act. One of the reasons given in that case for the conclusion that a revision transferred to the District Judge under clause (m) should be decided in accordance with the provision of the old Act was that clause (m) did not state that a revision transferred to the District Judge would be decided as a revision arising out of an application under Section 21 of the new Act and opinion was expressed from this circmustance that the revision falling under clause (m) continued to be a revision against an order under Section 3 of the old Act. The legislative intent to destroy the provisions of a repeal-ed Act may be manifested both expressly as well as impliedly and although this intention was not expressed in clause (m) by saying that the revision transferred to the District Judge shall be decided as a revision under Section 21 of the New Act there was sufficient indication that such an intention was impliedly expressed, the same being gathered on a review of all the various clauses of Section 43. In this case they expressed opinion to the effect that the benefit of clause (h) of Section 43 (2) of the new Act cannot be taken by a revisionist for amendment of his pleadings. This is an opinion with which I have already expressed dissent on the ground that the expression other proceeding relating to eviction from any building' used in clause (h) is wide enough to encompass a pending revision. To my mind, the scope of clause (h) should not be adjudged from the relative positioning of that clause and clause (m) or from the absence of juxta-position. In the case of Inderjeet Singh v. The State of U. P. 1973 A.W.R. 499 it was held that revisional proceedings are to be decided in accordance with the old Act. In arriving at this conclusion the Bench appears to have been influenced in the main by the positioning of clause (h) of Section 43, a matter, which for reasons stated earlier, is to my mind, not determinative. Further, the Bench observed: "It is not necessary to decide whether Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will or will not apply in view of the enactment of sub-section (2) of Section 43 as we hold that looking to the juxtaposition in which the various clauses dealing with the trial court proceedings are placed in relation to the clauses dealing with the revisional proceedings the legislative intention seemed to be that while at the trial stage the parties should be enabled to amend their pleadings in the light of the new enactment in respect of the revisional proceedings the same should continue to be decided in accordance with the old Act." To my mind it was germane to decide whether Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act applied to case inasmuch as it in the nature of a statutory savings clause to a repealing enactment and, therefore, unless the provisions of the Repealing Act disclose a contrary intention, that is an intention to destroy or obliterate the provision of the former the provisions of the repealed Act will prevail. I am in respectful disagreement with the conclusion reached by the Bench in the case of Inderjeet Singh. In the case of Mohammad Matin v. Addl. District Judge. Kanpur (A.I.R, 1975 Alld. 390 it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the provisions of the new Act did not apply to a pending revision decided by the State Government under Section 7-F and that it should be decided in accordance with the old Act. This decision is based on the case of Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and the case of Inderjeet Singh v. State of U. P. (supra). I have already discussed these two cases expressing my respectful disagreement with the view taken in those cases. In the case of Maliaraj Narain Khanna v. Adll. Distt. Judge, Moradnbad 1976 A.L.R. 48 a learned Single Judge of this Court expressed the view that a revision filed before the Commissioner under Section 3 (3) of the old Act and pending at the time of commencement of the new Act should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. With profound respects I am not in agreement with this view, as already stated. In that case the provisions of the new Act were not examined in order to judge whether they manifested an intention to destroy and to obliterate the provisions of the old Act. The learned Single Judge appears to have been influenced by the circumstance that whereas clause (a) of Section 43 provided that a pending application or a proceeding under Section 3 shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 and shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the new Act no such express provision was made by the Legislature qua a revision under clause (m) of Section 43 (2). To my mind, for reasons already given in the foregoing paragraphs there was a change in procedure under the new Act which must be applied retrospectively to pending proceedings unless the Legislature expressly laid down to the contrary that pending revisions shall be disposed of in accordance with the old Act. The legislature appears to have provided in clause (a) to Section 43 (2) advisedly that it will be treated as an application under Section 21 and decided in accordance with the provisions of the new Act so as to shut out any possibility of doubt regarding its intention that all pending matters arising under Section 3 of the old Act should be decided in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down infection 21 of the new Act. In sum, in respect of a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the Commissioner what is saved under Section 43 of the new Act is only the continuance of the revision which, but for clause (m), would have lapsed as a result of repeal; but the old procedure for the disposal of such a revision has not been saved which, for reasons already stated, must be found to have been destroyed and obliterated and, therefore, such a revision, which is transferred to the District Judge, shall be decided by him in accordance with procedure and conditions laid down in Section 21 of the new Act and not in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. I would answer this reference accordingly. D.N. Jha, J.