(1.) We have heard at some length learned Counsel for the Appellant in this special appeal. The only point that calls for determination in the appeal is as to whether in the circumstances of the particular case as noticed in the judgment of the learned single Judge the order of the R.T.A. dated 19th April 1965 is to be deemed to have been passed on 6th May 1965 on which date Respondent No. 1 was given intimation about it by the R.T.A. As pointed out by the learned single Judge it was conceded by the Secretary, RTA, in his comments submitted to the State Transport Authority Respondent No. 2 that on 19th April 1965 after the particular item namely item No. 18 -C was heard it was announced that the judgment war reserved. That being so, it is obvious that the order, which, as it appears from the order itself, came to be announced on that very date, namely 19th April 1965, was passed without any notice to Respondent No. 1 who had earlier been given to understand that the judgment was reserved and was consequently to be passed on a date to be notified to him. As appears from the record there was no intimation to Respondent No. 1 of this order till letter dated 6th May, 1965 was addressed to Respondent No. 1 informing him about the order and requiring him not to ply the bus. In these circumstances no exception can be taken in our opinion to the view of the learned single Judge that even though the order may have been passed on 19th April 1965 it would be deemed to have been passed on 6th May 1965 for the purposes of computing limitation for revision to be filed by Respondent No. 1. Once a judgment is reserved it cannot be pronounced without fixing a date of its pronouncement and giving a notice of that date to the parties concerned. If it is subsequently pronounced without complying with that requirement, may be on the very date on which it was earlier reserved, it can have no effect in the eye of law till notice of it is given to the parties affected by it. In that view of the matter even though it may be correct to say that limitation under Sec. 64 -A of the Motor Vehicles Act is to be competed from the date of the order and not from the date of the knowledge of the order, we see no fault in the finding recorded by the learned single Judge that in the peculiar circumstances of the present case the date of the order will be deemed to be 6th May 1965 and not 19th April 1965. No other point arises in the Special Appeal. We see no substance in it and dismiss it summarily.