MOHAMMAD RAIHAN Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner Mohammad Raihan had applied for a stage carriage permit which was rejected by the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. An appeal was filed to the State Transport Authority and the decision of the Regional Transport Authority was confirmed by the State Transport Authority. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution was thereafter filed in this Court for a writ of certiorari quashing the order o the Regional Transport Authority refusing the stage carriage permit to the petitioner and also for a mandamus commanding the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit in favour of the applicant. By my order dated 25-2-1955, the petition was allowed, the order of the Regional Transport Authority was quashed and the Regional Transport Authority was directed to Consider the application of the petitioner for the grant of a permit and it was directed further not to reject it on the ground that there was adequate transport service on the route. The application remained pending for some time and no orders were passed by the Regional Transport Authority. Thereafter an application was made on 25-7-1955 to this Court praying that a direction be issued to the Regional Transport Authority to carry out the orders and directions of this Court. The Standing Counsel however, took time to take the necessary instructions from his client. On a subsequent date, the Standing Counsel gave an undertaking that the application would be disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority by 21-10-1955. Thereafter on 18-10-1955, the Regional Transport Authority rejected again the petitioner's application for a permit and an application was made to this Court praying that the reliefs claimed in the Misc. Appln. made on 25-7-1955, which was numbered as 1127 of 1955 (All) (A) be allowed to be amended. By amendment it was prayed that the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 18-10-1955 refusing the permit to the petitioner be quashed and further a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the opposite party to grant a permit to the petitioner. Notice was issued to the opposite parties, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut and the Standing Counsel took time to file a counter-affidavit. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the State and the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority in its order elated 18-10-1955 has stated that as another writ petition filed by Ved Singh Sohan Vir Singh, which was of similar nature, was pending before the Luck-now Bench, the consideration of the petitioner's application was postponed till the final decision in that petition. The petition before the Lucknow Bench was disposed of on 2-7-1955 and thereafter the present application was considered. The Regional Transport Authority further remarked that there were two vacancies on the route and two buses on temporary permits were plying against those vacancies. As the applicant was only a driver and not even a recently displaced operator, his application could not be granted. It was observed by the Regional Transport Authority that there were many others who were recently displaced operators and had more experience and claim than the applicant. It was, therefore, not in the public interest to grant a permit to the applicant who was a fresh comer as against those who were old operators and had a longer standing and experience. As there were no suitable applicants the application was rejected. A counter-affidavit has been filed in which it is stated that the Regional Transport Authority, after consideration, has rejected the application of the petitioner on merits and has exercised its discretion bona fide. The main contention raised by the petitioner in the present petition is that the application of the petitioner has been rejected on grounds which are extraneous to the considerations under the Act. Section 47, Motor Vehicles Act provides:

(2.) It was contended by the State Counsel that an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner inasmuch as he could have gone up in appeal to the State Transport Authority against the order of the Regional Transport . Authority and in these circumstances this Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner. Ordinarily this Court will not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution if another alternative remedy is available but, in the circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the alternative remedy would have been adequate. The petitioner's application had already been rejected once on the ground that there was no vacancy. The order of the Appellate Authority was also set aside by this Court. In spite of the directions issued by this Court, the application remained pending for some time and ultimately it has again been rejected on a ground which is beyond the provisions of Section 47. In those circumstances if the petitioner is allowed to wait till the decision of the Appellate Authority, he may be considerably prejudiced and it cannot be said that the alternative remedy was equally adequate.

(3.) The next question then to be considered is what is the relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the circumstances of the case. It has been strongly contended by the Standing Counsel that this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is not acting as an appellate court and it cannot substitute its order for the order of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit. The only relief -which can be granted by this Court is to set aside the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority and then to leave the matter to the Regional Transport Authority to deal with the application in accordance with law. The powers granted to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide. Article 226 of the Constitution gives power to this Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. The power is not confined to the issue of writs mentioned therein but any order or direction can be issued under this Article for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for the enforcement of any other right. In suitable cases, therefore, it cannot be said that this Court cannot issue a direction to the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit. Apart from Article 226 of the Constitution after having quashed the order of the Regional Transport Authority under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is open to this Court to issue a direction under Article 227 of the Constitution directing the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit to the petitioner. In the case of -- 'Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque', 1955 SC 233 ((S) AIR V 42) (D), it was observed by the Supreme Court at page 243 as follows :