- I agree. Prem Prakash, J.- The full narration by brother Trivedi, J. of the essential facts renders it unnecessary for me to set them out again, but, with respect. I regret my inability to agree with the conclusion arrived at by him. We have been presented with an anthology of cases laying down the rule regarding the consequences of repeal of a temporary statute as also about the impact of the subsequent legislation on the same subject upon the proceedings pending in the court or the Tribunal on the date of the commencement of the latter Act. We were also invited to the two decisions of this Court in Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Maliaraj Narain Khanna v. Addl. District Judge, Moradabad (supra) the correcthess of which has been doubted by Trivedi, J. The issue in the case is whether a revision against grant of permission to sue eviction under Section 3(2) of Act III of 1947 (to be hereinafter referred as the old Act) pending before the Commissioner on the date of the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be hereinafter referred as the new Act) and transferred to the District Judge under Section 43 (2) (m) of the new Act has to be decided under the provisions of the old Act or should it be decided by the District Judge in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down in Section 21 of the new Act. That brings me to Section 3 of the Act. Section 3(1) reads thus: * * * * * It is unnecessary to quote the various grounds, because the ground set out by the landlord that the house was in dilapidated condition and needed immediate reconstruction justified his claim for the tenant's ejectment. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 3 are in these terms: It would be thus seen that the scheme of Section 3 is that if a landlord wants to bring a suit to eject his tenant, he has to apply to the District Magistrate for permission to do so. The District Magistrate may grant or refuse to grant such permission. After the District Magistrate makes an order on the landlord's application the party aggrieved by the order can apply in revision to the Commissioner and the Commissioner in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction had to deal with the revision under Section 3(3). The Commissioner's jurisdiction has not been limited only to eases where irregularity or illegality had been committed by the District Magistrate in granting or refusing to grant permission, but the power conferred upon him is wide enough to correct the error committed by the District Magistrate in making an order brought before him. It was a power much wider than the power conferred on the High Court or District Judge under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, the revision preferred by the tenant against the order of the District Magistrate granting permission to the landlord to sue for eviction was pending on the date of the commencement of the new Act before the Commissioner and it was subsequently transferred for decision to the District Judge, under Section 43 (2) (m) of the new Act. The landlord having availed of the remedy and the action so taken having concluded in an order by the District Magistrate granting permission, on the principle laid down in the case of Abbott v. Minister of Lands 1895 Appeal Cases 425 at p. 431, the proceeding pending before the Commissioner on the date of the commencement of the new Act would be deemed to be a legal proceeding in respect of a 'right accrued' within the meaning of Section 6 (c) and (e) of the U. P. General Clauses Act inchoate on the date of the commencement of the Act. The inchoate rights are but an incident to the statute and fall with its repeal. The Act would have expired by the end of September, 1972, but, before its life had run out, it was extinguished by statutory repeal on July 22, 1972 on which date the new Act came into force. Section 1 (4) of the Act reads thus: "It shall cease to have effect on the expiry of September 30, 1972, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof, and Section 6 of the United Provinces General Clauses Act, 1904, shall apply upon the expiry of the Act as if it had then been repealed by an Uttar Pradesh Act." Section 43 of the new Act repeals the old Act and also in subsection (2) we find a saving clause. Sub-section (2), in so far as it is relevant for our present purpose, provides: " (a) Any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the old Act shall stand transferred to the prescribed authority having jurisdiction and shall be deemed to be an application or proceeding under Section 21 of this Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act ........(m) a revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the Commissioner shall stand transferred to the District Judge, and his decision shall be final ......