TARZAN HOSIERY PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition filed by Messrs. Tarzan Hosiery Private Limited of Kanpur against the Income-tax Officer of district I(B) Ward of Kanpur, has been referred to us for decision at the instance of Pathak J. on the ground that it raises questions of great importance. The facts of the case are as follows : On June 22, 1964, the petitioner received a notice dated April 8, 1964, from the respondent under section 139(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requiring a return of total income for the assessment year 1964-65, to be filed by July 25, 1964. On July 24, 1964, the petitioner applied for extension of time up to August 30, 1964, but this was refused by the respondent, with the result that the petitioner was unable to file the return within the time allowed and became liable for the payment of interest and to the imposition of penalty.

(2.) THE petitioners contention is that, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to file its return of income up to September 30, 1964, and that the respondent had no right to demand a return to be filed earlier under sub-section (2) of the section.

(3.) ON a plain reading of the two sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 139, we find no force in the argument that sub-section (2) can only operate after the period prescribed by sub-section (1) is over. The two sub-sections in fact deal with two distinct and different aspects of the procedure for submitting returns : sub-section (1) imposes an obligation on all persons whose income is assessable to tax to furnish a return within a certain specified time without being asked to do so; while sub-section (2) confers a power on the income-tax authorities to demand a return at any time before the expiry of the assessment year. We find no incompatibility or repugnance between these two provisions and we see no reason why both of them should not operate simultaneously to their full extent. Reading the two sub-sections harmoniously together, we are of opinion that the intention of the section is that all persons liable to assessment should be under an obligation to furnish a return of income within the time prescribed by sub-section (1) (i.e., either by 30th of June or by 30th of September of the assessment year), provided they have not already been asked by the Income-tax Officer to furnish a return by means of a notice under sub-section (2). There is nothing in the wording of these two sub-sections themselves that would lead to the inference that sub-section (2) was not meant to operate during the period prescribed for the submission of the return under sub-section (1).