(1.) The applicant in the case wa3 the defendant in the Court below in a suit for possession under S. D, Specific Relief Act. It has been found as a fact that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendant on 6th July 1944, without his consent and otherwise than in due coarse of law. On these findings the suit has been decreed by the Court below. Before the institution of the suit and after dispossession, which took place on 6th July 1941, proceedings under Section 115, Criminal P. C, were started on a police report. These proceedings terminated on 21st December 1944, when it was found by the criminal Court that the defendant was in possession on the date of the preliminary order under Section 146, Criminal P. 0., and on that ground his possession over the property was to be maintained be long as he was not evicted therefrom by due process of law.
(2.) The contention of the learned Counsel before me is that the due process of law mentioned in Section 145, Criminal P. C, should be confined to a civil suit based upon title and does not include a proceeding under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. This contention was raised in the Court below but was not pressed and as such was abandoned. I am loath to entertain a revision on a ground which had been abandoned in the Court below.
(3.) Quite apart from this fact there seems to be no merit in the contention that has been put forward in this Court. A cause of action, entitling the plaintiff to institute a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act, arose on 6th July 1944, when he was dispossessed by the defendant. It is not possible to accept the contention that the plaintiff was deprived of the right of seeking a remedy under Section 9, Specific Relief Act on account of the proceedings having been instituted under Section 145, Criminal P. 0., before the limitation for instituting a suit under Section 9, Specific Relief Act had expired.