(q) the provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all appeals filed before the District Judge, under cl. (i), cl. (j) or cl. (k) and all revisions transferred to him under clause (m) or clause (p)". The question for consideration is what is the result brought about by these provisions in the context of the facts of the present, keeping -in mind at the same time Section 1 (4) of the old Act, adverted to in the above. The effect of the repeal of a statute, were neither a saving clause nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed Act in future and to divest the right to proceed under the statute which, except to proceedings past and closed is considered as if it had never existed (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Volume I, Para 2042). The U.P. General Clauses Act provides for the consequences of repeal under Section 6. Unless different intention appears, the repeal shall not (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed, or (e) affect any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. If a contrary intention appears from the repealing statute, that prevails. 'In any case where a repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the subject, the Court has to look to the provisions of the new Act to see whether they indicate a different intention.' These observations were made by the Supreme Court in Qudrat Ullali v. Municipal Board, Bareilly A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 396 at p. 402 delivering the opinion that the U.P. Act, 1947...... expressly attracts Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act I of 1904. The line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an inention to ascertain from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material -see State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84. The controversy thus narrows down to the short point as to whether the fact of the repeal of the Act being followed by enactment of a fresh legislation would make the provision of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act inapplicable to the present case. If the repealing enactment thus makes a special provision regarding pending or past transaction, it is this provision that will determine whether the liability arising under the repealed enactment survives or is extinguished. 'Where, however, the procedure is merely modified by the repeal of the remedy, cases pending are not halted by the repeal but proceed to their conclusion'-see footnote at page 538 in Sutherland Statutory Construction, Volume I. The cause of action having arisen in the present when the Act was in operation land the landlord having availed of the remedy culminating in an order of the District Magistrate, the appeal by the District Judge would, in my opinion, in absence of any thing to indicate to the contrary in the new Act, have to be decided as on the state of facts in existence on the date the revision application was made and not as the law and facts, as they existed during the pendency of the appeal. The general principle of law is that a suit must be then on the original cause of action, the principle does not only govern suits but also appeals. If the original relief becomes inappropriate or the subsequent legislation affects the rights of the parties, the court has to mould the relief accordingly, but this power of the court, as observed by the Supreme Court in their recent decision in Rameshwar v. Jot Ram A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 49 is not an unfettered one. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court, handed down the following opinion: "......It is basic to our procedural jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suit or institutes the legal proceedings................................, by reason of change in the circumstances, become inappropriate and not when the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment." We have, therefore, got to consider whether the cause of action, which formed the basis of action by the landlord in this case by an application made under Section 3(1) of the Act and which had resulted in an order granting permission, was obliterated by the new Act, or on account of changes made by the new Act the original relief claimed, in the facts of the instant, had to be moulded, varied or reshaped on the presence or absence of the conditions set forth under Section 21 of the new Act. Pausing here, and before I turn to the scheme underlying Section 43 (2), it may be mentioned that the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses (Amendment) Act, 1975 makes Section 6 of the Act applicable to a temporary U. P. Act (see Section 7) and the said provision has been made applicable to all U.P. Acts whether made before or after the commencement of the Amendment Act (see Section 4). This being so, the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to the old Act does no longer remain a subject of controversy. I need not go over again to the scheme underlying Section 43 (2) as it has been analysed in detail by Trivedi, J. without being meticulously accurate, it may be stated in general terms that the scheme underlying sub-section (2) appears to be that right of action, which were still inchoate and not perfected by an order of the District Magistrate, Munsif, Civil Judge or a Commissioner, as the case may be, were treated and required to be decided as matters arising and to be dealt with under the new Act. Wherever the Legislature intended otherwise, it made an express provision in that behalf, to instance, Clauses (d), (e), (s) and partly Clauses (f) and (g). Whereas, to proceedings concluded by an order passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner or proceedings taken in consequence of such orders it was the old Act that was made applicable except that in certain matters the forum for hearing was altered. And further, only the permission obtained under Section 3 of the old Act either before the Commencement of the Act or after its commencement and based on any ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 was made executable by Clause (rr), it being not necessary for the Prescribed Authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid. In cases where permission has been obtained on any other ground, the Legislature has disabled the landlord from invoking the aid of Section 21. The observations made by Yashodanandan, J. in Sibte Hasan's case (supra) are here in point. 