STATE OF U.P. Vs. SMT. ARCHANA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A writ petition preferred by the first to eighth respondents has come to be allowed by a learned Single Judge in terms of the judgment and order dated 4 August, 2015. The learned Single Judge in terms of the judgment impugned before us has proceeded to quash the order passed by the Basic Education Officer on 11 October, 2007 refusing to accord approval to the appointment of the first to eighth respondents. The learned Single Judge has remanded the proceedings to the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) with directions to pass consequential orders for release of salary of the first to eighth respondents within a period of three months. The State is in appeal.

(2.) As we read the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, we find that the writ petition came to be allowed following the judgment rendered by the Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others (Writ Petition No. 41838 of 2007). The learned Single Judge proceeded in the matter after taking on record a statement of the Additional Chief Standing Counsel made upon instructions to the effect that the first to eighth respondents were still working in the institution and that their claim was liable to be considered in light of the judgment rendered by the Court in Ashok Kumar Gupta. It is in the aforesaid background that it was vehemently contended initially by the learned counsel for the respondents that the instant appeal would not be maintainable being directed against a judgment rendered on concession. The above submission has been countered by the learned Standing Counsel who would submit that no concession could have formed the basis of the learned Single Judge proceeding to allow the writ petition without referring to the specific stand of the State as evidenced from the averments made in the counter affidavit filed in the writ proceedings. It has been submitted that in the counter affidavit, it was the specific stand of the appellants that the orders of approval dated 30 March, 1990 was a forged and fabricated document and that no record of it having ever been dispatched from the office of the District Basic Education Officer existed. The learned Standing Counsel submits therefore that there was no evidence of the first to eighth respondents having been validly appointed in the institution prior to it being taken on the grant-in-aid list and its upgradation. It was further submitted that the statement made by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel before the learned Single Judge has been clearly misinterpreted inasmuch as the concession, if at all it could be described as one, was only to the extent that the absence of a dispatch number could not form the basis for presuming that the order of approval was forged. It was further submitted that a concession made contrary to law or the pleadings of parties would not bind the appellants.

(3.) We find that the counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge carried specific averments to the effect that the order of approval dated 30 March, 1990 was a forged and fabricated document. The order impugned in the writ proceedings dated 26 July, 2012 also noted that there was no evidence of the approval order having been dispatched from the office of the District Basic Education Officer. We are constrained to observe that the statement made by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel before the learned Single Judge was therefore not only inaccurate but also at variance with the stand of the appellants as evidenced from the pleadings placed before the learned Single Judge. We may further note that the judgment in Ashok Kumar Gupta proceeded on the basis of a significant distinguishing feature. In the said case, the approval letter existed on the record of the authorities. What was however contended before the Court in the said case, was that the said order did not carry a dispatch number. It was in the above light that the Court proceeded to hold that the absence of a dispatch number on an order of approval which admittedly existed on record could not give rise to a presumption that it was forged. The statement of the Additional Chief Standing Counsel as taken on record by the learned Single Judge was therefore not only contrary to the pleas taken in the counter affidavit but also perhaps made without the degree of circumspection and responsibility which should have preceded the statement so being made before the learned Single Judge. This, additionally because the distinguishing factual backdrop in which Ashok Kumar Gupta came to be rendered was not borne in mind. We, however and since the statement itself came to be made upon instructions, refrain from observing anything further leaving the appellants only with a note of caution that a Court generally looks no further when a solemn statement is made before it by counsel and proceeds in the matter reposing its trust upon the position of the counsel as being first and foremost an officer of the Court. It therefore necessarily follows that such statements must be made with a great degree of responsibility and upon due circumspection.