'Since no remedy has been left open for enforcing permission for eviction of a tenant granted on grounds other than those contemplated by Section 21 (1) and (2), the revisional authority will refuse to grant permission if it was sought on grounds not covered by Section 21 of the Act on the principle that no Court or authority will pass an infructuoue and unenforceable order. If, however, the application under Sec. 3 of the old Act was on a ground covered by Section 21 of the Act, the revision under Section 43 (2) (m) will still be decided as a revision would have been by the Commissioner under Section 3 (2) of the old Act and in case permission is granted, the landlord has a right under Section 43 (2) (rr) to move the prescribed authority on the basis of the permission for an order under Section 21 of the Act' vide Sibte Hasan's case (supra). Non-enforcibility of the permission granted otherwise than on a ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21 is another exception contained in Clause (rr). Turning to the scheme of sub-section (2), it may further be noticed that clause (a) of sub-section (2) provides that an application under Section 3 of the old Act pending before the Magistrate on the date when the Act came into force shall stand transferred to the Prescribed Authority having jurisdiction and be deemed to be an application under Section 21 of the Act; it is not stated in Clause (m) that a revision transferred to the District Judge would be deemed a proceeding arising out of an application under Section 21 of the Act. The forum for hearing a pending revision has been changed; since the power conferred upon the Commissioner under Section 3 (3) was much wider than the power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the change is not substantial. There is nothing in Clause (m) or Clause (q) to demonstrate that the appeal has to be treated as one arising from an order made on an application under Section 21 of the new Act. If the Legislature intended to apply Section 21 with full force to a revision transferred to the District Judge, it would have made an express provision for the amendment of the application giving rise to the revision in conformity with the conditions enumerated in Section 21. Clause (h), to which, I shall advert later, does not, also, afford a procedure in that behalf. Various other considerations, in my respectful submission, constrain me to hold that the Legislature has not only kept alive the initial cause of action but intended a decision of the pending revision to be made in accordance with the old Act. Clause (rr), as I have noticed in the above, contemplates the enforcement of the permission obtained on any ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and the Prescribed Authority is bound to accept the finding in the permission proceedings as conclusive. Since clause (rr) relates to permissions obtained even after the commencement of the new Act, if the District Judge in case of pending revisions transferred to him were to decide the case as a proceeding under Section 21 of the new Act, it was not necessary for the Legislature to clothe the permission obtained on a permission obtained under Section 21 of the new Act. The Legislature has made the classification as regards executability of the order with respect to permissions obtained on any ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the classification has been made with a purpose namely, to bring the eviction of such tenants in harmony with the legislative scheme enshrined in Section 21. But that, in my opinion, does not warrant the conversion of a pending revision into an application under Section 21. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of welfare legislation Courts should adopt what is described as a beneficent rule of construction without losing sight of another cannon of interpretation that statute or for the matter of that even a particular section has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the Legislature -see workmen v. The Management A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1227. In these premises, I am in respectful agreement with the view of Mehrotra, J., in Indrajeet Singh v. The State of U. P. (supra) that revisional proceedings in the matter of permission continue to retain their character as such and continue to be governed by the provisions of the old Act. That was a case arising under Clause (o) of sub-section (2) of Section 43 but the reasoning adopted there is equally applicable here. Clause (h), having regard to the structure of sub-section, does not, in my opinion, envisage an amendment of the revisional pleading in consequence of the provisions of the new Act. When read along with preceding Clauses (a), (d), (f), (g), it seems to be applicable to a proceeding or suit of the aforesaid nature and to no other proceeding. Since we are dealing with two clauses of the sub-section, it is necessary that the two Clauses must be construed as a whole 'each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest'. The two Clauses must be read as parts of the (sic) whole and as being inter-dependent an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, to avoid a repugnancy. If repugnancy cannot be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail-see Madan Lal v. Changdeo Mills A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1543. In my opinion, there is no conflict or repugnancy between Clause (h) and the following Clause (m) if in keeping with the scheme of the said section and in accord with the Legislative intent we hold that an application under Section 3(1) of the old Act does not fall within the mischief of Clause (h). Clause (q) of sub-section (2) provides that the provisions of Section 18 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to all revisions transferred to the District Judge under Clause (m). Section 18 provides for an appeal against an order of allotment made under Section 16 (1) (a) and Section 19 as well as against an order of release made under Section 16 (1) (b) in respect of an accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. In relation to such appeal the provisions of Section 10 have been made applicable. Section 10, amongst other things, empowers the District Judge to assign an appeal for disposal to any Additional District Judge with power to recall it from any such officer or transfer it to any other such officer. By sub-section (2) the appellate authority is empowered to confirm, vary or rescind the order or remand the case to the District Magistrate for re-hearing with power to take additional evidence and, pending the decision, stay operation of the order in appeal on such terms if any, as it thinks fit. Upon a combined reading of Sections 10 and 18, it would appear that the Legislature, instead of providing afresh in Clause (m) as to how a revision transferred to the District Judge shall be heard and decided, applied the procedure in relation to appeals from orders under Section 16 or 19 without expressly stating that the appeal shall be heard as if it was an appeal from an order under Section 21 of the Act. We may also note that Section 22 separately provides for an appeal to the District Judge against an order made under Section 21. If, therefore, Clause (q) does not provide that the revision transferred to the District Judge will be heard under or in accordance with Sec. 21, I feel considerable hesitation in holding that the District Judge, hearing an appeal against an order granting permission on any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) would be required to start a de novo enquiry under Section 21. It may be pointed out that Clause (m) does not make use of expression 'and concluded as if this Act had not been passed' as it appears in some other clauses of the sub-section. But, as I have said above, the point for our consideration is whether the new Act indicates an intention which is inconsistent with the continuance of the initial cause of action and the right accrued to the landlord under the old Act and, in my opinion, this question has to be answered in the negative. Clauses (m) and (q) are not intended in any sense to confiscate the cause of action that arose in favour of the landlord under Section 3 (1) of the old Act. The right of a party is deter-mined by the law and the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted unless there is an intention to the contrary in the subsequent legislation. Sub-section (2) (m) only alters the forum for hearing of a pending revision without making any retrospective change in the law applicable at the stage of the initial cause of action. The provisions of Sec. 6(c) and (e) of the U.P. General Clauses Act are applicable to the case since there is no contrary intention appearing in the repealing statute. There is one more point which, in passing, may be mentioned here. The Legislature has not so far chosen to abrogate the rule laid down by this Court as far back as the year 1974. As observed by the Supreme Court in Raj Narain v. Sant Prasad A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1543. a decision of long standing, on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged their affairs, should not be lightly disturbed. The decision in Sibte Hasan's case (supra) is not a decision of long standing, but a contrary view if taken, from the law laid down earlier by this court, may have the effect of unsettling transactions passed and closed. For the above considerations, I am in respectful agreement with (supra) and Maliaraj Narain Khanna v. Additional District Judge, the view taken by this court in Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh Moradabad (supra) and I accordingly answer the reference holding that a revision pending before the Commissioner and transferred to the District Judge under Section 43 (2) (m) of the new Act, which had come into force during the pendency of the revision, should be decided under the provisions of Act III of 1947. BY THE COURT.-A revision relating to the grant of permission under Section 3 of U.P. Act III of 1947 pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) before the Commissioner and transferred to the District Judge on commencement of the new Act shall be decided in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down in Section 21 of the new Act and not in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947. The reference is answered accordingly. Let the record be laid before the Bench concerned. Question answered.